Terror from behind the keyboard: conceptualising faceless detractors and guarantors of security in cyberspace

By reflecting on active public-domain government documents and statements, this article seeks to develop securitisation theory’s articulation of the dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate violence as it is reflected in British government policy. This dichotomy has (re)developed through a process wherein GCHQ and MI5 are portrayed as ‘faceless guarantors’ of security, in Manichean juxtaposition to the discursively-created phantom cyberterrorists, who are presented as ‘faceless detractors’ of security. It has previously been stated that the terrorism discourse associated with the present ‘War on Terror’ is attributed, in part, to mechanics of fantasy. I argue that, within the securitised discourse of cyberterrorism, the limits of fantasy possesses a murky nuance, which in turn, allows for a deeper - or at least more entrenched - securitisation. The official discourse surrounding the intelligence services’ online surveillance apparatus operates with a similar opaque quality, but this is upheld by securitising actors as a strength to be maintained

From \u2018cyberterrorism\u2019 to \u2018cyberwar\u2019, back and forth: how the United States securitized cyberspace

The chapter analyzes how the United States government secutitized the issue of cyberterrorism. In so doing, it put that issue outside of the public scrutiny. The Clinton administration had identified non-state actors (such as al-Qaeda) as the main threat to the United States, whereas the Bush administration first did not want to recognize non-state actors as threats (to the US information nfrastructure system) and only changed its attitude after Spetember 11