740 research outputs found
Incentivising Privacy in Cryptocurrencies
Privacy was one of the key points mentioned in Nakamoto's Bitcoin whitepaper,
and one of the selling points of Bitcoin in its early stages. In hindsight,
however, de-anonymising Bitcoin users turned out to be more feasible than
expected. Since then, privacy focused cryptocurrencies such as Zcash and Monero
have surfaced. Both of these examples cannot be described as fully successful
in their aims, as recent research has shown. Incentives are integral to the
security of cryptocurrencies, so it is interesting to investigate whether they
could also be aligned with privacy goals. A lack of privacy often results from
low user counts, resulting in low anonymity sets. Could users be incentivised
to use the privacy preserving implementations of the systems they use? Not only
is Zcash much less used than Bitcoin (which it forked from), but most Zcash
transactions are simply transparent transactions, rather than the (at least
intended to be) privacy-preserving shielded transactions. This paper and poster
briefly discusses how incentives could be incorporated into systems like
cryptocurrencies with the aim of achieving privacy goals. We take Zcash as
example, but the ideas discussed could apply to other privacy-focused
cryptocurrencies. This work was presented as a poster at OPERANDI 2018, the
poster can be found within this short document
Descartes et le Nouveau Monde : le cheminement du cartésianisme au Canada XVIIe-XXe siècle. Par Jean-François de Raymond. (Québec : Presses de l’Université Laval, 2003. 334 p. ISBN 2-7637-7980-8 $35.)
Levels of Decentralization and Trust in Cryptocurrencies: Consensus, Governance and Applications
Since the apparition of Bitcoin, decentralization has become an ideal praised almost religiously. Indeed, removing the need for a central authority prevents many forms of abuse that could be performed by a trusted third party, especially when there are no transparency and accountability mechanisms in place. Decentralization is however a very subtle concept that has limits. In this thesis, we look at the decentralization of blockchains at three different levels. First we look at the consensus protocol, which is the heart of any decentralized system. The Nakamoto protocol, used by Bitcoin, has been shown to induce centralization through the shift to mining pools. Additionally, it is heavily criticized for the enormous amount of energy it requires. We propose a protocol, Fantômette, that incorporates incentives at its core and that consumes much less energy than Bitcoin and other proof-of-work based cryptocurrencies. If the consensus protocol makes it possible to decentralize the enforcement of rules in a cryptocurrency, there is still the question of who decides on the rules. Indeed, if a central authority is able to determine what those rules are then the fact that they are enforced in a decentralized way does not make it a decentralized system. We study the governance structure of Bitcoin and Ethereum by making measurements of their GitHub repositories and providing quantitative ways to compare their level of centralization by using appropriate metrics based on centrality measures. Finally, many applications are now built on top of blockchains. These can also induce or straightforwardly lead to centralization, for example by requiring that users register their identities to comply with regulations. We show how identities can be registered on blockchains in a decentralized and privacy-preserving way
Winkle: Foiling Long-Range Attacks in Proof-of-Stake Systems
Winkle protects any validator-based byzantine fault tolerant consensus mechanisms, such as those used in modern Proof-of-Stake blockchains, against long-range attacks where old validators' signature keys get compromised. Winkle is a decentralized secondary layer of client-based validation, where a client includes a single additional field into a transaction that they sign: a hash of the previously sequenced block. The block that gets a threshold of signatures (confirmations) weighted by clients' coins is called a "confirmed"checkpoint. We show that under plausible and flexible security assumptions about clients the confirmed checkpoints can not be equivocated. We discuss how client key rotation increases security, how to accommodate for coins' minting and how delegation allows for faster checkpoints. We evaluate checkpoint latency experimentally using Bitcoin and Ethereum transaction graphs, with and without delegation of stake
Security Analysis of Filecoin's Expected Consensus in the Byzantine vs Honest Model
Filecoin is the largest storage-based open-source blockchain, both by storage
capacity (>11EiB) and market capitalization. This paper provides the first
formal security analysis of Filecoin's consensus (ordering) protocol, Expected
Consensus (EC). Specifically, we show that EC is secure against an arbitrary
adversary that controls a fraction of the total storage for , where is a parameter that corresponds to the expected
number of blocks per round, currently in Filecoin. We then present an
attack, the -split attack, where an adversary splits the honest miners
between multiple chains, and show that it is successful for , thus proving that is the tight
security threshold of EC. This corresponds roughly to an adversary with
of the total storage pledged to the chain. Finally, we propose two improvements
to EC security that would increase this threshold. One of these two fixes is
being implemented as a Filecoin Improvement Proposal (FIP).Comment: AFT 202
Histoire politique et culturelle de la philosophie moderne
François Azouvi, directeur d’études Les philosophes français et la République, 1848-1900 Le séminaire a été consacré à l’étude des premières philosophies de la République dans la France révolutionnaire et post-révolutionnaire. Il a paru indispensable de revenir d’abord, et longuement, sur la personne et l’œuvre de Condorcet, même si elles sont l’une et l’autre bien connues. Mais c’est que Condorcet a posé les bases d’une philosophie rationnelle de la République qui laissera sa trace très dura..
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