Modes of Foreign Entry under Asymmetric Information about Potential Technology Spillovers

This paper studies the effect of technology spillovers on the entry decision of a multinational enterprise into a foreign market. Two alternative entry modes for a foreign direct investment are considered: Greenfield investment versus acquisition. We find that with quantity competition a spillover makes acquisitions less attractive, while with price competition acquisitions become more attractive. Asymmetric information about potential spillovers always reduces the number of acquisitions independently of whether the host country or the entrant has private information. Interestingly, we find that asymmetric information always hurts the entrant, while it sometimes is in favor of the host country

How to increase technology transfers to developing countries: a synthesis of the evidence

The existing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has failed to deliver the rate of low-carbon technology transfer (TT) required to curb GHG emissions in developing countries. This failure has exposed the limitations of universalism and renewed interest in bilateral approaches to TT. Gaps are identified in the UNFCCC approach to climate change TT: missing links between international institutions and the national enabling environments that encourage private investment; a non-differentiated approach for (developing) country and technology characteristics; and a lack of clear measurements of the volume and effectiveness of TTs. Evidence from econometric literature and business experience on climate change TT is reviewed, so as to address the identified pitfalls of the UNFCCC process. Strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches are highlighted. International policy recommendations are offered aimed at improving the level of emission reductions achieved through TT

Strategies of Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Technological Spillovers

Dawid H, Zou B. Strategies of Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Technological Spillovers. Working Papers in Economics and Management. Vol 12-2013. Bielefeld: Bielefeld University, Department of Business Administration and Economics; 2013.In this paper we present a differential game model of two firms with different technologies producing the same good and selling in the same world market. The firm equipped with advanced technology is deciding whether to outsource parts of its production to the home country of its competitor, where wages and the level of technology are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with spillovers to the foreign competitor. The degree to which the foreign competitor can absorb these spillovers depends on its absorptive effort. Using numerical methods the properties of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this game are characterized and the implications of the variation of different key parameters are examined