29 research outputs found

    On the Psychological Basis for Rigid Designation

    Get PDF
    Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975a; 1975b) have argued forcefully for the philosophical view of word meaning known as rigid designation. While certain psychological studies have appeared to offer this view support (Keil, 1986; Rips, 1989), we argue that these have not provided an exhaustive evaluation. In particular, the original discussions of Kripke and Putnam reveal that their view rests on an explicit appeal to intuition concerning word use in a range of different scenarios. The study reported here investigates word use under three such types of scenarios, for a variety of natural kind terms, by investigating subjects' judgements of truth or falsity for a range of statement types. W e argue that the results obtained indicate that the intuition on which rigid designation rests is not one which is generally true of agents' language use. Further, we obtam patterns of apparent contradiction which appear strictly inconsistent with rigid designation and which require an account of word meaning which allows that the sense of words may vary systematically with context (Franks & Braisby, 1990)

    Deference in categorisation: evidence for essentialism?

    No full text
    Many studies appear to show that categorization conforms to psychological essentialism (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991). However, key implications of essentialism have not been scrutinized. These are that people’s categorizations should shift as their knowledge of micro-structural properties shift, and that people should defer in their categorizations to appropriate experts. Three studies are reported. The first shows that even gross changes in genetic structure do not radically shift categorizations of living kinds. The second and third reveal a pattern of conditional deference to experts, coupled with systematic deference to non-experts. It is argued that these results point towards only a partial role for essentialism in explaining categorization, and a continuing role for theories that emphasize the importance of appearance and/or functional properties

    Deference and essentialism in the categorization of chemical kinds

    No full text
    Abstract Psychological essentialism has been subject to much debate. Yet a key implication -that people should defer to experts in categorizing natural kinds -has not been widely examined. Three experiments examine deference in the categorization of chemical kinds. The first establishes borderline cases used in the second and third. These latter show limited deference to experts, and some deference to non-experts. These data are consistent with a perspectival framework for concepts in which categorization is sometimes based on micro-structural properties and sometimes on appearance and function
    corecore