179 research outputs found
Leadership and conflict
We model the choice of leaders of groups within society, where leaders influence both the mode of interaction between groups (either peaceful compromise or costly conflict) and the outcome of these interactions. Group members may choose leaders strategically/instrumentally or they may choose leaders expressively. We characterize the equilibria of the instrumental choice model and also argue that leadership elections may overemphasise the role of expressive considerations in the choice of leader, and that this may result in increased conflict between groups
Bygones are Bygones
'Bygones are bygones' might seem to be an analytic truth, lacking any substantive content. Yet, economists think that, when they state that bygones are bygones, they are asserting something interesting and important. Furthermore, others would argue that the statement 'bygones are bygones', when read appropriately, is false. By interrogating the statement 'bygones are bygones' we identify a number of key issues relating to rational choice theory and the treatment of intentions, habits and promises. The more philosophical discussion of the things that economists say (and what they might mean) is particularly appropriate in honoring Hartmut Kliemt, much of whose work has brought philosophy and economics into closer proximity.philosophy of economics, intervention principle, future-orientation
Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications
A growing literature has focussed attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental' behaviour in political settings - particularly voting A common criticism of the expressive idea is that its myriad possibilities make it rather ad hoc and lacking in both predictive and normative bite. We agree that no single clear definition of expressive behaviour has emerged to date, and no detailed foundations of specific expressive motivations have been provided, so that there are rather few specific implications drawn from the analysis of expressive behaviour. In response, we provide a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour that accounts for a range of factors. We also discuss the content of expressive choice distinguishing between moral, social and emotional cases, and relate this more general account to the specific theories of expressive choice in the literature. Finally, we discuss the normative and institutional implications of expressive behaviour.expressive behaviour; identity; moral choice; populism; institutional design
Group formation and competition: instrumental and expressive approaches
We construct models of group formation designed to capture some of the key features of political and social competition. The models draw on the ‘citizen candidate’ approach and allow competition to be modelled as either compromise - where all groups influence outcomes; or conflict - where one group wins the right to dictate. We also consider both instrumental and expressive approaches to understanding group formation, first separately and then in a setting which encompasses both approaches. <br><br> Keywords; group formation, expressive behaviour, conflict, compromise <br><br> ISSN 0966-4246
Paying for politics
In Disclosure V. Anonymity in Campaign Finance, Ian Ayres broaches a very particular issue in the design of democratic institutions, discusses that issue in a very particular context, and advocates a very particular institutional remedy. The specific issue concerns the regulation of information concerning political donations. The specific context has two relevant dimensions. Ayres is clearly concerned with the case of the US, and, implicitly and explicitly, the discussion takes many other aspects of the US political environment as the relevant background. At the same time, Ayres is primarily concerned with the prevention of corruption, so that the relevant criterion by which alternative institutional regimes are judged is just the extent to which corruption is deterred. Within this context, Ayres argues that the norm of full anonymity in respect of political donations would operate more effectively to prevent corruption than would the norm of full disclosure; so that rather than ‘sunlight [being] the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman’, Ayres argues that total darkness is the real cure for corruption. Ayres’s constructed ‘veil of ignorance’ is nothing like Rawls’s, but it does involve a putatively constructive use of ignorance in the same way that Rawls’s construction does. The essential argument is simple enough. Under full information, all campaign donations are matters of public record, so that there can be nothing covert about the funding process; nevertheless, the possibility of buying political favours is still present. Indeed, in the limit, one might imagine that competitive political donations constitute a straightforward market for political influence that operates alongside the electoral process to determine political outcomes. Whether or not we describe open financial transactions in such a market as ‘corrupt’1, or ‘unfair’ (given an unequal distribution of income and wealth), there is certainly a presumption that such a ‘market’ might be expected to influence political outcomes and so reduce the reliance of political outcomes on the electoral process and other more strictly ‘political’ mechanisms. At the other extreme, under perfect anonymity, campaign donations are organised in such a way that no one (other than the donor - and specifically not the recipient) has any reliable information about the existence, or size, of any individual donation. In this case, so the argument goes, since there can be no proof that a donation has been made, there can be no political deals struck: it is impossible to buy influence if it is impossible to demonstrate payment. Of course, this sketch does not do full justice to Ayres’s argument, but we believe that it suffices to focus attention on the key issues: the idea that corruption takes the form of market-like deals that ‘pervert’ the democratic process in the sense that political outcomes differ from those that would be realised under purely political process; and the argument that such deals are effectively ruled out by complete anonymity. We also note that Ayres’s discussion is informed by a recurring analogy with the process of voting itself - and with the idea, in particular, that the secret or ‘Australian’ ballot provides an appropriate exemplar for secrecy in the political process. We will return to the significance of this analogical reasoning, and to other aspects of Ayres’s specific argument, in due course but first we wish to make some effort to widen the discussion a little. The design of democratic institutions may be approached in either of two styles - a ‘piecemeal’ style or a ‘synoptic’ one. A piecemeal style characteristically focuses on this or that piece of institutional practice and subjects it to scrutiny. A synoptic style is one that attempts to work from general principles in developing an overview of the operation of democratic institutions and to develop thereby implications for the design of particular institutional devices2. Clearly, neither style holds a monopoly