2,289 research outputs found

    Networking Effects on Cooperation in Evolutionary Snowdrift Game

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    The effects of networking on the extent of cooperation emerging in a competitive setting are studied. The evolutionary snowdrift game, which represents a realistic alternative to the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, is studied in the Watts-Strogatz network that spans the regular, small-world, and random networks through random re-wiring. Over a wide range of payoffs, a re-wired network is found to suppress cooperation when compared with a well-mixed or fully connected system. Two extinction payoffs, that characterize the emergence of a homogeneous steady state, are identified. It is found that, unlike in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the standard deviation of the degree distribution is the dominant network property that governs the extinction payoffs.Comment: Changed conten

    A dynamically extending exclusion process

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    An extension of the totally asymmetric exclusion process, which incorporates a dynamically extending lattice is explored. Although originally inspired as a model for filamentous fungal growth, here the dynamically extending exclusion process (DEEP) is studied in its own right, as a nontrivial addition to the class of nonequilibrium exclusion process models. Here we discuss various mean-field approximation schemes and elucidate the steady state behaviour of the model and its associated phase diagram. Of particular note is that the dynamics of the extending lattice leads to a new region in the phase diagram in which a shock discontinuity in the density travels forward with a velocity that is lower than the velocity of the tip of the lattice. Thus in this region the shock recedes from both boundaries.Comment: 20 pages, 12 figure

    Phase diagram of two-lane driven diffusive systems

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    We consider a large class of two-lane driven diffusive systems in contact with reservoirs at their boundaries and develop a stability analysis as a method to derive the phase diagrams of such systems. We illustrate the method by deriving phase diagrams for the asymmetric exclusion process coupled to various second lanes: a diffusive lane; an asymmetric exclusion process with advection in the same direction as the first lane, and an asymmetric exclusion process with advection in the opposite direction. The competing currents on the two lanes naturally lead to a very rich phenomenology and we find a variety of phase diagrams. It is shown that the stability analysis is equivalent to an `extremal current principle' for the total current in the two lanes. We also point to classes of models where both the stability analysis and the extremal current principle fail

    Chaos and unpredictability in evolutionary dynamics in discrete time

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    A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is studied. The stationary properties differ from that of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where periodic and chaotic behavior replace the usual fixed-point population solutions. We observe the familiar period-doubling and chaotic-band-splitting attractor cascades of unimodal maps but in some cases more elaborate variations appear due to bimodality. Also unphysical stationary solutions have unusual physical implications, such as uncertainty of final population caused by sensitivity to initial conditions and fractality of attractor preimage manifolds.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

    Do people really want to be nudged towards healthy lifestyles?

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    This paper assesses Thaler and Sunstein’s claim that policies that nudge individuals towards healthy lifestyles promote the welfare of those individuals, as judged by themselves. I argue that Thaler and Sunstein switch between two different interpretations of that clause. One interpretation gives the clause a wide range of applicability, but drains it of its content as a repudiation of paternalism. The other interpretation makes it more meaningful to say that people want to make the choices they are being nudged towards, but applies to a much narrower range of cases than Thaler and Sunstein have in mind

    Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity

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    This paper analyses alternative profiles of opportunity sets for individuals in an exchange economy, without assuming that individuals’ choices reveal coherent preferences. It introduces the concept of a ‘market-clearing single-price regime’, representing a profile of opportunity sets consistent with competitive equilibrium. It also proposes an opportunity-based normative criterion, the Strong Opportunity Criterion, which is analogous with the core in preference-based analysis. It shows that every market-clearing single-price regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion and that, in the limit as an economy is replicated, only such regimes have this property

    ‘I don't think I can catch it’: women, confidence and responsibility in football coach education

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    Whilst women’s participation in sport continues to increase, their presence remains ideologically challenging given the significance of sport for the construction of gendered identities. As a hegmonically masculine institution, leadership roles across sport remain male-dominated and the entry of women into positions of authority (such as coaching) routinely contested. But in powerful male-typed sports, like football, women’s participation remains particularly challenging. Consequently, constructions of gender inequity in coaching were explored at a regional division of the English Football Association through unstructured interviews and coaching course observation. Using critical discourse analysis we identified the consistent re/production of women as unconfident in their own skills and abilities, and the framing of women themselves as responsible for the gendered inequities in football coaching. Women were thereby strategically positioned as deservedly on the periphery of the football category,whilst the organization was positioned as progressive and liberal

    Public goods and decay in networks

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    We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments
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