The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for Judgments of Truth

This article combines findings from cognitive psychology on the role of processing fluency in truth judgments with epistemological theory on justification of belief. We first review evidence that repeated exposure to a statement increases the subjective ease with which that statement is processed. This increased processing fluency, in turn, increases the probability that the statement is judged to be true. The basic question discussed here is whether the use of processing fluency as a cue to truth is epistemically justified. In the present analysis, based on Bayes’ Theorem, we adopt the reliable-process account of justification presented by Goldman (1986) and show that fluency is a reliable cue to truth, under the assumption that the majority of statements one has been exposed to are true. In the final section, we broaden the scope of this analysis and discuss how processing fluency as a potentially universal cue to judged truth may contribute to cultural differences in commonsense beliefs

Recollection, perception, imagination

Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. Our first question is: Q1 What are these similarities (and differences)? The question can equally well be asked about other modalities—a purring cat could be substituted for a sleeping one, for example. But the chief examples will be visual. Despite the similarities between remembering, seeing, and imagining, one can readily distinguish them in one’s own case. When one sees a cat sleeping, one is often in a position to know that one sees a cat sleeping. (Or, at least, to know that one sees something, which perhaps unbeknownst to one is a cat sleeping.) In ordinary cases, there is no danger of confusing vision with recollection or imagination. Although confusion between recollection and imagination is more likely, it is not pervasive: usually there is little difficulty in knowing that one is recalling a cat sleeping, not (merely) visualizing a cat sleeping. 1 Our second question concerns this latter fact: Q2 How does one tell that one is recalling (and so not perceiving or imagining)? “By introspection ” is no doubt a correct answer, if ‘introspection ’ is taken as a label for that special first-person method—whatever it is—that delivers knowledge of one’s mental life. Correct, but hardly illuminating. Of course, there are versions of Q2 for perceiving and imagining, with equally unobvious substantive answers. The version of Q2 for perception will be addressed en route to answering the version for recollection. 1 Seeming to recall is an important category, but space precludes the discussion it deserves.

Creating Non-Believed Memories for Recent Autobiographical Events

A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs

Negative Priming Under Rapid Serial Visual Presentation

Negative priming (NP) was examined under a new paradigm wherein a target and distractors were temporally separated using rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP). The results from the two experiments revealed that (a) NP was robust under RSVP, such that the responses to a target were slower when the target served as a distractor in a previous trial than when it did not; (b) NP was found regardless of whether the distractors appeared before or after the targets; and (c) NP was stronger when the distractor was more distinctive. These findings are generally similar to those on NP in the spatial search task. The implications for the processes causing NP under RSVP are discussed in the current paper

The Mere Exposure Effect in the Domain of Haptics

Background: Zajonc showed that the attitude towards stimuli that one had been previously exposed to is more positive than towards novel stimuli. This mere exposure effect (MEE) has been tested extensively using various visual stimuli. Research on the MEE is sparse, however, for other sensory modalities. Methodology/Principal Findings: We used objects of two material categories (stone and wood) and two complexity levels (simple and complex) to test the influence of exposure frequency (F0 = novel stimuli, F2 = stimuli exposed twice, F10 = stimuli exposed ten times) under two sensory modalities (haptics only and haptics & vision). Effects of exposure frequency were found for high complex stimuli with significantly increasing liking from F0 to F2 and F10, but only for the stone category. Analysis of ‘‘Need for Touch’ ’ data showed the MEE in participants with high need for touch, which suggests different sensitivity or saturation levels of MEE. Conclusions/Significance: This different sensitivity or saturation levels might also reflect the effects of expertise on the haptic evaluation of objects. It seems that haptic and cross-modal MEEs are influenced by factors similar to those in the visual domain indicating a common cognitive basis

Capacity and Procedural Accounts of Impaired Memory in Depression

Findings of impaired memory in states of dysphoria or depression are summarized and subsumed under different accounts of mood-related memory deficits. Theoretical accounts based on the assumption of a storage system of limited capacity are compared to accounts which emphasize the role of procedures and strategies in attending and remembering. Two reanalyses of a recent experiment in the process-dissociation paradigm are reported. They address issues of dysphoria-related differences in automatic versus controlled uses of memory in a task of word-stem completion. The two reanalyses rest on different assumptions about the relation between automatic and controlled components, but they converge in highlighting the advantages of a procedural rather than capacity-based view of memory deficits. finally. similarities to other research domains and theoretical approaches are outlined

Preference for facial averageness: evidence for a common mechanism in human and macaque infants

Human adults and infants show a preference for average faces, which could stem from a general processing mechanism and may be shared among primates. However, little is known about preference for facial averageness in monkeys. We used a comparative developmental approach and eye-tracking methodology to assess visual attention in human and macaque infants to faces naturally varying in their distance from a prototypical face. In Experiment 1, we examined the preference for faces relatively close to or far from the prototype in 12-month-old human infants with human adult female faces. Infants preferred faces closer to the average than faces farther from it. In Experiment 2, we measured the looking time of 3-month-old rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) viewing macaque faces varying in their distance from the prototype. Like human infants, macaque infants looked longer to faces closer to the average. In Experiments 3 and 4, both species were presented with unfamiliar categories of faces (i.e., macaque infants tested with adult macaque faces; human infants and adults tested with infant macaque faces) and showed no prototype preferences, suggesting that the prototypicality effect is experience-dependent. Overall, the findings suggest a common processing mechanism across species, leading to averageness preferences in primates