The Structure of the Asymmetric Tax Treaty Network: Theory and Implications

Certain parts of the international tax system are largely unexplored from a structural perspective. One prominent example is the asymmetric tax treaty network, i.e., the network that consists of bilateral tax treaties concluded between developed and emerging countries on the basis of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD model). The relative size of this network is substantial. For instance, the United States´ asymmetric tax treaty network represents about 53% of its entire tax treaty network. This Article offers a structural analysis of the asymmetric tax treaty network. It answers two fundamental questions. First, it elaborates a theory for explaining why a representative emerging country is willing to conclude tax treaties with developed countries on the basis of the OECD model. Second, this Article extends that theory to understand the dynamics of tax treaty interpretation in the emerging world. This extension aims to illuminate the incentive structure that the courts of a representative emerging country normally have when construing OECD-based tax treaties in the foreign direct investment (FDI) area. Game theory is used as a theoretical framework for answering both questions

The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Proposal for Simplification.

This Article focuses on the problem of transfer pricing from an international taxation perspective. It elaborates two major points using game theory as a theoretical framework. First, it argues that both developed and developing countries are facing the same fundamental problem in the transfer pricing arena; the meaning of the arm’s length standard (ALS) is increasingly unknowable because of the absence of transfer pricing case law with public good features. Second, this Article proposes a solution to the transfer pricing problem within the ALS framework. The proposal consists of a procedural, rather than a substantive, system in which multilateral advance pricing agreements (APAs) are used to produce a proxy for case law with public good features. The proposal is arguably superior to other options (such as formulary apportionment and consolidated base taxation approach elaborated by the European Commission in 2001) because it can be applied by both developed and developing countries and is consistent with the current structure of international taxation. The proposal has been written to facilitate its addition to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital

Global tax hubs

Global tax hubs are the black boxes of the international tax regime (ITR). The driving forces of their strategic interaction with other building blocks of the ITR remain undertheorized. This paper offers the first theory of tax hubs as a two-sided global marketplace. It argues that tax hubs are the matchmakers of the ITR. Indeed, international investors, tax hubs and endpoint jurisdictions play different yet interrelated roles within the same ecosystem, i.e., the two-sided platform. The theory is positive rather than normative. It aims to explain how the creeping marketization of the ITR, as part of international law, has been frequently instrumented worldwide over the last century. The paper provides a stress test to the theory’s explanatory power and its limitations. The conceptual framework of this piece rests on antitrust law and economic concepts

How to restructure the international tax regime

Liberal democracy, national determination and economic globalisation are increasingly at odds with one another, which keeps the global governance structure from working smoothly. Eduardo Baistrocchi details a proposal that could be a first step towards solving the problem: a United Nations-controlled platform for standardising international taxation agreements. The idea is to make the international tax regime responsive to the needs and values of people worldwide

The transfer pricing problem: the Argentine experience (1932-1998)

This essay examines the various approaches that Argentina has developed to address this problem in the income tax area. The period studied runs from 1932, when the first transfer pricing provision was passed, up to the 1998 Reform that, according to what was stated in a recent New York conference, embodies “… the [1995] OECD guidelines related to Transfer Pricing methods and rules…

Honorarios

Se aborda cómo es retribuida la tarea realizada por el contador síndico pero, por sobre todo, se analizará si esa retribución es suficiente o no, tema que está sujeto a gran cantidad de opiniones y debates, producto de las últimas modificaciones a la legislación concursal que alteraron la forma de regulación de los emolumentos. Se examinará la coherencia entre la labor realizada y los honorarios cobrados, teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, llegando a la conclusión que el trabajo del síndico concursal no se encuentra bien remunerado, necesitando la ley concursal una profunda actualización, de manera de solucionar los desfasajes existentes y lograr así una actividad sindical comprometida y de excelencia, tal como lo exige el proceso, ya sea un concurso preventivo o una quiebra.Fil: Baistrocchi, Tomás. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas.Fil: Carra, Marcos. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas

Il mispricing dei prodotti strutturati nel mercato italiano

Il processo di innovazione finanziaria e il processo di stabilizzazione dei tassi di interesse dovuto all' adozione della moneta unica hanno spinto gli intermediari finanziari e la loro clientela alla ricerca di nuove opportunità  di raccolta per i primi e di impiego delle risorse finanziarie per la seconda, tra queste i prodotti strutturati. Essi sono un indice di accresciuta maturità nelle preferenze di impiego e nella costruzione del portafoglio degli investitori, ma anche sintomo evidente della scarsa accessibilità  della clientela retail ai mercati dei derivati. Di conseguenza le banche e le assicurazioni, emettendo e distribuendo i prodotti strutturati, sopperiscono alle mancanze di un mercato incompleto e divengono i market makers nel mercato delle negoziazioni; ciò determina una forte asimmetria tra gli offerenti e i clienti/investitori sintetizzabile nella differenza tra il prezzo di emissione e il prezzo teorico degli strumenti finanziari in esame. Il mispricing è dovuto alla non perfetta circolazione delle informazioni dovuta alla complessità dei prodotti, alla mancanza di liquidità del mercato secondario e al ruolo delle Autorità di Vigilanza.Financial innovation and EMU constitution are the causes of the research of new opportunities for investiments. Structured product are one of these opportunities as derivatives markets are incomplete and customers have riskier investiment preferences. These products allow retail customer to invest in markets unknow and much complex. So banks and insurances are market makers and manage this market in a not enough transparent way because of imperfect information of investors due to product complexity, illiquidity of the market and the Authority rule. Keywords: Financial innovation, Asimmetric information, Fair value, Mispricing, Disclosure

Responsabilidad y realidad : ¿por qué es innecesaria la existencia de un régimen de responsabilidad civil contractual por un lado y extracontractual por el otro?

Fil: Rodríguez Galli, Javier. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Buenos Aires, ArgentinaFil: Baistrocchi, Eduardo A. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Buenos Aires, Argentin

Il mispricing dei prodotti strutturati nel mercato italiano

Il processo di innovazione finanziaria e il processo di stabilizzazione dei tassi di interesse dovuto all' adozione della moneta unica hanno spinto gli intermediari finanziari e la loro clientela alla ricerca di nuove opportunità  di raccolta per i primi e di impiego delle risorse finanziarie per la seconda, tra queste i prodotti strutturati. Essi sono un indice di accresciuta maturità nelle preferenze di impiego e nella costruzione del portafoglio degli investitori, ma anche sintomo evidente della scarsa accessibilità  della clientela retail ai mercati dei derivati. Di conseguenza le banche e le assicurazioni, emettendo e distribuendo i prodotti strutturati, sopperiscono alle mancanze di un mercato incompleto e divengono i market makers nel mercato delle negoziazioni; ciò determina una forte asimmetria tra gli offerenti e i clienti/investitori sintetizzabile nella differenza tra il prezzo di emissione e il prezzo teorico degli strumenti finanziari in esame. Il mispricing è dovuto alla non perfetta circolazione delle informazioni dovuta alla complessità dei prodotti, alla mancanza di liquidità del mercato secondario e al ruolo delle Autorità di Vigilanza.Financial innovation and EMU constitution are the causes of the research of new opportunities for investiments. Structured product are one of these opportunities as derivatives markets are incomplete and customers have riskier investiment preferences. These products allow retail customer to invest in markets unknow and much complex. So banks and insurances are market makers and manage this market in a not enough transparent way because of imperfect information of investors due to product complexity, illiquidity of the market and the Authority rule. Keywords: Financial innovation, Asimmetric information, Fair value, Mispricing, Disclosure