The Divide between Subsistence and Transformational Entrepreneurship

This paper argues that it is crucially important to differentiate between two very distinct sets of entrepreneurs: subsistence and transformational entrepreneurs. Recent evidence suggests that people engaging in these two types of entrepreneurship are not only very distinct in nature but that only a negligible fraction of them transition from subsistence to transformational entrepreneurship. These individuals vary in their economic objectives, their skills, and their role in the economy. Most important, they seem to respond very differently to policy changes and economic cycles. Yet most development policies aimed at fostering entrepreneurship focus on subsistence entrepreneurship in the hope of creating transformational entrepreneurs. I argue that unless we understand the differences between those two types of entrepreneurs more clearly, many policy interventions may have unintended consequences and may even have an adverse impact on the economy

Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital

This paper investigates the performance of private equity partnerships using a data set of individual fund returns collected by Venture Economics. Over the sample period, average fund returns net of fees approximately equal the S\&P 500 although there is a large degree of heterogeneity. Returns persist strongly across funds raised by individual private equity partnerships. Better performing funds are more likely to raise follow-on funds and raise larger funds than funds that perform poorly. This relationship is concave so that top performing funds do not grow proportionally as much as the average fund. Finally, market entry in private equity is cyclical. Funds (and partnerships) started in boom times are less likely to raise follow-on funds, suggesting that these funds subsequently perform worse. Several of these results differ markedly from those for mutual funds.

Transaction Structures in the Developing World

While variations in public securities markets across nations have attracted increasing scrutiny, private financings have received little attention. But in developing nations, the bulk of financings are private ones. This paper analyzes 210 private equity transactions in developing countries. We find that unlike in the U.S., where convertible preferred securities are ubiquitous, in developing nations a much broader array of securities are employed and private equity investors often have fewer contractual protections. The choice of security appears to be driven by the legal and economic circumstances of the nation and the private equity group. Investments in common law nations are structured similar to those in the U.S., being less likely to employ common stock or straight debt, and more likely to use preferred stock with a variety of covenants. By way of contrast, in nations where the rule of law is less established, private equity groups are likely to use common stock and own the majority of the firm's equity if the investment encounters difficulties. Private equity groups based in the U.S. and U.K. rely more on preferred securities but also adapt transactions to local conditions. These contractual differences appear to have real consequences: larger transactions with higher valuations are seen in common law countries. These findings suggest that the structure of a country's legal system affects private contracts and cannot easily be undone by (bi-lateral) private solutions.

Are the Seeds of Bad Governance Sown in Good Times?

This paper examines the extent to which the corporate governance structure of a firm arises endogenously in response to its performance. We demonstrate that following periods of abnormally good performance, managers are more likely to call special meetings and to propose and pass governance measures that are contrary to shareholder interests (based on IRRC classification). These results are driven primarily by firms that are characterized as having poor governance according to either the GIM Index or the proportion of activist shareholders. Following these special meetings, we find that the next quarter performance of the firm is negative. Our results are consistent with an interpretation of shareholder inattention to governance following good firm performance or a desire to reward management for good past performance. Overall, our evidence seems more consistent with the former interpretation.

Credit and Product Market Effects of Banking Deregulation: Evidence from the French Experience

Bankenreform, Deregulierung,, Industriestruktur, Frankreich, Banking reform, Deregulation, Industrial structure, France

The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds

This paper examines the direct private equity investment strategies across sovereign wealth funds and their relationship to the funds’ organizational structures. SWFs seem to engage in a form of trend chasing, since they are more likely to invest at home when domestic equity prices are higher, and invest abroad when foreign prices are higher. Funds see the industry P/E ratios of their home investments drop in the year after the investment, while they have a positive change in the year after their investments abroad. SWFs where politicians are involved have a much greater likelihood of investing at home than those where external managers are involved. At the same time, SWFs with external managers tend to invest in lower P/E industries, which see an increase in the P/E ratios in the year after the investment. By way of contrast, funds with politicians involved invest in higher P/E industries, which have a negative valuation change in the year after the investment.General Finance, Countries & Regions, Financial Services

Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices? The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle

The returns that institutional investors realize from private equity investments differ dramatically across institutions. Using detailed and hitherto unexplored records of fund investors and performance, we document large heterogeneity in the performance of different classes of limited partners. In particular, endowments' annual returns are nearly 14% greater than average. Funds selected by investment advisors and banks lag sharply. These results are robust to controlling for the type and year of the investment, as well as to the use of different specifications. Analyses of reinvestment decisions and young funds suggest that the results are not primarily due to endowments' greater access to established funds. Finally, we examine the differences in the choice of intermediaries across various institutional investors and their relationship to success. We find that LPs that have higher average IRRs also tend to invest in older funds and have a smaller fraction of GPs in their geographic area, and that the performance of university endowments is correlated with measures of the quality and loyalty of the student body.

How do CEOs see their roles? Management philosophies and styles in family and non-family firms

Using a survey of 800 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in 22 emerging economies, we show that CEOs' management styles and philosophies vary with the ownership and governance structure of their firms. Founders and CEOs of firms with greater family involvement display a greater stakeholder focus, and feel more accountable to employees and banks than to shareholders. They also have a more hierarchical management approach, and see their role as maintaining the status quo rather than bringing about change. In contrast, CEOs of non-family firms emphasize shareholder-value-maximization. Finally, firm-level variation in ownership is as important in explaining management philosophies as cross-country or industry-level differences. Keywords: CEOs; Founder; Family firms; Stakeholders; Delegatio