684 research outputs found
Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action
Some of the reasons one acts on in joint action are shared with fellow participants. But others are proprietary: reasons of oneâs own that have no direct practical significance for other participants. The compatibility of joint action with proprietary reasons serves to distinguish the former from other forms of collective agency; moreover, it is arguably a desirable feature of joint action. Advocates of âteam reasoningâ link the special collective intention individual participants have when acting together with a distinctive form of practical reasoning that purports to put individuals in touch with group or collective reasons. Such views entail the surprising conclusion that one cannot engage in joint action for proprietary reasons. Suppose we understand the contrast between minimal and robust forms of joint action in terms of the extent to which participants act on proprietary reasons as opposed to shared reasons. Then, if the team reasoning view of joint intention and action is correct, it makes no sense to talk of minimal joint action. As soon as the reason for which one participates is proprietary, then one is not, on this view, genuinely engaged in joint action
Intention and motor representation in purposive action
Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions
Why We Conform
Are humans fundamentally helpful, or does coercion inevitably come with altruism? Julia Fischer examines this question in her review of Michael Tomasello's new book, Why We Cooperate
Interacting mindreaders
Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader's target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition
What's the point of knowing how?
Why is it useful to talk and think about knowledge-how? Using Edward Craigâs discussion of the function of the concepts of knowledge and knowledge-how as a jumping off point, this paper argues that considering this question can offer us new angles on the debate about knowledge-how. We consider two candidate functions for the concept of knowledge-how: pooling capacities, and mutual reliance. Craig makes the case for pooling capacities, which connects knowledge-how to our need to pool practical capacities. I argue that the evidence is much more equivocal. My suggested diagnosis is that the concept of knowledge-how plays both functions, meaning that the concept of knowledge-how is inconsistent, and that the debate about knowledge-how is at least partly a metalinguistic negotiation. In closing, I suggest a way to revise the philosophical concept of knowledge how
Towards an Ontological Modelling of Preference Relations
Preference relations are intensively studied in Economics,
but they are also approached in AI, Knowledge Representation, and
Conceptual Modelling, as they provide a key concept in a variety of
domains of application. In this paper, we propose an ontological foundation
of preference relations to formalise their essential aspects across
domains. Firstly, we shall discuss what is the ontological status of the
relata of a preference relation. Secondly, we investigate the place of preference
relations within a rich taxonomy of relations (e.g. we ask whether
they are internal or external, essential or contingent, descriptive or nondescriptive
relations). Finally, we provide an ontological modelling of
preference relation as a module of a foundational (or upper) ontology
(viz. OntoUML).
The aim of this paper is to provide a sharable foundational theory of
preference relation that foster interoperability across the heterogeneous
domains of application of preference relations
Explanation in mathematical conversations:An empirical investigation
Analysis of online mathematics forums can help reveal how explanation is used by mathematicians; we contend that this use of explanation may help to provide an informal conceptualization of simplicity. We extracted six conjectures from recent philosophical work on the occurrence and characteristics of explanation in mathematics. We then tested these conjectures against a corpus derived from online mathematical discussions. To this end, we employed two techniques, one based on indicator terms, the other on a random sample of comments lacking such indicators. Our findings suggest that explanation is widespread in mathematical practice and that it occurs not only in proofs but also in other mathematical contexts. Our work also provides further evidence for the utility of empirical methods in addressing philosophical problems
An agent-based approach to assess driversâ interaction with pre-trip information systems.
This article reports on the practical use of a multi-agent microsimulation framework to address the issue of assessing driversâ
responses to pretrip information systems. The population of drivers is represented as a community of autonomous agents,
and travel demand results from the decision-making deliberation performed by each individual of the population as regards
route and departure time. A simple simulation scenario was devised, where pretrip information was made available to users
on an individual basis so that its effects at the aggregate level could be observed. The simulation results show that the
overall performance of the system is very likely affected by exogenous information, and these results are ascribed to demand
formation and network topology. The expressiveness offered by cognitive approaches based on predicate logics, such as the
one used in this research, appears to be a promising approximation to fostering more complex behavior modelling, allowing
us to represent many of the mental aspects involved in the deliberation process
BIO Logical Agents: Norms, Beliefs, Intentions in Defeasible Logic
In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue, in particular, that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks
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