Inefficiency

We introduce an ordinal model of efficiency measurement. Our primitive is a notion of efficiency that is comparative, but not cardinal or absolute. In this framework, we postulate axioms that we believe an ordinal efficiency measure should satisfy. Primary among these are choice consistency and planning consistency, which guide the measurement of efficiency in a firm with access to multiple technologies. Other axioms include symmetry, which states that the names of commodities do not matter, scale-invariance, which says that units of measurement of commodities does not matter, and strong monotonicity, which states that efficiency should decrease if the inputs and outputs remain static when the technology becomes unambiguously more efficient. These axioms characterize a unique ordinal efficiency measure which is represented by the coefficient of resource utilization. By replacing symmetry (the weakest of our axioms) with a very mild continuity condition, we obtain a family of path-based measures.Efficiency Measurement, Coefficient of Resource Utilization, Ordinal, Choice Consistency, Planning Consistency, Path-based

Frontloading selectivity: a third way in scientific publishing?

Prestigious scientific journals traditionally decide which articles to accept at least partially based on the results of research. This backloaded selectivity enforces publication bias and encourages authors to selectively report their most persuasive findings, even when they are misleading, biased, and unreliable. One answer to backloaded selectivity is to curtail editorial selectivity altogether, deciding publication on the basis of technical merit alone. However, this strategy is unlikely to win appeal among highly selective journals. A third way is to frontload selectivity—reaching editorial decisions based on rigorous evaluation of the research question and methodology but before the research is conducted and thus regardless of the eventual results. This model, now offered at PLOS Biology in the form of “Preregistered Research Articles” (or Registered Reports), allows a scientific journal to maintain high selectivity for the importance and rigor of research while simultaneously eliminating outcome bias by editors, reviewers, and authors. I believe the rise of Registered Reports among selective journals will change how research is evaluated and may trigger the realization that frontloaded selectivity is the most secure way of advancing knowledge

Brain matters…in social sciences

Here we offer a general introduction to cognitive neuroscience and provide examples relevant to psychology, healthcare and bioethics, law and criminology, information studies, of how brain studies have influenced, are influencing or show the potential to influence the social sciences. We argue that social scientists should read, and be enabled to understand, primary sources of evidence in cognitive neuroscience. We encourage cognitive neuroscientists to reflect upon the resonance that their work may have across the social sciences and to facilitate a mutually enriching interdisciplinary dialogue

Fictitious inhibitory differences: how skewness and slowing distort the estimation of stopping latencies.

This is a postprint of an article published in Psychological Science © 2013 copyright SAGE Publications. Psychological Science is available online at: http://pss.sagepub.com/content/by/yearThe stop-signal paradigm is a popular method for examining response inhibition and impulse control in psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical domains because it allows the estimation of the covert latency of the stop process: the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT). In three sets of simulations, we examined to what extent SSRTs that were estimated with the popular mean and integration methods were influenced by the skew of the reaction time distribution and the gradual slowing of the response latencies. We found that the mean method consistently overestimated SSRT. The integration method tended to underestimate SSRT when response latencies gradually increased. This underestimation bias was absent when SSRTs were estimated with the integration method for smaller blocks of trials. Thus, skewing and response slowing can lead to spurious inhibitory differences. We recommend that the mean method of estimating SSRT be abandoned in favor of the integration method

Proactive motor control reduces monetary risk taking in gambling.

This is a postprint of an article published in Psychological Science © 2012 copyright SAGE Publications. Psychological Science is available online at: http://pss.sagepub.com/content/by/yearLess supervision by the executive system after disruption of the right prefrontal cortex leads to increased risk taking in gambling because superficially attractive-but risky-choices are not suppressed. Similarly, people might gamble more in multitask situations than in single-task situations because concurrent executive processes usually interfere with each other. In the study reported here, we used a novel monetary decision-making paradigm to investigate whether multitasking could reduce rather than increase risk taking in gambling. We found that performing a task that induced cautious motor responding reduced gambling in a multitask situation (Experiment 1). We then found that a short period of inhibitory training lessened risk taking in gambling at least 2 hr later (Experiments 2 and 3). Our findings indicate that proactive motor control strongly affects monetary risk taking in gambling. The link between control systems at different cognitive levels might be exploited to develop new methods for rehabilitation of addiction and impulse-control disorders

Proactive and reactive stopping when distracted: An attentional account

This is a postprint of an article published in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance © 2014 copyright American Psychological Association. 'This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.' Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance is available online at: http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/xhp/index.aspxThe authors have deposited data related to this article in ORE on open access. See: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/13401Performance in response-inhibition paradigms is typically attributed to inhibitory control. Here we examined the idea that stopping may largely depend on the outcome of a sensory detection process. Subjects performed a speeded go task, but they were instructed to withhold their response when a visual stop signal was presented. The stop signal could occur in the centre of the screen or in the periphery. On half of the trials, perceptual distractors were presented throughout the trial. We found that these perceptual distractors impaired stopping, especially when stop signals could occur in the periphery. Furthermore, the effect of the distractors on going was smallest in the central stop-signal condition, medium in a condition in which no-signals could occur, and largest in the condition in which stop signals could occur in the periphery. The results show that an important component of stopping is finding a balance between ignoring irrelevant information in the environment and monitoring for the occurrence of occasional stop signals. These findings highlight the importance of sensory detection processes when stopping and could shed new light on a range of phenomena and findings in the response-inhibition literature.Economic and Social Research CouncilBiotechnology and Biological Sciences Research CouncilEuropean Research Counci

Banishing the control homunculi in studies of action control and behaviour change

types: ReviewDOI and citation will be added to the record once they are known.© 2014 Association for Psychological ScienceFor centuries, human self-control has fascinated scientists and nonscientists alike. Current theories often attribute it to an executive control system. But even though executive control receives a great deal of attention across disciplines, most aspects of it are still poorly understood. Many theories rely on an ill-defined set of ‘homunculi’ doing jobs like 'response inhibition' or ‘updating’ without explaining how they do so. Furthermore, it is not always appreciated that control takes place across different time-scales. These two issues hamper major advances. Here we focus on the mechanistic basis for the executive control of actions. We propose that at the most basic level, action control depends on three cognitive processes: signal detection, action selection, and action execution. These processes are modulated via error-correction or outcome-evaluation mechanisms, preparation, and task rules maintained in working- and long-term memory. We also consider how executive control of actions becomes automatised with practice, and how people develop a control network. Finally, we discuss how the application of this unified framework in clinical domains can increase our understanding of control deficits and provide a theoretical basis for the development of novel ‘behavioural change’ interventions