Flexible societies excelled in saving lives in the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic

Background: Previous studies have shown that national cultural traits, such as collectivism–individualism and tightness–looseness, are associated with COVID-19 infection and mortality rates. However, although East Asian countries have outperformed other countries in containing COVID-19 infections and lowering mortality in the first pandemic waves, no studies to date have examined flexibility-monumentalism, a cultural trait that uniquely distinguishes East Asia from the rest of the world. Moreover, none of the previous studies have explored mechanisms underpinning the association between national culture and COVID-19 mortality. Aims: Our study fills in these gaps by examining the association between flexibility-monumentalism and COVID-19 mortality, adjusting for important covariates and by analyzing mask wearing and fear of COVID-19 during the first weeks of the pandemic as plausible mechanisms underpinning this association. Methods: We constructed and analyzed a dataset including 37 countries that have valid information on flexibility-monumentalism, COVID-19 deaths as of 31 October 2020 (before the start of vaccination campaigns), and relevant covariates including two other national cultural traits (individualism–collectivism and tightness–looseness) and other national characteristics (economic, political, demographic and health). Multiple linear regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors was used to assess the independent effect of flexibility-monumentalism on COVID-19 mortality. Mediation was assessed by examining the indirect effects of flexibility through mask wearing and fear of COVID-19 and determining the statistical significance through bootstrapping. Graphical and delete-one analysis was used to assess the robustness of the results. Results: We found that flexibility was associated with a significant reduction in COVID-19 mortality as of 31 October 2020, independent of level of democracy, per capita GDP, urbanization, population density, supply of hospital beds, and median age of the population. This association with mortality is stronger and more robust than for two other prominent national cultural traits (individualism–collectivism and tightness–looseness). We also found tentative evidence that the effect of flexibility on COVID-19 mortality may be partially mediated through mask wearing in the first weeks of the pandemic

Non-linear relationship between maternal work hours and child body weight: Evidence from the Western Australian Pregnancy Cohort (Raine) Study

Using longitudinal data from the Western Australia Pregnancy Cohort (Raine) Study and both random-effects and fixed-effects models, this study examined the connection between maternal work hours and child overweight or obesity. Following children in two-parent families from early childhood to early adolescence, multivariate analyses revealed a non-linear and developmentally dynamic relationship. Among preschool children (ages 2 to 5), we found lower likelihood of child overweight and obesity when mothers worked 24 h or less per week, compared to when mothers worked 35 or more hours. This effect was stronger in low-to-medium income families. For older children (ages 8 to 14), compared to working 35–40 h a week, working shorter hours (1–24, 25–34) or longer hours (41 or more) was both associated with increases in child overweight and obesity. These non-linear effects were more pronounced in low-to-medium income families, particularly when fathers also worked long hours.We acknowledge the University of Western Australia (UWA), the Raine Medical Research Foundation, the UWA Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, the Women’s and Infant’s Research Foundation (KEMH), Curtin University and Edith Cowan University for providing funding for the Core Management of the Raine Study. Lyndall Strazdins is supported by an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship FT110100686, and this paper was part of a visiting fellowship supported by WZB Berlin Social Science Center (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

Cultural Diversity and Change in Post-Cold War Europe

How do we explain the cultural differences between European societies? Are any of these differences increasing or diminishing in the wake of the Cold War and, if so, why? In this dissertation, I attempt to answer these difficult questions that are especially crucial to the future of Europe. More than 270,000 respondents in 47 European countries were surveyed at several points in time since 1990 as part of the largest cross-cultural projects on values and attitudes (World Values Survey and European Values Study) in order to provide representative information on their countries’ cultures. The results revealed that enormous cultural gaps exist in Europe, with the Nordic countries exhibiting the most modern—i.e., liberal, tolerant, egalitarian, and individualistic—set of cultural values, followed by the Western European and Central European countries, while most of the Southeastern European and former-Soviet countries share conservative social values, especially in the domains of sexual freedom and gender equality. The variation between countries on a wide variety of cultural values and attitudes can be explained predominantly by the following factors: the level of socio-economic modernization, former Cold War alliances, historically influential religious traditions, linguistic similarities and differences, geographic location, climate, past empire membership, and the increasingly important role of the European Union. These differences, however, are not static, and the largest cultural transformations in post-Cold War Europe were associated with the geopolitical restructuring of the continent after the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Most countries that joined the European Union after 1995 have successfully converged with the Western European cultural model. But the opposite development has occurred in the countries with no prospects of joining the European Union, especially the Eurasian Economic Union members. In my last article, I explain the cultural divergence between Eastern and Western Europe by contrasting supranational identities that political actors have increasingly accentuated to strengthen their nations’ appraisal or dismissal of liberal values, thus making these values an increasingly distinct marker of cultural Westernness

