Secure and Efficient Initialization and Authentication Protocols for SHIELD

With the globalization of semiconductor production, out-sourcing IC fabrication has become a trend in various aspects. This, however, introduces serious threats from the entire untrusted supply chain. To combat these threats, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) proposed in 2014 the SHIELD (Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense) program to design a secure hardware root-of-trust, called dielet, to be inserted into the host package of legitimately produced ICs. Dielets are RF powered and communicate with the outside world through their RF antennas. They have sensors which allow them to passively (without the need for power) record malicious events which can later be read out during an authentication protocol between the dielet and server with a smartphone as intermediary. This paper introduces a general framework for the initialization and authentication protocols in SHIELD with different adversarial models based on formally-defined security games. We introduce a ``try-and-check\u27\u27 attack against DARPA\u27s example authentication protocol in their call for SHIELD proposals which nullifies the effectiveness of SHIELD\u27s main goal of being able to detect and trace adversarial activities with significant probability. We introduce the first concrete initialization protocol and, compared to DARPA\u27s example authentication protocol, introduce an improved authentication protocol which resists the try-and-check attack. The area overhead of our authentication and initialization protocols together is only 64-bit NVM, one 8-bit counter and a TRNG based on a single SRAM-cell together with corresponding control logic. Our findings and rigorous analysis are of utmost importance for the teams which received DARPA\u27s funding for implementing SHIELD

A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Physical Unclonable Function Interfaces and its Relation to the Random Oracle Model

Analysis of advanced Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) applications and protocols rely on assuming that a PUF behaves like a random oracle, that is, upon receiving a challenge, a uniform random response with replacement is selected, measurement noise is added, and the resulting response is returned. In order to justify such an assumption, we need to rely on digital interface computation that to some extent remains confidential -- otherwise, information about PUF challenge response pairs leak with which the adversary can train a prediction model for the PUF. We introduce a theoretical framework that allows the adversary to have a prediction model (with a typical accuracy of 75% for predicting response bits for state-of-the-art silicon PUF designs). We do not require any confidential digital computing or digital secrets while we can still prove rigorous statements about the bit security of a system that interfaces with the PUF. In particular, we prove the bit security of a PUF-based random oracle construction; this merges the PUF framework with fuzzy extractors.</p

HMAKE: Legacy-Compliant Multi-factor Authenticated Key Exchange from Historical Data

In this paper, we introduce two lightweight historical data based multi-factor authenticated key exchange (HMAKE) protocols in the random oracle model. Our HMAKE protocols use a symmetric secret key, as their first authentication factor, together with their second authentication factor, historical data exchanged between the two parties in the past, and the third authentication factor, a set of secret tags associated with the historical data, to establish a secure communication channel between the client and the server. A remarkable security feature of HMAKE is bounded historical tag leakage resilience, which means that (informally speaking) if a small portion of the secret tags is leaked to an adversary, it will not affect the security of one HMAKE protocol with an overwhelming probability. Our first HMAKE protocol can provide static bounded leakage resilience, meaning that the secret tags are leaked at the beginning of the security game. To enhance its security, our second HMAKE protocol makes use of our first protocol as a compiler to transform any passively secure two-message key exchange protocol to an actively secure HMAKE protocol with perfect forward secrecy, and therefore it can be secure even if the historical tags are compromised adaptively by an attacker. In addition to the strong security properties we achieved, our protocols can potentially have great impacts in practice: they are efficient in computation, and they are compatible with legacy devices in cyber-physical systems

PwoP: Intrusion-Tolerant and Privacy-Preserving Sensor Fusion

We design and implement, PwoP, an efficient and scalable system for intrusion-tolerant and privacy-preserving multi-sensor fusion. PwoP develops and unifies techniques from dependable distributed systems and modern cryptography, and in contrast to prior works, can 1) provably defend against pollution attacks where some malicious sensors lie about their values to sway the final result, and 2) perform within the computation and bandwidth limitations of cyber-physical systems. PwoP is flexible and extensible, covering a variety of application scenarios. We demonstrate the practicality of our system using Raspberry Pi Zero W, and we show that PwoP is efficient in both failure-free and failure scenarios

PLayPUF: Programmable Logically Erasable PUFs for Forward and Backward Secure Key Management

A silicon Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a hardware security primitive which implements a unique and unclonable function on a chip which, given a challenge as input, computes a response by measuring and leveraging (semiconductor process) manufacturing variations which differ from PUF to PUF. In this paper, we observe that by equipping a PUF with a small, constant-sized, tamper-resistant state, whose content cannot be modified, but can be read by adversaries, new and powerful cryptographic applications of PUFs become feasible. In particular, we show a new hardware concept which we call a Programmable Logically erasable PUF (PLayPUF). Its distinctive feature is that it allows the selective erasure of single challenge-response pairs (CRPs) without altering any other PUF-CRPs. The selective erasure of a CRP can be programmed a-priori by using a counter to indicate how many times the CRP can be read out before erasure. We show PLayPUFs can realize forward and {\it backward} secure key management schemes for public key encryption. The new notion of backward security informally means that even if an attacker uncovers a session key through the key management interface, the legitimate user will detect this leakage before he will ever use the session key. Backward security and its implementation via PLayPUFs allow the construction of novel, self-recovering certificate authorities (CAs) without relying on a digital master key. Our new CAs immediately detect key exposure through their interfaces, and recover from it without stopping their service, and without ever issuing certificates based on such exposed keys. This is a crucial step forward in implementing secure key management. We deliver a full proof-of-concept implementation of our new scheme on FPGA together with detailed performance data, as well as formal definitions of our new concepts, including the first definition of stateful PUFs