Science and Technology Studies in Policy: the UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap

In this paper, we reflect on our experience as Science and Technology Studies (STS) researchers who were members of the working group that produced A Synthetic Biology Roadmap for the UK in 2012. We explore how this initiative sought to govern an uncertain future, and describe how it was successfully used to mobilize public funds for synthetic biology from the UK government. We discuss our attempts to incorporate the insights and sensibilities of STS into the policy process, and why we chose to use the concept of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) to do so. We analyze how the roadmapping process, and the final report, narrowed and transformed our contributions to the Roadmap. We show how difficult it is for STS researchers to influence policy when our ideas challenge deeply entrenched pervasive assumptions, framings and narratives about how technological innovation necessarily leads to economic progress, about public reticence as a roadblock to that progress, and about the supposed separation between science and society. We end by reflecting on the constraints under which we were operating from the outset, and on the challenges for STS in policy

The construction of imaginaries of the public as a threat to synthetic biology

Scientific institutions and innovation-focused government bodies have identified public attitudes to synthetic biology as an obstruction to the field. This view is based on a perception that the public is (or will likely become) fearful of synthetic biology and that a ‘public scare’ would impede development of the field. Fear of the public's fear of synthetic biology, which I characterise as ‘synbiophobia-phobia’, has been the driving force behind the promotion of public engagement and other activities to address ‘ethical, legal and social issues' (ELSI). These activities have been problematic in two ways. Firstly, they are based on the discredited ‘deficit-model’ understanding of public responses to science, in which negative public attitudes towards science are thought to result from a lack of scientific knowledge. Secondly, they have taken for granted sociotechnical expectations put forward by scientific institutions. These promises of the field, and the tacit normative commitments embedded within them, have not been opened up to public appraisal. In these ways, synthetic biology exemplifies many phenomena described by Welsh and Wynne (2013). This article analyses the ontological stakes in the work conducted by scientific institutions to conjure up imaginaries of publics with respect to synthetic biology. As synthetic biology emerges as a field of hope under threat from publics, how have science, publics and the relations between them become defined

Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the "myths"

Synthetic biology, a field that aims to "make biology easier to engineer," is routinely described as leading to an increase in the "dual-use" threat, i.e., the potential for the same scientific research to be "used" for peaceful purposes or "misused" for warfare or terrorism. Fears have been expressed that the "de-skilling" of biology, combined with online access to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and the reduction in price for DNA synthesis, will make biology increasingly accessible to people operating outside well-equipped professional research laboratories, including people with malevolent intentions. The emergence of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology communities and of the student iGEM competition has come to epitomize this supposed trend toward greater ease of access and the associated potential threat from rogue actors. In this article, we identify five "myths" that permeate discussions about synthetic biology and biosecurity, and argue that they embody misleading assumptions about both synthetic biology and bioterrorism. We demonstrate how these myths are challenged by more realistic understandings of the scientific research currently being conducted in both professional and DIY laboratories, and by an analysis of historical cases of bioterrorism. We show that the importance of tacit knowledge is commonly overlooked in the dominant narrative: the focus is on access to biological materials and digital information, rather than on human practices and institutional dimensions. As a result, public discourse on synthetic biology and biosecurity tends to portray speculative scenarios about the future as realities in the present or the near future, when this is not warranted. We suggest that these "myths" play an important role in defining synthetic biology as a "promissory" field of research and as an "emerging technology" in need of governance

Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge: The case of dual use and synthetic biology

Institutions need to ignore some knowledge in order to function. This is "uncomfortable knowledge" because it undermines the ability of those institutions to pursue their goals (Rayner, 2012). We identify three bodies of knowledge that are relevant to understandings of the dual use threat posed by synthetic biology but are excluded from related policy discussions. We demonstrate how these "unknown knowns" constitute uncomfortable knowledge because they disrupt the simplified worldview that underpins contemporary discourse on the potential misuse of synthetic biology by malign actors. We describe how these inconvenient truths have been systematically ignored and argue that this is because they are perceived as a threat by organisations involved in the promotion of synthetic biology as well as by those involved in managing biosecurity risks. This has led to a situation where concerns about the biosecurity threat posed by synthetic biology are not only exaggerated, but are, more importantly, misplaced. This, in turn, means that related policies are misdirected and unlikely to have much impact. We focus on the dynamics of discussions about synthetic biology and dual use to demonstrate how the same "knowns" that are denied or dismissed as "unknown knowns" in certain circumstances are sometimes mobilised as "known knowns" by the same category of actors in a different context, when this serves to sustain the goals of the individuals and institutions involved. Based on our own experience, we argue that negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge is a difficult, but necessary, component of meaningful transdisciplinary collaborations

Les Américains ont-ils accepté les OGM ?: Analyse comparée de la construction des OGM comme problème public en France et aux Etats-Unis

How can one explain that the use of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in food and agriculture poses a problem in France, where they are hardly used, yet seems to be taken for granted in the US, where their use is widespread ? Many observers see this as a sign that American consumers have accepted transgenic foods, due to a different attitude to risks, food and nature. The present article rejects that explanation. It presents a comparative analysis of the trajectory of GMOs as a public problem in France and the US, showing that very similar arguments were put forward by opponents to GMOs on both sides of the Atlantic, and that conflicts between opponents and defenders have focussed on the same issues : (i) food labeling ; (ii) the link between the choice of a technique (GMOs) and that of an economic system (intensive agriculture, capitalism) ; and (iii) the appropriate framework for evaluating risks. But whereas in France (and more generally in Europe), opponents’ arguments crystallized during specific key controversies, and contributed towards the definition of the cognitive and normative dimensions of GMOs as a public problem, this did not occur in the US. Three factors seem to explain this difference : (i) very different regulatory choices made in the late 1980s (based on processes in Europe and on products in the US) ; (ii) the fact that the usefulness of transgenic plants is perceived negatively in France whereas their association with the intensive export agriculture project is perceived positively in the US ; and (iii) the growing influence of a broader, “constructive” framework for risk analysis in Europe, whereas in the US regulatory authorities continue to base their legitimacy on the ideology of “sound science