Determinants of banks' engagement in loan securitization

This paper provides new insights into the nature of loan securitization. We analyze the use of collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions by European banks from 1997 to 2004 andtry to identify the influence that various firm-specific and macroeconomic factors may have on an institution's securitization decision. We find that not only regulatory capital arbitrage under Basel I has been driving the market. Rather, our results suggest that loan securitization is an appropriate funding tool for banks with high risk and low liquidity. It may also have been used by commercial banks to indirectly access investment-bank activities and the associated gains

Network coding for undirected information exchange

We consider the information exchange problem where each in a set of terminals transmits information to all other terminals in the set, over an undirected network. We show that the design of only a single network code for multicasting is sufficient to achieve an arbitrary point in the achievable rate region. We also provide an alternative proof for the set of achievable rate tuples

Determinants of banks' engagement in loan securitization

This paper provides new insights into the use of loan securitization. We analyze collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions by European banks from 1997 to 2004 and try to identify the influence that various firm-specific and macroeconomic factors may have on an institution's securitization decision. Our results suggest that loan securitization is an appropriate funding tool for banks with high risk and low liquidity. It may also have been used by commercial banks to indirectly access investment-bank activities and the associated gains. Regulatory capital arbitrage under Basel I does not seem to have driven the market. --Securitization,credit risk transfer,collateralized loan obligations

Critical random graphs : limiting constructions and distributional properties

We consider the Erdos-Renyi random graph G(n, p) inside the critical window, where p = 1/n + lambda n(-4/3) for some lambda is an element of R. We proved in Addario-Berry et al. [2009+] that considering the connected components of G(n, p) as a sequence of metric spaces with the graph distance rescaled by n(-1/3) and letting n -> infinity yields a non-trivial sequence of limit metric spaces C = (C-1, C-2,...). These limit metric spaces can be constructed from certain random real trees with vertex-identifications. For a single such metric space, we give here two equivalent constructions, both of which are in terms of more standard probabilistic objects. The first is a global construction using Dirichlet random variables and Aldous' Brownian continuum random tree. The second is a recursive construction from an inhomogeneous Poisson point process on R+. These constructions allow us to characterize the distributions of the masses and lengths in the constituent parts of a limit component when it is decomposed according to its cycle structure. In particular, this strengthens results of Luczak et al. [1994] by providing precise distributional convergence for the lengths of paths between kernel vertices and the length of a shortest cycle, within any fixed limit component

Determinants of European banks' engagement in loan securitization

We analyze collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions by European banks (1997 - 2004), trying to identify firm-specific and macroeconomic factors influencing an institution's securitization decision. CLO issuance seems to be an appropriate funding tool for large banks with high risk and low liquidity. However, risk transfer turns out to be limited in the extremes. Controlling for fixed effects, we find that fixed costs of securitization are surmountable also for smaller institutions. Interestingly, commercial banks seem to use loan securitization to access capital-market based businesses and the associated fee income. Regulatory capital arbitrage does not appear to have driven the market. -- Trotz des rasanten Wachstums des Marktes für Kreditrisikotransfer sind die Motive der Banken für die Verbriefung von Kreditportfolios noch nicht vollständig geklärt. Kreditverbriefungen führen zwar zu höherer Liquidität, einer Reduktion von Kredit- und Zinsrisiken, einer Steigerung von Provisionseinkommen, möglicherweise auch einer Verbesserung der Kapitalstruktur, jedoch entscheiden sich einige Banken trotzdem gegen eine Strukturierung und Weiterreichung ihrer Kreditportfolios. Unter den Nachteilen der Verbriefung werden unter anderem die relativ hohen fixen Kosten der erstmaligen Errichtung einer Verbriefungsstruktur sowie eventuelle Steuernachteile von nicht auf der Bilanz gehaltenen Krediten genannt. Weiterhin ermöglicht das neue Basel-II Regelwerk keine ?Arbitrage regulatorischen Eigenkapitals? via Kreditverbriefung mehr, anders als die weniger risikosensitive Eigenkapitalunterlegung unter den alten Basel-Richtlinien. Unsere Studie analysiert ?Collateralized Loan Obligation? (CLO) Transaktionen von Europäischen Banken in den Jahren 1997-2004. Ziel ist es, Faktoren zu isolieren, die die Entscheidung einer Bank, Kredite zu verbriefen, beeinflusst haben. Während wir einen Einfluss regulatorischer Arbitrage nicht vollkommen ausschließen können, zeigt unsere Studie, dass die wesentlichen Bestimmungsfaktoren vielmehr individuelle Faktoren der Banken sind. So ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass eine Bank Kredite verbrieft, umso höher, je größer die Bank, je geringer ihre Liquidität und je höher ihr erwartetes Kreditrisiko ist. Kreditverbriefungen werden offensichtlich als Möglichkeit des Kreditrisikotransfers genutzt. Allerdings zeigt sich, dass Banken mit dem höchsten Kreditrisiko ihre Verbriefungsaktivitäten mit zunehmendem Risiko einstellen, so dass die Risikotransferfunktion nur begrenzt zu nutzen zu sein scheint. Für am Aktienmarkt notierte Banken treffen obige Aussagen noch stärker zu. Interessanterweise zeigt sich hier sogar ein ?negativer? regulatorischer Arbitrageeffekt : Banken mit niedrigem regulatorischem Eigenkapital verbriefen weniger Kredite als Banken mit höherem Eigenkapital. Die neuen Eigenkapitalrichtlinien nach Basel II sollten daher das zukünftige Wachstum des Kreditrisikotransfermarktes nicht beeinträchtigen. Bemerkenswerterweise scheint auch die Bankengröße eine weniger wichtige Rolle zu spielen als zunächst gedacht. Auch kleinere Banken sind somit in der Lage, die mit einer Kreditverbriefung verbundenen Fixkosten zu tragen. Es ist zu vermuten, dass gerade traditionelle Kreditbanken die Verbriefung von Kreditportfolios unter anderem auch nutzen, um indirekt dem ?investment-banking? verwandte Geschäftsbereiche und die entsprechenden Provisionseinkommen zu erschließen.Securitization,credit risk transfer,collateralized loan obligations

