31,405 research outputs found
Thinking about Attention in Games: Backward and Forward Induction
Behavioral economics improves economic analysis by using psychological
regularity to suggest limits on rationality and self-interest (e.g. Camerer and
Loewenstein 2003). Expressing these regularities in formal terms permits productive
theorizing, suggests new experiments, can contribute to psychology,
and can be used to shape economic policies which make normal people
better off
Are there timing effects in coordination game experiments?
The timing effects (timing without observability) identified by Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) in coordination game experiments are caused by their fixed-matching protocol. When we use a random-matching protocol the alleged timing effects completely vanish.
Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games
Disposition effect and gender
Investors seem to hold on to their losing stocks to a greater extent than they hold on to their winning stocks. This well-document behavioral regularity is termed disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985). We set an experiment to replicate results from a previous study of the disposition effect (Weber and Camerer 1998), and further show that a subject’s gender may interfere with the effect’s detection.
Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols
Gift-giving has often puzzled economists, especially because efficient gifts-like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for-seem crass or inappropriate. It is shown in a formal game-theoretic model that gifts serve as "signals" of a person's intentions about future investment in a relationship, and inefficient gifts can be better signals. Other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced, and some stylized facts about gift-giving practices are described (many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts)
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