Dealing with the Inventory Risk. A solution to the market making problem

Market makers continuously set bid and ask quotes for the stocks they have under consideration. Hence they face a complex optimization problem in which their return, based on the bid-ask spread they quote and the frequency at which they indeed provide liquidity, is challenged by the price risk they bear due to their inventory. In this paper, we consider a stochastic control problem similar to the one introduced by Ho and Stoll and formalized mathematically by Avellaneda and Stoikov. The market is modeled using a reference price $S_t$ following a Brownian motion with standard deviation $\sigma$, arrival rates of buy or sell liquidity-consuming orders depend on the distance to the reference price $S_t$ and a market maker maximizes the expected utility of its P&L over a finite time horizon. We show that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations associated to the stochastic optimal control problem can be transformed into a system of linear ordinary differential equations and we solve the market making problem under inventory constraints. We also shed light on the asymptotic behavior of the optimal quotes and propose closed-form approximations based on a spectral characterization of the optimal quotes

Stock Exchanges and Issuers: A Changing Relationship

The nature of the relation between stock exchanges and firms seeking a listing has changed considerably over the past decades. In this paper, we argue that the relationship has lost most of its historic complexity and has almost been reduced to a standardized contract in the sense that there are few contractual properties distinguishing listing on different exchanges apart from granting access to a specific liquidity pool. Analyzing the actual specifications of listing agreements at five major stock exchanges, we demonstrate that the contractual features are converging towards a standardized agreement. Furthermore, we show that some of the functions formerly fulfilled by exchanges are now performed by other institutions. We analyze whether these changes are reflected by policy makers in their efforts to create integrated European capital markets.Die Beziehung zwischen Börsen und Eigenkapitalemittenten hat sich in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten fundamental verändert. In diesem Beitrag argumentieren wir, dass diese Beziehung einer standardisierten Vertragsbeziehung gleicht, die ihre historische Komplexität weitgehend verloren hat. Während Börsen in der Vergangenheit unterschiedlich gestaltete Listinganforderungen an Unternehmen gestellt und durchgesetzt haben, ist heute ihr wesentliches Differenzierungsmerkmal die Liquidität der gehandelten Aktien. Eine Untersuchung der Listinganforderungen von fünf bedeutenden Börsen zeigt, dass die wichtigsten Vertragsbestandteile des Abkommens zwischen Emmittent und Börse weitgehend vereinheitlicht sind. Wir zeigen weiterhin, dass neue Institutionen wie etwa nationale Börsenaufsichtsbehörden einige der früher von Börsen wahrgenommenen Aufgaben übernommen haben. Abschließend untersuchen wir, ob und in welchem Maße diese Veränderungen in den gegenwärtigen Bemühungen zur Schaffung integrierter europäischer Kapitalmärkte berücksichtigt werden

Accounting, boundary-making and organizational permeability

Financial accounting necessarily depends on an entity assumption which shapes the way it recognises and accounts for organizational exchanges with social environments. It thereby constructs boundaries and frames permeability in terms of what counts, is accounted for, as being inside and outside of the organization. Yet there are different possible entity concepts reflecting different values about the relationship between the organizational entity and society. This essay considers four problem areas in which these values and the entity-society relationship are at stake within financial accounting: the problem of control within group accounting; accounting for externalities; the economization of public organizations; and the construction of organizational actorhood. These four problematics suggest that financial accounting, its boundary determining assumptions and the forms of organizational permeability it permits, are deeply intertwined and subject to continuous pressure for change

The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Reserve's Extraordinary Intervention During the Global Financial Crisis

Before the global financial crisis, the assistance of a lender of last resort was traditionally thought to be limited to commercial banks. During the crisis, however, the Federal Reserve created a number of facilities to support brokers and dealers, money market mutual funds, the commercial paper market, the mortgage-backed securities market, the triparty repo market, et cetera. In this paper, we argue that the elimination of specialized banking through the eventual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) has played an important role in the leakage of the public subsidy intended for commercial banks to nonbank financial institutions. In a specialized financial system, which the GSA had helped create, the use of the lender-of-last-resort safety net could be more comfortably limited to commercial banks. However, the elimination of GSA restrictions on bank-permissible activities has contributed to the rise of a financial system where the lines between regulated and protected banks and the so-called shadow banking system have become blurred. The existence of the shadow banking universe, which is directly or indirectly guaranteed by banks, has made it practically impossible to confine the safety to the regulated banking system. In this context, reforming the lender-of-last-resort institution requires fundamental changes within the financial system itself

The German Banking System and the Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Developments and Policy Responses

Germany's banking sector has been severely hit by the global financial crisis. In a German context as of February, 2009, this paper reviews briefly the structure of the banking industry, quantifies effects of the crisis on banks and surveys responses of economic policy. It is argued that policy design needs to enhance transparency and enforce the liability principle. In addition, economic policy should not eclipse principles of competition policy.Der deutsche Bankensektor ist durch die internationale Finanzkrise schwer getroffen. Auf Deutschland und die im Februar 2009 verfügbaren Informationen bezogen, werden die Struktur des Bankensektors kurz umrissen, die Effekte auf die Banken quantifiziert und wirtschaftspolitische Reaktionen aufgezeigt. Ziel der Wirtschaftspolitik ist es, die Transparenz zu erhöhen und das Haftungsprinzip durchzusetzen. Darüber hinaus sollten Grundsätze der Wettbewerbspolitik nicht in den Hintergrund geraten