MULTI-ISSUE BARGAINING UNDER BUDGET-CONSTRAINTS

We analyze a multi-issue bargaining model where the joint production of public goods is budget-constrained. The players must decide the part of the budget that is dedicated to produce any public good. We model the decision process as an alternating offer bargaining game with random proposers. The utilities of the players are assumed separable in any public issue. We show that multiple sophisticated outcomes are (generically) attained when a complete agreement is required for a subset of public projects to be implemented, either if the players bargain globally over the sizes of different public goods or sequentially through partial agreements. However, when public projects are immediately implemented after partial agreements, then uniqueness (which is a necessary condition for efficiency) is generically achieved.Multilateral bargaining, Sophisticated equilibrium, Issue-by-issue bargaining

Cost-Based Models of Economic Growth

In this paper we highlight the importance of the operational costs in explaining economic growth and analyze how the industrial structure affects the growth rate of the economy. If there is monopolistic competition only in an intermediate goods sector, then production growth coincides with consumption growth. Moreover, the pattern of growth depends on the particular form of the operational cost. If the monopolistically competitive sector is the final goods sector, then per capita production is constant but per capita effective consumption or welfare grows. Finally, we modify again the industrial structure of the economy and show an economy with two different growth speeds, one for production and another for effective consumption. Thus, both the operational cost and the particular structure of the sector that produces the final goods determines ultimately the pattern of growth.operational cost, growth, monopolistic competition

Union Power, Minimum Wage Legislation, Endogenous Labor Supplies and Production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has e.ects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.skills, labor supplies, minimum wage, union power

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

We analyze the effects of the unemployment benefit system on the economy. In particular, we focus on both the tax structure and the unemployment benefits composition. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is only paid by firms, then employment and production are maximized. Moreover, the way the government contemplates the unemployment benefit system, either as a redistributive or as an insurance institution, is crucial for the dynamics and the equilibria of the economy.unemployment benefit system, payroll tax, wage tax.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.wage tax, unemployment benefit system, payroll tax

P not equal to NP

This article finds the answer to the question: for any problem from which a non-deterministic algorithm can be derived which verifies whether an answer is correct or not in polynomial time (complexity class NP), is it possible to create an algorithm that finds the right answer to the problem in polynomial time (complexity class P)? For this purpose, this article shows a decision problem and analyzes it to demonstrate that this problem does not belong to the complexity class P, but it belongs to the class NP; doing so it will be proved that it exists at least one problem that belongs to class NP but not to class P, which means that this article will prove that not all NP problems are P.Comment: 9 pages, 7 figure

Estandarización del método de ensayo para material particulado PM10 y PM 2.5 con base en la NTC- ISO/IEC 17025:2005

El presente trabajo tuvo como finalidad la estandarización de un instructivo para la medición de material particulado PM10 y PM2.5, con el propósito de ampliar el alcance operacional del Centro Regional de Producción Más Limpia CRPML, a través del seguimiento de guías y procedimientos de medición de la EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), escritos de algunos profesionales en el tema citados a lo largo del documento y al seguimiento del proceso en campo. El instructivo consta de tres partes: Antes, Durante y Después; Donde antes sería la preparación del equipo, de los filtros a utilizar y de la apropiación del procedimiento por parte del personal. Durante, sería la etapa de la medición y las pruebas en campo, donde trabajamos con unos parámetros de ubicación del lugar de muestreo y el establecimiento de los tiempos de recolección de datos. Después, sería la etapa de medición de filtros después del muestre, análisis de los datos y validación del muestreo

Firms' operational costs, market entry and growth

The industrial organizational literature identifies operational costs as being an important determinant of industry evolution over time; however, it also shows that they can be endogenous and time-dependent. In this paper, we analyze the effects of endogenous and time-dependent operational costs on economic activity and, hence, on economic growth. We show that the particular nature of these costs determines the way in which the overall number of firms grows, which ultimately determines the pattern of economic growth. Our analysis differs from other approaches in that (i) a new firm is associated with the creation of a new product in such a way that a planned expenditure of resources is required (e.g. R&D), and (ii) an accumulation law for the growth of the number of firms is assumed. Hence, we show that growth can occur endogenously in an economy without any specific growth generating sector