340 research outputs found
"Self-Knowledge and the Science of the Soul in Buridan's Quaestiones De Anima"
Buridan holds that the proper subject of psychology (i.e., the science undertaken in Aristotleâs De Anima) is the soul, its powers, and characteristic functions. But, on his view, the science of psychology should not be understood as including the body nor even the soul-body composite as its proper subject. Rather its subject is just âthe soul in itself and its powers and functions insofar as they stand on the side of the soul". Buridan takes it as obvious that, even thus narrowly construed, such a science is possible. To the extent that this science includes the human or intellective soul, however, Buridanâs claim regarding its possibility is far from obvious. After all, like most of his contemporaries, Buridan takes the human soul to be immaterial. Thus, he readily admits that âthe intellect cannot be sensedâ and its operations are likewise inaccessible to the senses. Yet, on Buridan's broadly empiricist theory of knowledge, all (human) knowledge, including knowledge of the intellect or intellective soul, takes its start in the senses. How, then, is a science of the human soul possible? What is the nature or source of our knowledge of the intellect? In this paper, I reconstruct Buridan's answer to these questions.
My discussion divides roughly into two parts. In the first, I set out the main elements of Buridanâs account of how we come to cognize the intellect, focusing on what he says about the genesis of our concept of the intellect. I then consider his account of our cognition of our own intellective states. As the discussion in part one make clear, Buridan holds that our concepts of intellect and of intellective states are both derived (inferentially) from subjective âexperienceâ of our own states and rational activities. In part two, therefore, I try to elucidate Buridanâs notion of experience. Ultimately, I argue that it is a non-conceptual, non-discursive mode of self-awareness. I suggest, moreover, that it might best be understood in terms of our own notion of phenomenal consciousness. On the interpretation I advance, then, it turns out that, for Buridan, our concept of the intellect itself and, hence, the science of (human) psychology in general, is ultimately grounded in phenomenal experience of our own intellective states
Olivi on Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: the Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Mind's Reflexivity
The theory of mind that medieval philosophers inherit from Augustine is predicated on the thesis that the human mind is essentially self-reflexive. This paper examines Peter John Olivi's (1248-1298) distinctive development of this traditional Augustinian thesis. The aim of the paper is three-fold. The first is to establish that Olivi's theory of reflexive awareness amounts to a theory of phenomenal consciousness. The second is to show that, despite appearances, Olivi rejects a higher-order analysis of consciousness in favor of a same-order theory. The third and final is to show that, on his view, consciousness is both self-intimating and infallible
How Chatton Changed Ockhamâs Mind
It is well-known that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockhamâs theory of judgment, but scholars have overlooked the role Chattonâs criticisms play in shaping Ockhamâs final account. In this paper, I demonstrate that Ockhamâs most mature treatment of judgment not only contains revisions that resolve the problems Chatton identifies in his earlier theories, but also that these revisions ultimately bring his final account of the objects of judgment surprisingly close to Chattonâs own. Even so, I argue that, at the end of the day, there remain significant differences between their respective analyses of the structure and intentionality of judicative states
Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham
In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockhamâs theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a âdirect reference thesisâ, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a âcausal thesisâ, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, I claim that the causal thesis doesnât square with Ockhamâs account of supernaturally produced intuition and that the direct reference thesis sits uneasily with Ockhamâs characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states
Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality
In this paper I examine William Ockhamâs theory of judgment and, in particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects. Commentators, both past and present, habitually interpret Ockham as defending a kind of anti-realism about objects of judgment. My aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that the traditional interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ways in which Ockhamâs theory of judgment changes over the course of his career. The second, and larger, aim is to show that careful attention to these changes in Ockhamâs account (and to the motivations for them) sheds new light on broader developments in his philosophy of mindâspecifically, on his views about the nature of concepts and on his account of the nature and structure of intentionality itself
Perception in Augustine's De Trinitate 11: A Non-Trinitarian Analysis
In this paper, I explore Augustineâs account of sense cognition in book 11 of De Trinitate. His discussion in this context focuses on two types of sensory stateâwhat he calls âouter visionâ and âinner vision,â respectively. His analysis of both types of state is designed to show that cognitive acts involving external and internal sense faculties are susceptible of a kind of trinitarian analysis. A common way to read De Trin. 11, is to interpret Augustineâs account of âouterâ vision as an analysis of sense perception and his account âinnerâ vision as an analysis of occurrent sensory memory and imagination. I argue against such a reading of De Trin. 11, however. Insofar as we take perception to be a phenomenally conscious mode of sensory awareness, outer vision cannot, I claim, be the equivalent of ordinary sense perception. For, on Augustineâs view, the deliverances of outer vision only reach the threshold of consciousness, when outer vision occurs in conjunction with inner vision. Hence, on my analysis, sense perception turns out to be a complex, hybrid stateâone that involves both outer and inner vision. If I am right, acts of sense perception turn out not to be directly susceptible to trinitarian analysis. Even so, the account is interesting and nuanced for all that
- âŠ