Structure, Agency, and Working Law

Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights(2016), by Lauren Edelman, presents an integrated theory of endogeneity that explains how organizational responses to civil rights laws undermine civil rights protections, preserve managerial prerogatives, and redefine judicial interpretations of compliance. Structural dynamics baked into organizations and driven by legitimacy and meaning produce organizational practices that appear to prohibit discrimination but do little to change discrimination on the ground. Working Law raises important questions for future research: Under what conditions might symbolic structures be effective? How does power affect the institutionalization of some symbols of compliance but not others? Can legal reforms limit the effects of endogeneity?</jats:p

Institutional Inequality and the Mobilization of the Family and Medical Leave Act

How do Family and Medical Leave Act rights operate in practice in the courts and in the workplace? This empirical study examines how institutions and social practices transform the meaning of these rights to recreate inequality. Workplace rules and norms built around the family wage ideal, the assumption that disability and work are mutually exclusive, and management's historical control over time all constrain opportunities for social change. Yet workers can also mobilize rights as a cultural discourse to change the social meaning of family and medical leave. Drawing on theoretical frameworks from social constructivism and new institutionalism, this study explains how institutions transform rights to recreate systems of power and inequality but at the same time also provide opportunities for law to change social structure. It provides a fresh look at the perennial debate about law and social change by examining how institutions shape the process of rights mobilization.</jats:p

Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change

Most of the work of public interest law organizations does not make money. How do these organizations survive, given the economic realities of law practice? Drawing on survey data from a national random sample of public interest law firms, we investigate how funding models vary across public interest organizations and how funding sources affect these organizations’ activities. We find funding structures have, over time, shifted away from foundation support toward government grants. Compared to other organizations, however, conservative organizations draw significantly less of their budget from federal and state grants, and significantly more of their budget from private contributions. Conservative organizations are significantly less likely than other organizations to rely on funding that prohibits engaging in class actions, receiving attorney's fees, or lobbying. Respondents reported that funding restrictions hamper their ability to negotiate favorable settlements, bring about systemic change, and represent vulnerable client communities. We close with a comparative institutional analysis of different funding models.</jats:p