CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CHOICE, WHAT SCOPE FOR FLEXIBILITY IN TUNISIA?

Capital account liberalization and exchange rate regime choice, what scope for flexibility in Tunisia? This study evaluates within a game-theoretic framework the exchange rate regime from a welfare perspective. In a tradable-nontradable goods model framework, Tunisia’s exchange rate regime choice is cast in terms of strategic interactions between the monetary authority and domestic enterprises. The monetary authority is assumed to choose an optimal exchange rate regime according to a welfare-related criterion by minimising a loss function defined in terms of external competitiveness and domestic inflation. Simulations outcomes reveal that capital account liberalization in the Tunisian economic context is compatible with a flexible exchange rate regime.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40201/3/wp815.pd

Credit constraints in education: Evidence from international data

This paper tests empirically the credit-constraints thesis by using cross-country data on secondary and higher-education enrolment rates. Contrary to some previous works in this direction, we find several pieces of evidence that support the importance of such a thesis. First, controlling for the effects of both economic development and educational inequality, we find that school enrolments are negatively correlated with income inequality and positively correlated with financial-market development. Second, these correlations are robust to the specific country-effects, the composition of the sample of countries, and the inclusion of public education expenditures. Finally, public education expenditures are significantly correlated with school enrolment ratios. Distinguishing developed countries from developing ones reveals that the effects of both social and material factors are larger in rich countries than in poor ones. Our estimation results also show that the way public expenditures are allocated across educational levels affects enrolment ratios in higher educational stages. Specifically, countries where expenditure allocations are biased in favour of the advanced stages of education at the expense of the basic levels also experience low enrolment ratios in the higher levels of education.borrowing constraints, educational inequality, education expenditures, empirical estimations

Inequalities, public education expenditures and intergenerational mobility

This paper shows that, depending on the initial distribution of material wealth and that of individuals' abilities, economies converge in the long-run towards different levels of the size of the skilled workforce, and average wealth. Furthermore, unless the income tax rate is too high, the increase in total public funds is associated, in the long-run, with a higher net mobility, a larger fraction of skilled workers, and higher levels of wealth of all the dynasties. In addition, the reallocation of public expenditures from basic to advanced education can result in a lower mobility, a lower long-run size of skilled workforce, and a lower long-run level of wealth held by rich dynasties, if the transfer of resources comes at the expense of excessively lowering the quality of education at the basic schooling level.

Exit from short-term contract. A french empirical analysis, 1990-2002

This paper tests the determinants of the transition out of short-term contracts by means of competing risk form of the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model. We use three labour market states distinguishing between exit into long-term contract, another short-term contract, and unemployment. For each type of exit, we define a separate hazard function that we'll call a type-specific hazard. The estimates are carried out from a dataset recording individual labour market histories, the French Labour Force Survey (LFS) collected by theFrench National Statistical Institute (INSEE). The competing risk model is estimated for all the individual as well as separately for men and women. Our results show that, for men and women, the conditional probability of exiting STC into LTC decreases after 12th months. Moreover, staying in the same firm after a STC increases the chances of getting stable jobs in the future.Short-Term Contracts ; Duration model ; Competing risk hazard model