Credibility and Agency Termination under Parliamentarism

We investigate the life span and risk of termination of 723 arm’s length agencies in the United Kingdom between 1985 and 2008, an under investigated question in parliamentary systems. We hypothesize that termination risk depends on three groups of factors: (1) factors relating to the rationales for initial delegation of responsibility to the arm’s length agency; (2) factors relating to the political and economic position of the government; and (3) factors relating to the institutional form of the agency. We find that agencies intended to generate credible commitments in regulation are less likely than others to be terminated in any given year. Agencies operating under right-wing governments and under heavily indebted governments are more likely to be terminated, although left-wing governments are more sensitive to the effects of debt. Agencies structured as executive non-departmental public bodies and non-ministerial departments are also longer lived than others. Contrary to expectations about arm’s length agencies in parliamentary systems with single-party government, partisan change does not affect the risk of termination

Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies

Regulation by independent agencies, rather than ministries, is believed to result in better policy outcomes. Yet this belief requires one to accept a complex causal chain leading from formal independence to actual independence from politics, to policy decisions and, ultimately, to policy outcomes. In this study, we analyze the link between the formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies in Western Europe. New data on the appointment of chief executives of these agencies is used to create a proxy for the actual independence of agencies from politics. The analysis demonstrates that formal independence is an important determinant of actual independence, but the rule of law and the number of veto players matter as well

The 2015 election has been described as the most disproportional ever – but it wasn’t disproportional everywhere

Disproportionality is the degree of mismatch between parties’ shares of votes and their shares of seats, with measures of disproportionality usually calculated for national elections. This year’s general election was criticised by many as the least proportional ever. Chris Hanretty acknowledges that on some measures, this is a valid claim, but demonstrates that calculating a measure for local disproportionality gives a better sense of how the mismatch varied across England, Scotland and Wales

Reconciling to other forecasts

The assumptions behind various election forecasting models lead to different central predictions for the outcome on May 7th. In this post, Chris Hanretty, one of the team at electionforecast.co.uk, evaluates two assumptions that differ across three of the main academic forecasting projects for the election in 2015

“Horse-race” coverage of elections is most common in polarised party systems in close electoral contests

What causes ‘horse-race’ coverage of electoral contests? Drawing on data from 160 different European print and broadcast outlets in 27 different countries at three different points in time, Chris Hanretty finds that this kind of electoral coverage is most frequent in polarised party systems with close electoral contests, and in large markets with professional journalists – findings which challenge the traditional view of horse-race journalism as a ‘low-quality’ form of news

The pork barrel politics of the towns fund: funding decisions were driven by party-political considerations, not by need

The Towns Fund is a scheme designed to support towns across England, particularly those with high levels of income deprivation. Chris Hanretty takes a look at the selection of towns invited to bid for funding under the scheme. He finds that the funding decisions were driven by party-political considerations, not by need

Comparing Strategies for Estimating Constituency Opinion from National Survey Samples

Political scientists interested in estimating how public opinion varies by constituency have developed several strategies for supplementing limited constituency survey data with additional sources of information. We present two evaluation studies in the previously unexamined context of British constituency-level opinion: an external validation study of party vote share in the 2010 general election and a cross-validation of opinion toward the European Union. We find that most of the gains over direct estimation come from the inclusion of constituency-level predictors, which are also the easiest source of additional information to incorporate. Individual-level predictors combined with post-stratification particularly improve estimates from unrepresentative samples, and geographic local smoothing can compensate for weak constituency-level predictors. We argue that these findings are likely to be representative of applications of these methods where the number of constituencies is large

Legislators' accountability for issue stances:evidence from Australia's Marriage Law Postal Survey

For legislators to be held accountable for their stances voters need to sanction unpopular positions. However, because of strong party discipline it is difficult to identify the effects of individual MPs’ stances rather than the stance of their party, because MPs almost always have the same stance as their party. Researchers must therefore study issues which cut across parties or where parties allowed representatives to follow their conscience. Same-sex marriage is one such issue. We use data from the 2017 marriage law survey and subsequent 2019 federal election results to test whether MPs whose referendum positions were out-of-step with their district faced electoral sanction. We find that a standard deviation increase in congruence at the level of the polling place catchment area yields a statistically and substantively insignificant change in vote share of -0.1 percentage points. The results question the degree to which electors control their representatives beyond voting for a party label

Patronising lawyers? Homophily and same-sex litigation teams before the UK Supreme Court

In this paper, we investigate patterns of team formation amongst barristers who appeared before the UK Supreme Court between October 2009 and August 2015. We show that there is evidence of considerable gender homophily in the formation of teams of barristers appearing before the UK Supreme Court. Same-sex teams of barristers are over-represented compared to the number we would expect if barristers paired up randomly. We also show that this gender homophily remains when we allow for the possibility that barristers pair up randomly within their chambers, or within their area of law. As such, the formation of teams of barristers in the Supreme Court is governed by practices and preferences which make same-sex legal teams more likely than they would be if team formation simply involved a gender-blind draw from a pool of lawyers. Barristers appearing before the Supreme Court prefer, for whatever reason, to work with other barristers of the same sex. We set out reasons why homophily in team formation is undesirable and discuss the routes through which different remedies might operate

The Decisions and Ideal Points of British Law Lords

Policy-sensitive models of judicial behaviour, whether attitudinal or strategic, have largely passed Britain by. This article argues that this neglect has been benign, because explanations of judicial decisions in terms of the positions of individual judges fare poorly in the British case. To support this argument, the non-unanimous opinions of British Law Lords between 1969 and 2009 are analysed. A hierarchical item-response model of individual judges’ votes is estimated in order to identify judges’ locations along a one-dimensional policy space. Such a model is found to be no better than a null model that predicts that every judge will vote with the majority with the same probability. Locations generated by the model do not represent judges’ political attitudes, only their propensity to dissent. Consequently, judges’ individual votes should not be used to describe them in political terms