Thinking styles and doctors' knowledge and behaviours relating to acute coronary syndromes guidelines

Background How humans think and make decisions is important in understanding behaviour. Hence an understanding of cognitive processes among physicians may inform our understanding of behaviour in relation to evidence implementation strategies. A personality theory, Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST) proposes a relationship between different ways of thinking and behaviour, and articulates pathways for behaviour change. However prior to the empirical testing of interventions based on CEST, it is first necessary to demonstrate its suitability among a sample of healthcare workers. Objectives To investigate the relationship between thinking styles and the knowledge and clinical practices of doctors directly involved in the management of acute coronary syndromes. Methods Self-reported doctors' thinking styles (N = 74) were correlated with results from a survey investigating knowledge, attitudes, and clinical practice, and evaluated against recently published acute coronary syndrome clinical guidelines. Results Guideline-discordant practice was associated with an experiential style of thinking. Conversely, guideline-concordant practice was associated with a higher preference for a rational style of reasoning. Conclusion Findings support that while guidelines might be necessary to communicate evidence, other strategies may be necessary to target discordant behaviours. Further research designed to examine the relationships found in the current study is required

The effect of self-affirmation in nonthreatening persuasion domains: Timing affects the process

Ismael Gallardo. Universidad de TalcaMost research on self-affirmation and persuasion has argued that self-affirmation buffers the self against the threat posed by a persuasive message; thus, it increases the likelihood that participants will respond to the message favorably. Little research, in contrast, has looked at the effects of self-affirmation on persuasive messages that are not threatening to the self. This research examines mechanisms that can operate under these conditions. Consistent with the idea that self-affirmation affects confidence, the article shows that self-affirmation can decrease information processing when induced prior to message reception (Experiment 1) and can increase the use of self-generated thoughts in response to a persuasive message when induced after message reception (Experiment 2). In addition, Experiment 3 manipulates the timing of self-affirmation to replicate both effects and Experiment 4 provides direct evidence for the impact of self-affirmation on confidence