Asking the public twice: why do voters change their minds in second referendums on EU treaties?

On three occasions – Denmark on the Maastricht Treaty, Ireland on the Nice Treaty and Ireland again on the Lisbon Treaty – voters have initially rejected an EU treaty only to vote in favour of it in a second referendum. Based on research conducted in Denmark and Ireland, Ece Özlem Atikcan assesses the reasons why voters changed their minds in each case. She illustrates that ‘Yes’ campaigners in both states learned from previous referendums and developed an approach that reframed the issue by emphasising concessions gained from the EU and the risks of rejecting a treaty for a second time

Diffusion in referendum campaigns : the case of EU constitutional referendums

The problem of cross-case influences is crucial in the analysis of social phenomena. Is a referendum held in a state entirely a ‘domestic’ event? No work has applied diffusion theories to the study of referendum campaigns. In this paper, I show diffusion effects among the 2005 Constitutional Treaty referendums. Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg used the referendum method to ratify the European Constitution. Based on 85 interviews with campaigners in all four countries, I find that campaign arguments and strategies were not always homegrown. However, such diffusion is not automatic and depends on diffusion channels

Choosing lobbying sides : the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union

Despite the impressive amount of empirical research on lobbying, a fundamental question remains overlooked. How do interest groups choose to lobby different sides of an issue? We argue that how groups choose sides is a function of firm-level economic activity. By studying a highly salient regulatory issue, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and using a novel dataset of lobbying, we reveal that a group’s main economic sector matters most. Firms operating in finance and retail face unique costs and are incentivized to lobby against the GDPR. However, these groups are outgunned by a large, heterogeneous group of firms with superior lobbying firepower on the other side of the issue

Framing risky choices: how the Leave campaign convinced Britain to take a leap into the unknown

Prior to the Brexit referendum in 2016, many observers expected that floating voters would swing toward Remain due to the perceived risks and uncertainty associated with leaving the European Union. Drawing on a new book, Ece Özlem Atikcan, Richard Nadeau and Éric Bélanger explain how the Leave campaign managed to reframe the risks associated with Brexit and win the referendum

When who and how matter: explaining the success of referendums in Europe

This article aims to identify the institutional factors that make a referendum successful. This comparative analysis seeks to explain the success of top-down referendums organized in Europe between 2001 and 2013. It argues and tests for the main effect of three institutional factors (popularity of the initiator, size of parliamentary majority, and political cues during referendum campaigns) and controls for the type of referendum and voter turnout. The analysis uses data collected from referendums and electoral databases, public opinion surveys, and newspaper articles. Results show that referendums proposed by a large parliamentary majority or with clear messages from political parties during campaign are likely to be successful

Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns : the power of the anti-EU side

European Union (EU) referendums provide unique opportunities to study voters’ attitudes toward a distant level of governance. Scholars have long tried to understand whether EU referendum results reflect domestic (dis-)satisfaction with the incumbent governments or actual attitudes toward the Union. Finding evidence supporting both domestic and European factors, the recent focus has thus turned to referendum campaigns. Recent studies emphasise the importance of the information provided to voters during these campaigns in order to analyse how domestic or European issues become salient in the minds of voters. These studies nonetheless overlook the asymmetrical political advantage in such campaigns. The broader literature on referendums and public opinion suggest that in a referendum, the ‘No’ side typically has the advantage since it can boost the public's fears by linking the proposal to unpopular issues. This article explores whether this dynamic applies to EU treaty ratification referendums. Does the anti-EU treaty campaign have more advantage than the pro-EU treaty campaign in these referendums? Campaign strategies in 11 EU treaty ratification referendums are analysed, providing a clear juxtaposition between pro-treaty (‘Yes’) and anti-treaty (‘No’) campaigns. Based on 140 interviews with campaigners in 11 referendums, a series of indicators on political setting and campaign characteristics, as well as an in-depth case study of the 2012 Irish Fiscal Compact referendum, it is found that the anti-treaty side indeed holds the advantage if it engages the debate. Nonetheless, the findings also show that this advantage is not unconditional. The underlying mechanism rests on the multidimensionality of the issue. The extent to which the referendum debate includes a large variety of ‘No’ campaign arguments correlates strongly with the campaigners’ perceived advantage/disadvantage, and the referendum results. When the ‘No’ side's arguments are limited (either through a single-issue treaty or guarantees from the EU), this provides the ‘Yes’ side with a ‘cleaner’ agenda with which to work. Importantly, the detailed data demonstrate that the availability of arguments is important for the ‘Yes’ side as well. They tend to have the most advantage when they can tap into the economic costs of an anti-EU vote. This analysis has implications for other kinds of EU referendums such as Brexit, non-EU referendums such as independence referendums, and the future of European integration

Centrosome amplification induced by survivin suppression enhances both chromosome instability and radiosensitivity in glioma cells

Glioblastoma is characterised by invasive growth and a high degree of radioresistance. Survivin, a regulator of chromosome segregation, is highly expressed and known to induce radioresistance in human gliomas. In this study, we examined the effect of survivin suppression on radiosensitivity in malignant glioma cells, while focusing on centrosome aberration and chromosome instability (CIN). We suppressed survivin by small interfering RNA transfection, and examined the radiosensitivity using a clonogenic assay and a trypan blue exclusion assay in U251MG (p53 mutant) and D54MG (p53 wild type) cells. To assess the CIN status, we determined the number of centrosomes using an immunofluorescence analysis, and the centromeric copy number by fluorescence in situ hybridisation. As a result, the radiosensitisation differed regarding the p53 status as U251MG cells quickly developed extreme centrosome amplification (=CIN) and enhanced the radiosensitivity, while centrosome amplification and radiosensitivity increased more gradually in D54MG cells. TUNEL assay showed that survivin inhibition did not lead to apoptosis after irradiation. This cell death was accompanied by an increased degree of aneuploidy, suggesting mitotic cell death. Therefore, survivin inhibition may be an attractive therapeutic target to overcome the radioresistance while, in addition, proper attention to CIN (centrosome number) is considered important for improving radiosensitivity in human glioma

Emotions, cognitions and moderation : understanding losers’ consent in the 2016 Brexit referendum

Why do some voters accept their defeat and agree to a democratic verdict while some do not? This distinction between “graceful” and “sore” losers is essential for the stability of democratic regimes. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of losers’ consent in the 2016 Brexit referendum using original public opinion data. Extant studies suggest that post-electoral reactions are mainly outcome-driven, consider winners and losers as homogeneous groups, and neglect the individual-level profile and motivations of graceful losers. Using an innovative and direct question to measure losers’ consent, this research finds that voters’ reaction to the outcome is also process-driven. Graceful losers are politically involved and principled citizens who are more inclined to judge the merits of democracy in procedural terms. They are also more politically sophisticated, less emotionally engaged in the electoral decision, hold more moderate views on the object of the vote, and are torn between the options until the end of the campaign. These findings have important implications for democratic theory. The stability of democracies depends not only on sophisticated voters capable of prioritizing the benefits of the democratic process over disappointing outcomes but also on voters who are indecisive, hesitant, and above all, moderate