415 research outputs found
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies
The appropriate role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved in US antitrust law and policy. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has led to a significant shift in health care delivery. The ACA promises that increased integration and a shift from quantity of performance through increased competition will create a system in which quality will go up and prices will go down. Increasingly, due to the economic trends that respond to the ACA, including considerable consolidation both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that the antitrust agencies provide an economically sound and administrable legal approach to efficiency enhancing mergers. In this regard, horizontal hospital mergers present particularly challenges for antitrust. Most hospital merger cases focus on cost based efficiencies, as does most of the academic empirical literature. Yet, government policy seems out of synch with quality analysis. This essay proceeds as follows. First, it provides a discussion of the welfare effects on quality and its implications for antitrust analysis. In the next part, the article explores quality analysis both in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and in antitrust case law. In doing so, the essay identifies areas both of clarity and ambiguity regarding quality enhancing efficiencies policy. In the subsequent part, the essay draws parallels to an efficiency analysis of quality under rule of reason analysis, in which the essay offers examples of resale price maintenance and tying of franchising contracts. Thereafter, in the next part, the essay addresses how agencies and courts should treat quality efficiencies in mergers. In doing so, the essay draws upon the existing academic literature in empirical industrial organization economics and public health on measurements of what is hospital quality in a consolidating healthcare marketplace. In its concluding section, the essay advocates a more robust use of quality measurements as a guiding principle of merger law and policy that is flexible enough for case by case analysis and that will provide for ease of adminstrability and outcomes more in line with sound economic analysis than the current system
The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach
In this paper, we discuss the problem of the rule of reason and the welfare standard in antitrust. We begin with the Introduction (Section I), which provides an overview of the problem. In Section II, we review the Supreme Court’s guidance on the standard for conducting a rule of reason analysis. Put simply, the Supreme Court has failed to identify clearly what standard to use in conducting a rule of reason inquiry. After a careful — albeit selective — reading of Supreme Court opinions it is simply not clear. While a case can be made for total welfare as the guiding principle of a rule of reason analysis, which is the standard that we advocate, an argument also can be made, based upon case law, for consumer welfare. In most simple cases, the antitrust welfare standard does not matter. Beyond these simple cases, however, there are more complicated cases for which the welfare standard does matter. The article introduces the first set of complications in Section III where we analyze the need to weigh efficiencies that are accompanied by increased market power flowing from joint ventures or mergers. In Section IV, we turn our attention to the creation of countervailing power through joint ventures or mergers. In Section V, we turn our attention to restraints that have no apparent total welfare effects, but do have pronounced distributive effects. Finally, we close the article with some concluding comments in Section VI regarding how to solve the policy dilemma of the implementation of proper goal of antitrust
Rethinking Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
For nearly a century, Major League Baseball (MLB) has enjoyed antitrust immunity. No other sports league or organization is similarly exempt. Shielded by precedent from antitrust prosecution, MLB clubs are free to exploit both monopolistic and monopsonistic power. In this paper, we call for a repeal of MLB’s antitrust exemption. In doing so, we examine some recent antitrust challenges to MLB conduct, the current interest of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in labor market issues, the welfare consequences of the exemption, and a policy recommendation for legislative action
Bundled Discounts, Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Policy
In this paper, we explore the competitive significance of both bundled and loyalty discounts. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we examine the antitrust treatment of both bundled discounts and loyalty discounts in the United States. In Section III, we examine bundled discounts and discuss their competitive significance. In Section IV, we examine loyalty discounts as well as their competitive significance. In Section V, we suggest that the courts evaluate bundled discounts and loyalty discounts under the Rule of Reason. In Section VI, we close with some concluding remarks and policy recommendations
Formula Pricing and Profit Sharing in Inter‐Firm Contracts
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109908/1/mde2704.pd
The NCAA’s Transfer Rules: An Antitrust Analysis
In Deppe v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Seventh Circuit accepted the NCAA’s argument that its transfer rules are presumptively procompetitive. It also approved the NCAA’s no-poaching agreement. This Article analyzes these NCAA-imposed restraints and finds them inconsistent with current antitrust policy
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