Pitch as a recipient, channel, and context factor affecting thought reliance and persuasion

Three experiments tested how low versus high pitch generated from sources beyond a message communicator can affect reliance on thoughts and influence recipients' attitudes. First, participants wrote positive or negative thoughts about an exam proposal (Experiments 1, 2) or their academic abilities (Experiment 3). Then, pitch from the message recipient (Experiment 1), channel (Experiment 2), or context (Experiment 3) was manipulated to be high or low. Experiment 1 showed that when participants vocally expressed their thoughts using low (vs. high) pitch, thoughts had a greater effect on attitudes toward exams. Experiment 2 revealed low (vs. high) pitch sounds from the keyboard participants used to write their thoughts produced the same effect on thought usage. Experiment 3 demonstrated that thoughts influenced attitudes more when listed while background music was low (vs. high) Pitch can influence attitudes through a meta-cognitive thought reliance process whether emerging from the recipient, channel, or context

Easier done than undone ... by some of the people, some of the time:The role of elaboration in explicit and implicit group preferences

Evidence suggests that while explicit evaluations of others are easily formed and equally easily changed, implicit evaluations are more intransigent. The present research investigated the role of individual and situational differences in determining whether explicit and implicit evaluations are changed in light of new information. In three studies, participants formed implicit and explicit evaluations of two groups before learning new information that objectively contradicted those evaluations. In Experiment 1, individuals characterised by a greater Personal Need for Structure (PNS) formed more extreme explicit evaluations but were also more likely to reverse them later. In contrast, while higher PNS individuals also formed more extreme implicit preferences, they were less likely to change them in response to new information. In Experiments 2a and 2b, the opportunity to re-assess the same evidence on which initial impressions were formed was essential to revising implicit evaluations, but was less important for changing explicit evaluations. These results confirm that differences in motivation and opportunity to engage in elaborative processing moderate the revision of implicit, but not explicit, group preferences. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc All rights reserved

Thinking styles and doctors' knowledge and behaviours relating to acute coronary syndromes guidelines

Background How humans think and make decisions is important in understanding behaviour. Hence an understanding of cognitive processes among physicians may inform our understanding of behaviour in relation to evidence implementation strategies. A personality theory, Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST) proposes a relationship between different ways of thinking and behaviour, and articulates pathways for behaviour change. However prior to the empirical testing of interventions based on CEST, it is first necessary to demonstrate its suitability among a sample of healthcare workers. Objectives To investigate the relationship between thinking styles and the knowledge and clinical practices of doctors directly involved in the management of acute coronary syndromes. Methods Self-reported doctors' thinking styles (N = 74) were correlated with results from a survey investigating knowledge, attitudes, and clinical practice, and evaluated against recently published acute coronary syndrome clinical guidelines. Results Guideline-discordant practice was associated with an experiential style of thinking. Conversely, guideline-concordant practice was associated with a higher preference for a rational style of reasoning. Conclusion Findings support that while guidelines might be necessary to communicate evidence, other strategies may be necessary to target discordant behaviours. Further research designed to examine the relationships found in the current study is required

Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias

The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by counterconditioning or extinction but should not be modulated by rational argumentation or logical interventions. This hypothesis is false; implicit biases are not predicated on any associative structures or associative processes but instead arise because of unconscious propositionally structured beliefs. I conclude by discussing how the case study of implicit bias illuminates problems with popular dual-process models of cognitive architectur

Metacognition and Emotion: the Dynamics of Emotions and Confidence

The present talk offers a metacognitive perspective on emotions by examining how confidence, a secondary or metacognition, can both affect emotions and be influenced by emotions. We present two sets of findings bearing on this notion. The first set of findings examines how emotions are affected by the confidence with which emotional thoughts (i.e., the thoughts leading to the emotion) were generated. The second set of findings examines how emotions can influence persuasion by affecting confidence in one's thoughts. Taken together, we offer a theoretical framework based on metacognition to gain better insight into understanding how emotions affect consumer persuasion and behavior