Australian and American tariffs policies: do they rock or tango?

This paper disentangles between two hypotheses on the determinants of Australia's and the US' average tariffs levels. Relying on historical data that covers a century (1904 to 2005), it is first shown that a break in the series occurs in 1947, forcing to separate the data into two sub-periods (before and after the 1947 break). The results permit to distinguish a "rock" and a "tango" regime. The first designates the period where one country (the US) has a stronger influence on the other, while the second indicates that, after 1947, stronger reciprocal inter-relations have to be taken into account.Australia, United States, Trade Policy, Tariffs

Australian and American tariffs policies: do they rock or tango?

This paper disentangles between two hypotheses on the determinants of Australia's and the US' average tariffs levels. Relying on historical data that covers a century (1904 to 2005), it is first shown that a break in the series occurs in 1947, forcing to separate the data into two sub-periods (before and after the 1947 break). The results permit to distinguish a "rock" and a "tango" regime. The first designates the period where one country (the US) has a stronger influence on the other, while the second indicates that, after 1947, stronger reciprocal inter-relations have to be taken into account.Australia, United States, Trade Policy, Tariffs

Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections

Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and 2 elections (2001 and 2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent. We assess the specicities created by the two-round process under French electoral rule (a dual ballot under plurality rule). We show that in the first round of the electoral process, spending on equipment can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent's score. In the second round, the incumbent's vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense. The results suggest that the determinants of each round in a two-round electoral process are different.Economic voting; Local elections; Plurality rule; Visible expenditures

Governments under influence: Country interactions in discretionary fiscal policy

We investigate the interactions between countries of the discretionary component of national fiscal policies (i.e. the cyclically- and interest-adjusted part of fiscal policy), therefore observing and investigating the part of public spending and tax receipts on which governments keep full discretion. Our sample covers 18 OECD countries, during the 1974-2008 period. First, we build a measure of such discretionary fiscal policy, considered as the residual component of a VAR model, and compute the measure for the full sample. Drawing on this new dataset, the second step provides estimates of discretionary fiscal policy interactions between countries of the sample. Our results highlight the existence of interactions between neighboring countries' public decisions, where neighborhood is defined by economic leadership as well as geography. We also find evidence of an opportunistic behavior of OECD countries' governments for the discretionary public spending. Finally, the disciplining device of the European Union fiscal framework is shown to be ineffective.Fiscal policy; discretion; interactions; VAR; spatial econometrics

Budget structure and reelection prospects: Empirical evidence from French local elections

This paper is a study of the influence of economic and political conditions on the results of incumbent parties' candidates in local elections in France. The large sample used covers 586 towns and two elections (2001 and 2008). It explicitly deals with the specificities induced by the tworound process of the French electoral rule, and results are provided for both the reelection probability and the share of votes. It is shown that the budget structure, and notably equipment expenditures, has a strong impact on the incumbent party's share of votes. Political variables also play a role, as do the number of candidates, and national partisan waves. --Local elections,Visible expenditures

La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?

L’objet de cet article est de tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’intensité de la concurrence fiscale est plus forte en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural. Dans ce but, nous construisons un modèle spatial de choix fiscal communal qui tient compte des choix fiscaux des communes concurrentes en matière de taxe professionnelle. Plus particulièrement, nous testons l’hypothèse de l’existence d’interactions fiscales au sein de différents groupements intercommunaux et nous en mesurons la forme et l’intensité à l’aide des techniques d’économétrie spatiale. Nous relions ensuite ces mesures d’intensité aux caractéristiques de l’aire étudiée, en particulier à son statut dans le zonage en aires urbaines et en aires d’emploi de l’espace rural (ZAU-ER). Nous concluons à l’existence d’interactions fiscales entre les communes appartenant à l’espace à dominante urbaine. En revanche, l’hypothèse d’interactions fiscales horizontales n’est pas vérifiée dans les communes appartenant à l’espace à dominante rurale.fiscal interaction, urban area, rural area, spatial econometrics

DE LA NATURE DES INTERACTIONS FISCALES AU SEIN DE L’UNION EUROPÉENE

Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à la nature des interactions fiscales au sein de l’UE27 en matière d’impôt sur les sociétés. Nous estimons un modèle empirique de choix fiscal au sein de l’UE27 sur la période 1995-2007 en utilisant la méthode des moments généralisés et en nous focalisant sur l’origine des interactions fiscales entre pays géographiquement proches. Tout d’abord, nous mettons en évidence le rôle de l’appartenance politique sur les interactions fiscales au niveau international et nous montrons plus particulièrement que ces interactions motivées par l’appartenance politique sont limitées aux pays contigus. De plus, en lien avec la littérature sur la nouvelle économie géographique, les résultats suggèrent la présence d’une rente d’agglomération imposable dans les pays les plus riches de l’UE15 et d’une moindre dépendance de ces pays aux choix fiscaux des autres pays. Abstract - In this paper, we investigate the pattern of strategic interactions among the EU27 regarding corporate taxes. We thus estimate an empirical model of strategic interactions among 27 European countries over the period 1995-2007 by using GMM. We focus on the nature of tax interactions between neighbor countries. First, our results indicate the role of ideology on tax interactions at an international level and particularly we show that interactions motivated by the political trend are limited to contiguous countries. Second, in line with the New Economic Geography literature, the results suggest the existence of a taxable agglomeration rent for some countries which are also less dependent to other countries’ tax rates.INTERACTIONS FISCALES, CONCURRENCE FISCALE, TENDANCE POLITIQUE, IMPÔT SUR LES SOCIÉTÉS

Budget structure and reelection prospects: Empirical evidence from French local elections

This paper is a study of the influence of economic and political conditions on the results of incumbent parties' candidates in local elections in France. The large sample used covers 586 towns and two elections (2001 and 2008). It explicitly deals with the specificities induced by the tworound process of the French electoral rule, and results are provided for both the reelection probability and the share of votes. It is shown that the budget structure, and notably equipment expenditures, has a strong impact on the incumbent party's share of votes. Political variables also play a role, as do the number of candidates, and national partisan waves

A dirty deed done dirt cheap: reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians

This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school rhythm in France provides the ground for a verification of this hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities and if they belong to the governing coalition. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically, offering a double gain to the government. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms the perception of the local cost of the reform

Australian and American tariffs policies: do they rock or tango?

This paper disentangles between two hypotheses on the determinants of Australia's and the US' average tariffs levels. Relying on historical data that covers a century (1904 to 2005), it is first shown that a break in the series occurs in 1947, forcing to separate the data into two sub-periods (before and after the 1947 break). The results permit to distinguish a "rock" and a "tango" regime. The first designates the period where one country (the US) has a stronger influence on the other, while the second indicates that, after 1947, stronger reciprocal inter-relations have to be taken into account