Abstracting Fairness: Oracles, Metrics, and Interpretability

It is well understood that classification algorithms, for example, for deciding on loan applications, cannot be evaluated for fairness without taking context into account. We examine what can be learned from a fairness oracle equipped with an underlying understanding of ``true'' fairness. The oracle takes as input a (context, classifier) pair satisfying an arbitrary fairness definition, and accepts or rejects the pair according to whether the classifier satisfies the underlying fairness truth. Our principal conceptual result is an extraction procedure that learns the underlying truth; moreover, the procedure can learn an approximation to this truth given access to a weak form of the oracle. Since every ``truly fair'' classifier induces a coarse metric, in which those receiving the same decision are at distance zero from one another and those receiving different decisions are at distance one, this extraction process provides the basis for ensuring a rough form of metric fairness, also known as individual fairness. Our principal technical result is a higher fidelity extractor under a mild technical constraint on the weak oracle's conception of fairness. Our framework permits the scenario in which many classifiers, with differing outcomes, may all be considered fair. Our results have implications for interpretablity -- a highly desired but poorly defined property of classification systems that endeavors to permit a human arbiter to reject classifiers deemed to be ``unfair'' or illegitimately derived.Comment: 17 pages, 1 figur

Male Partners' Involvement Towards Prenatal Screening and Diagnostic Testing for Down Syndrome

Introduction: Now, male partners' involvement in prenatal screening and diagnostic testing for Down syndrome is becoming increasingly recognized as well to ensure that parents are well informed of the risks and benefits of screening. The aim of study was to understand the degree of male partners' involvement during pregnancy in Singapore population. Methods: A cross-sectional survey of male partners' attending prenatal counseling was performed. The instrument used to measure the level of involvement is a self-assessment questionnaire that identifies the role of male partners with a Likert scale. Descriptive statistics was used to analyze data gained. Result: A total of 107 participants completed the questionnaire. Sixty-seven percent of male partners were found to have a highlevel of involvement while 32.7% was found to have a medium level of involvement. Most of them stated that women can pursue prenatal testing without their permission. Male partners found it more important for them to accompany their spouse to amniocentesis or CVS than to the Down syndrome screening test. When participants were asked about how much information about Down syndrome they sought prior to the appointment, how much discussion they had with their spouse about Down syndrome testing, and about whether they or their spouse should be the first person to receive test results, most stated that they were undecided. Conclusion: These results revealed that male partners were very well involved in the Down syndrome testing during pregnancy and future studies should assess possible underlying factors that influence male partners' involvement