Energy Confused Adversarial Metric Learning for Zero-Shot Image Retrieval and Clustering

Deep metric learning has been widely applied in many computer vision tasks, and recently, it is more attractive in \emph{zero-shot image retrieval and clustering}(ZSRC) where a good embedding is requested such that the unseen classes can be distinguished well. Most existing works deem this 'good' embedding just to be the discriminative one and thus race to devise powerful metric objectives or hard-sample mining strategies for leaning discriminative embedding. However, in this paper, we first emphasize that the generalization ability is a core ingredient of this 'good' embedding as well and largely affects the metric performance in zero-shot settings as a matter of fact. Then, we propose the Energy Confused Adversarial Metric Learning(ECAML) framework to explicitly optimize a robust metric. It is mainly achieved by introducing an interesting Energy Confusion regularization term, which daringly breaks away from the traditional metric learning idea of discriminative objective devising, and seeks to 'confuse' the learned model so as to encourage its generalization ability by reducing overfitting on the seen classes. We train this confusion term together with the conventional metric objective in an adversarial manner. Although it seems weird to 'confuse' the network, we show that our ECAML indeed serves as an efficient regularization technique for metric learning and is applicable to various conventional metric methods. This paper empirically and experimentally demonstrates the importance of learning embedding with good generalization, achieving state-of-the-art performances on the popular CUB, CARS, Stanford Online Products and In-Shop datasets for ZSRC tasks. \textcolor[rgb]{1, 0, 0}{Code available at http://www.bhchen.cn/}.Comment: AAAI 2019, Spotligh

On Nash Dynamics of Matching Market Equilibria

In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers, the market maker will decide on a price vector to clear the market in such a way that each buyer is allocated an item for which he desires the most (a.k.a., a market equilibrium solution). While such equilibrium outcomes are not unique, the market maker chooses one (maxeq) that optimizes its own objective --- revenue maximization. The buyers in turn change bids to their best interests in order to obtain higher utilities in the next round's market equilibrium solution. This is an (n+1)-person game where buyers place strategic bids to gain the most from the market maker's equilibrium mechanism. The incentives of buyers in deciding their bids and the market maker's choice of using the maxeq mechanism create a wave of Nash dynamics involved in the market. We characterize Nash equilibria in the dynamics in terms of the relationship between maxeq and mineq (i.e., minimum revenue equilibrium), and develop convergence results for Nash dynamics from the maxeq policy to a mineq solution, resulting an outcome equivalent to the truthful VCG mechanism. Our results imply revenue equivalence between maxeq and mineq, and address the question that why short-term revenue maximization is a poor long run strategy, in a deterministic and dynamic setting

Efficient high-capacity quantum secret sharing with two-photon entanglement

An efficient high-capacity quantum secret sharing scheme is proposed following some ideas in quantum dense coding with two-photon entanglement. The message sender, Alice prepares and measures the two-photon entangled states, and the two agents, Bob and Charlie code their information on their photons with four local unitary operations, which makes this scheme more convenient for the agents than others. This scheme has a high intrinsic efficiency for qubits and a high capacity.Comment: 5 pages, no figures. A inappreciable error is correcte