Education Choice, Endogenous Growth and Income Distribution

This paper studies the dynamic evolution of an economy in which parents can choose to send their child to a public or private school and vote over taxes used to fund public schools. The objective is to study growth and the evolution of income distribution in a model where alternative education systems coexist. In the model studied, the endogenous distribution of income is bimodal and connot be fully analytically characterized. Equilibrium is characterized and the dynamics studied analytically. Simulations of the model calibrated to US data are used to complement this analysis. A bimodal income distribution based on education emerges. Public education student converge to a low income equilibrium while private education students experience endogenous growth and have higher incomes. However, public education students also experience long run growth through a spillover from the growth experienced by private education students. the model identifies possible problems with the existence of a private alternative to public education, such as the emergence of an eduction based class structure. However, such an institutional setting can raise incomes and growth relative to a compulsory public education system while still reducing income inequality.Education Expenditures and Choice, Voting Equilibria, Endogenous Growth, Income Distribution.

Why do Education Vouchers Fail?

We examine quantitatively why uniform vouchers have repeatedly su¤ered electoral defeats against the current system where public and private schools coexist. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households to prefer the uniform vouchers to the current mix of public and private education. We then develop a model of publicly funded means-tested edu- cation vouchers where the voucher received by each household is a linearly decreasing function of income. Public policy, which is determined by majority voting, consists of two dimensions: the overall funding level (or the tax rate) and the slope of the means testing function. We solve the model when the political decisions are sequential ?households vote ?rst on the tax rate and then on the extent of means testing. We establish that a majority voting equilibrium exists. We show that the means-tested voucher regime is majority preferred to the status-quo. These results are robust to alternative preference parameters, income distribution parameters and voter turnout.

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.vouchers, political economy, opting out, education finance

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribution of welfare gains and losses across house- holds by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.Education ; Households

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system

Education Vouchers, Growth and Income Inequality

This paper uses a growth model with public and private education alternatives to investigate the implications of education voucher for economic growth and the evolution of income inequality. The results indicate that introducing education vouchers can increase economic growth. families that switch from public to private education due to vouchers experience higher incomes, leading to growth in the tax base which in turn raises public education expenditures and increases the growth of the whole economy. Vouchers have an ambiguous effect on income inequality. Gini coefficients indicate increasing inequality while other measures indicate decreased inequality. Comparing income distributions using generalised Lorenz curves, the distribution under a voucher scheme dominates the distribution without voucher. This implies that in the long run, vouchers offer a welfare improvement. In short run welfare comparisons however, more than half the population is worse off with vouchers, which is consistent with the repeated failures if voucher referenda in the US. The results add a new dimension on which vouchers can be evaluated in the continuing policy debate.Education Choice, Growth, Income Distribution, Public and Private Education, Vouchers EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau

Education Vouchers, Growth and Income Inequality

This paper studies a growth model with public and private education alternatives. The impact of education vouchers for economic growth and the evolution of income inequality are considered. Results indicate that introducing education vouchers can increase economic growth. Households switching from public to private education experience higher incomes. This raises the tax base, in turn raising public education expenditures and growth of the whole economy. Vouchers are found to generally in- crease income inequality. Welfare comparisons show that voucher schemes may in some cases gain majority support, depending on assumptions and parameters. The results add a new dimension on which vouchers can be evaluated in the continuing policy debate.Education Choice, Growth, Income Distribution, Vouchers EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau