Book Review

COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE is a compelling, informative book. As much as anything, it is a tremendous informational source for anyone interested in the Supreme Court. It is evident that the author has thoroughly researched the topic and provided the reader with a factual view of the past and present responsibilities of a Supreme Court law clerk. Because Peppers relies on principal-agent theory to develop his hypotheses and used exhaustive research to prove them, the book also appears to be objective

More Uncertainty After Daimler AG v. Bauman: A Response to Professors Cornett and Hoffheimer

In Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, Professors Judy M. Cornett and Michael H. Hoffheimer identify a number of legal issues that will become the focus of litigation after Daimler. This Response identifies an additional, perhaps surprising issue that is currently being litigated in the wake of Daimler AG v. Bauman. In the lower federal courts, defendants who have litigated cases on the merits without raising lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense are filing motions to dismiss and arguing that they are not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum under Daimler’s “at home” standard. The question is whether these defendants have waived their jurisdictional defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 because it was “available” to them in 2011 after Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown was decided. This Response explains the doctrine of waiver under Rule 12 and examines three cases that have addressed waiver under Goodyear and Daimler. This Response then asserts that defendants who failed to argue that they were not “at home” in the forum after Goodyear waived their jurisdictional defense and should not be permitted to raise it under Daimler

Distinguishing Certification from Abstention in Diversity Cases: Postponement Versus Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction

This Article argues that a federal court does not abdicate its duty to exercise its jurisdiction when it certifies a question in a diversity case; instead, the court merely postpones the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, federal courts need not limit certification in diversity cases to exceptional circumstances

Note, Civil Forfeiture and Innocent Owners

Although forfeiture is an ancient practice, its constitutional validity has only recently been seriously questioned. Historically, the Supreme Court has relied on a legal fiction-that the property itself is guilty-to confiscate property without regard to the Constitution. Cloaking itself in the guilty property fiction, the Court has virtually ignored the property owner\u27s culpability. In Bennis, the Court decided whether an owner\u27s interest in property is subject to forfeiture when the owner entrusts the property to a party who uses it to commit a crime, even if the owner has no knowledge of the illegal use

Protecting Cats and Dogs in Order to Protect Humans: Making the Case for a Felony Companion Animal Statute in Mississippi

During the 2010 session of the Mississippi legislature, Senator Billy Hewes (R-Gulfport) introduced Senate Bill No. 2623 which, inter alia, made it a felony to with malice torture, mutilate, maim, burn, starve, disfigure or kill any domesticated dog or cat. The penalty for a conviction under the proposed companion animal statute was one to five years in prison and a fine of $1500 to$10,000. Senate Bill No. 2623 passed the Senate but failed in the House, largely because the Mississippi Farm Bureau Federation argued that it would be harmful to Mississippi\u27s farming industry. This objection, along with the others that doomed Senate Bill No. 2623, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the purposes of animal cruelty laws and, in particular, the crucial role that a felony penalty for malicious cruelty to cats and dogs could play in protecting all Mississippians. Thus, the goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the objections to Senate Bill No. 2623 were meritless and explain why Mississippi should enact a felony companion animal statute as well as other key provisions of Senate Bill No. 2623

Teaching and Learning Personal Jurisdiction after the Stealth Revolution

In this Response [to Professor Michael Hoffheimer’s article The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction], Professor Challener points out one additional cost of the stealth revolution: the substantially increased difficulty of teaching and learning the law of personal jurisdiction which, in turn, erodes law students’ confidence in the Supreme Court as an institution

Love It or Leave It; An Examination of the Need for and Structure of a Class Action Rule in Mississippi

Forewor

Remand and Appellate Review When a District Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c): Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d), as well as Supreme Court precedent, remand orders in removed cases are immune from appellate review when they are based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Until recently, all appellate courts that had addressed the issue had concluded that a district court’s discretionary decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and remand the supplemental claims does not constitute a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore is reviewable on appeal

Remand and Appellate Review Issues Facing the Supreme Court in Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.

This Essay provides a brief explanation of § 1367 and §§ 1447(c) and (d) and argues that the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit’s decision in HIF Bio. We contend that the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional because a district court does not remand supplemental claims based on its lack of power over the claims. Instead, a district court remands supplemental claims based on its discretionary decision under § 1367(c) that a state court is a better forum in which to litigate them. After establishing that Cohill remands are not subject-matter jurisdictional and therefore are reviewable on appeal, we examine the district court‘s remand order and the Federal Circuit‘s opinion in HIF Bio. We assert that in reviewing the remand order in HIF Bio and deciding that Cohill remands fall within §§ 1447(c) and (d), the Federal Circuit incorrectly applied the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. Finally, we offer a few comments about whether Cohill remands should be reviewable on appeal