When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation

There has recently been a resurgence of philosophical and scientific interest in the foundations of self-consciousness, with particular focus on its altered, anomalous forms. This paper looks at the altered forms of self-awareness in Depersonalization Disorder (DPD), a condition in which people feel detached from their self, their body and the world (Derealisation). Building upon the phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, we argue that DPD may alter the transparency of basic embodied forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness, as well as the capacity to flexibly modulate and switch between the reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. Empirical evidence will be invoked in support of the idea that impaired processing of bodily signals is characteristic of the condition. We provide first-hand subjective reports describing the experience of self-detachment or fracture between an observing and an observed self. This split is compared with similar self-detachment phenomena reported in certain Buddhist-derived meditative practices. We suggest that these alterations and changes may reveal the underlying and tacit transparency that characterises the embodied and basic pre-reflective forms of self-consciousness, in the same way that a crack in a transparent glass may indicate the presence of an unnoticed window

Hanging in there: Prenatal origins of antigravity homeostasis in humans

All life on Earth must find a way to manage the continuous perturbation of gravity. From birth, and even before, humans exhibit effortful antigravity work to enact bodily, postural and behavioural form despite gravity. Indeed, observable antigravity behaviour is a standard diagnostic indicator of neonatal sensorimotor health. Antigravity behaviour has been investigated extensively in its biomechanical details. Yet its motivational structure has not been a focus of research. What drives the human body to expend energy on this effortful behaviour? It is widely understood that thermic homeostasis in humans is organised around conserving core body temperature at a set-point of 36.5-37.5oC. There is currently no equivalent concept of a general homeostatic set-point driving antigravity effort. In this theoretical paper, we aim to establish such a concept. We make the case that the core developmental set-point for human antigravity homeostasis is neutral buoyancy (gravity and buoyant force are balanced), which is afforded to the foetus by its approximately equi-dense amniotic fluid medium in utero. We argue that postnatally, the general task of human antigravity balance is to emulate the conditions of neutral buoyancy, based upon prenatal experience thereof. Our aim in this paper is to sketch a high-level outline of a novel characterisation of antigravity balance as conservative homeostasis, and lay out some implications and predictions of this model, with the intention of spurring wider research and discussion on this hitherto little explored topic. Keywords: antigravity, posture, homeostasis, prenatal, buoyancy, density, fetus, foetusComment: 19 pages (including references) Zero figure

The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life

The idea that our perceptions in the here and now are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this paper we look at how perceptual experiences get off the ground from the outset, in utero. One basic yet overlooked aspect of current PP approaches is that human organisms first develop within another human body. Crucially, while not all humans will have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the experience of being carried and growing within another person's body is universal. Specifically, we focus on the development of minimal selfhood in utero as a process co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, and highlight their close relationship. We conclude with some implications on several critical questions fuelling current debates on the nature of conscious experiences, minimal self and social cognition

Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks

Several studies (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007) demonstrated that children younger than 3years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others' actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called "Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner (2012) recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the "cognitive gap”, i.e. to provide us with a convincing account of how low-level sensorimotor practices transform into higher-order representational skills. This paper defends, against De Bruin and Kästner, an enactive response to the Developmental Paradox. I argue that 3-year olds' failure to verbally report their false-belief understanding does not arise from stronger decoupling demands. Rather, they fail because the elicited response false-belief trials involve representational decoupling tout court and what is more, under pressure

I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of 'predicting precision' and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that "I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception". We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that 'another agent' is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the 'other agent' is 'me' (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation

Sensorimotor foundations of self-consciousness in utero

We review recent work that examines the genesis of a prereflective self-consciousness in utero in humans. We focus on observable behaviours that suggest a state of anticipatory perceptual awareness evident in the foetal period and the foetus’ first expression of agency through self-generative engagement with it. This predictive, anticipatory awareness is first evident in the prospective sensorimotor organisation of bodily movements of the second-trimester foetus, revealing an early adaptive awareness and agency that establishes the foundation for additional forms of abstract, reflective, and conceptually backed conscious experience in adults. Advanced understanding of these early sensorimotor foundations of psychological development and health may afford a better understanding of adult human consciousness, the nature of its early ontogeny, and its particular expression mediated by the integrative nervous system

When the window cracks: transparency and the fractured self in depersonalisation

There has recently been a resurgence of philosophical and scientific interest in the foundations of self-consciousness, with particular focus on its altered, anomalous forms. This paper looks at the altered forms of self-awareness in Depersonalization Disorder (DPD), a condition in which people feel detached from their self, their body and the world (Derealisation). Building upon the phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, we argue that DPD may alter the transparency of basic embodied forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness, as well as the capacity to flexibly modulate and switch between the reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. Empirical evidence will be invoked in support of the idea that impaired processing of bodily signals is characteristic of the condition. We provide first-hand subjective reports describing the experience of self-detachment or fracture between an observing and an observed self. This split is compared with similar self-detachment phenomena reported in certain Buddhist-derived meditative practices. We suggest that these alterations and changes may reveal the underlying and tacit transparency that characterises the embodied and basic pre-reflective forms of self-consciousness, in the same way that a crack in a transparent glass may indicate the presence of an unnoticed window