on usefulness, and it is likely that the iteration between these styles offers the most plausible route to reasonable conclusions. It is for this reason that, initially at least, we wish to respond to Ayres’s piecemeal proposal in a rather more synoptic mode. Even if we narrow our range of concern to the institutional framework for financing democratic politics, we must recognise that a number of inter-related issues are raised: the relative merits of private and state funding of political parties or candidates; the possibility of regulating either the set of agents who may make political contributions, or the size of the political contributions they may make; the possibility of regulating the flow of information about the financial affairs of donors, parties or candidates; the possibility of regulating expenditures made by parties or candidates; and so on. None of these issues is trivial either in the sense that the normatively appropriate answer is obvious, or in the sense that the same practice has developed almost universally across democratic countries. And matters become still more complicated if we open up the possibility of interactions between these various issues, or with other aspects of the institutional fabric such as voting rules, the structure of representation, and so on. Indeed, it is not even obvious how we should go about addressing these matters. Two ingredients seem essential however - a reasonably clear statement of the model of democratic politics to be used as the test-bed within which to conduct the relevant thought-experiments, and a reasonably clear statement of the relevant normative criteria. Unfortunately, neither ingredient is readily available or widely agreed. The first aim of this brief essay is to say something about the appropriate ingredients to use in constructing particular arguments concerned with the funding of democratic politics or, indeed, any other aspect of the design of democratic institutions. Only then will we return to the specific issue of anonymity in political donations
Republican liberty and resilience
The object of this paper is to focus attention on the ‘resilience’ property of republican liberty – a property that, at least in some formulations, is among those features that distinguishes republican liberty from its more familiar ‘liberal’ counterpart. Our analysis proceeds by way of an analogy with the idea of risk aversion. After setting the stage with a brief description of what we are taking republican liberty to be (in Section I), we turn to the question of how to conceptualise resilience and how the notion might most plausibly be formulated (Section II). Examining alternative possible formulations serves to suggest an analogy between resilience and ‘risk aversion’. In Section III, we exploit that analogy to develop some implications that resilience carries for institutional design. Section IV offers a brief summary
How Multinational Companies Gain a Competitive Advantage Through the Effective Use of Knowledge Management
During the past two decades, domestic American business has undergone massive changes in the way commerce is both planned and conducted. Intense competition; the advent of high technology and its commercial applications; the reduction of global trade barriers; the effects of changing worker demographics; concern for environmental and employee welfare; and the resulting downsizing, reengineering and other efforts at cost-containment have all combined to make the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge within corporations paramount as firms struggle to find their way in a setting of ever-increasing uncertainty.
The management of corporate knowledge, including intellectual capital, R&D efforts, and management and worker expertise has become so crucial that many firms now employ full-time Knowledge Management (KM) specialists to better facilitate the development and sharing of knowledge across departmental and divisional barriers. What began in the late 1980s as an intense effort to help firms become more cost-efficient domestically has become a major force for productivity-enhancement in the global operations of multinational (MNCs). In fact, this one factor alone contributes in a significant way to understanding why the domestic American economy has experienced the longest peacetime expansion in our nation\u27s history, and why American MNCs have not succumbed to the recent economic problems which befell our trading partners in Europe and Asia. Simply put, America\u27s global firms are better-prepared to deal with the volatile business environment than are our competitors. This is largely due to a sea-change in attitude and philosophy with respect to the acquisition, distribution and storage of knowledge and expertise, commonly called knowledge management.
This paper will explore the relationship between KM and competitive advantage; analyze how certain successful domestic and foreign MNCs have used KM techniques to their advantage; and address the future implications of KM in an international setting
Ransomware - A Strategic Threat to Organizations
Ransomware is a strategic threat to government, business, and academic organizations. It has both short term and long term consequences, requiring strategic planning to create defenses, assess options, and create policies.
The purpose of the study is to answer three questions: What is the strategic risk of cyberattack to organizations? What are the current attitudes and practices of executives who are vulnerable to such threats? What are specific options that organizations should consider to prevent and deal with possible incidents in the future? The article is thus comprised of the following components: A) a history of the development and complexity of ransomware; B) a survey of IT professionals in government, business and education; and C) recommended strategic options for organizations to defend against cyber threats.
We conducted a survey of ninety-two cybersecurity professionals in government, education, and business. Attitudinal divergence occurred in the areas of cyber-defense, perpetrator negotiations, ransom payment, and involvement of law enforcement. The authors recommend thirteen specific solutions to assist organizations when dealing with ransomware
Expressive political behaviour : foundations, scope and implications
A growing literature has focused attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental’ behaviour in political settings, particularly voting. A common criticism of the expressive idea is that it is ad hoc and lacks both predictive and normative bite. No clear definition of expressive behaviour has gained wide acceptance yet, and no detailed understanding of the range of foundations of specific expressive motivations has emerged. This article provides a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour accounting for a range of factors. The content of expressive choice – distinguishing between identity-based, moral and social cases – is discussed and related to the specific theories of expressive choice in the literature. There is also a discussion of the normative and institutional implications of expressive behaviour
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