Sources of Societal Value Similarities across Europe: Evidence from Dyadic Models

Focusing on Europe, this article aims to disentangle the patterns of cultural clustering and to throw more light on concepts such as ‘civilizations’ and ‘cultural zones.’ Cross-cultural analyses unanimously find that various historical background and socioeconomic indicators are strongly correlated to societal values, however, a systematic investigation on what makes societal cultures similar and different hasn’t been conducted. The author first outlines the factors and mechanisms that may explain value similarities, then the author tests their importance using dyadic data on 40 countries from the wvs. Multiple factors are associated to the cultural similarities: the historical background – i.e. countries’ political-institutional traditions, religion, language, and imperial legacies – and also socio-economic development, geographical distance, European integration, and climatic differences. The substantial overlap among them, however, diminishes the absolute importance of any of the explanatory factors. The multiple determinants of value differences speak against a classification of national cultures into cultural zones based on single formative factors

United in diversity? The convergence of cultural values among EU member states and candidates

The European Union (EU) is considered to be a unique economic and political union that integrates most European countries. This article focuses on the cultural aspect of European integration, which has been increasingly debated over the course of deepening and widening integration and in the context of the legitimation crisis of the EU. Among the main goals of the EU is to promote certain values, which raises the question of whether it has been efficient in (or enabled) reducing cultural value gaps among the participating countries. World polity and institutional isomorphism theories suggest that cultural values may trickle down in a vertical manner from the institutions of the EU to its member states and candidates. Furthermore, hybridisation theory postulates that values diffuse horizontally through intensified interactions enabled by the EU. These two perspectives imply the possibility of cultural convergence among countries associated with the EU. By contrast, the culture clash thesis assumes that differences in cultural identity prevent value convergence across countries; growing awareness of such differences may even increase the pre‐existing cultural value distances. To test these different scenarios, distances in emancipative and secular values are compared across pairs of countries using combined repeated cross‐sectional data from the European Values Study and the World Values Survey gathered between 1992 and 2011. This study finds that the longer a country has been part of the EU, the more closely its values approximate those of the EU founding countries, which in turn are the most homogenous. Initial cultural distance to the founders’ average values appears irrelevant to acquiring membership or candidacy status. However, new member states experienced substantial cultural convergence with old member states after 1992, as did current candidates between 2001 and 2008. Since 1992, nations not participating in the integration process have diverged substantially from EU members, essentially leading to cultural polarisation in Europe. The findings are independent of (changes in) economic disparities and suggest the importance of cultural diffusion as one of the fundamental mechanisms of cultural change. This empirical study contributes to the literature on European integration, political and sociological theories of globalisation, and cross‐cultural theories of societal value change

Clashing Values: Supranational Identities, Geopolitical Rivalry and Europe’s Growing Cultural Divide

Soon after the collapse of Soviet-type communism in Central and Eastern Europe, a new geopolitical division began to reshape the continent. Our study demonstrates that this newly emerging geopolitical divide has been underpinned by a corresponding cultural divergence, of which “emancipative values” are the most powerful marker. Using the European Values Study/World Values Survey 1990 to 2014, we find that the former Iron Curtain no longer constitutes a cultural boundary because the ex-communist states that joined the European Union have been converging with the West’s strong emphasis on emancipative values. Instead, a new and steeply growing cultural gap has emerged between the European Union and its Eastern neighbors. The two competing geopolitical formations in the West and East—the European and Eurasian Unions, respectively—have diverged culturally in recent decades. The divergence goes back to contrasting supranational identities that originate in different religious traditions, which rulers have increasingly accentuated to strengthen their nations’ endorsement or dismissal of emancipative values. Through this sorting-out process, emancipative values became an increasingly significant marker of a Western-vs-Eastern cultural identity. Our study is the first to link this groundbreaking cultural transformation to civilizational identities and geopolitical rivalry

Ukrainian values: Between the Slavic-Orthodox legacy and Europe’s allure

An important question in understanding the war in Ukraine is whether Russian President Putin’s claim that Russians and Ukrainians are ‘one people’ or whether the statement made by European Union Commission President von der Leyen, echoing Ukrainian government’s position, that Ukraine is ‘one of us’ receives more support. In our contribution, we assess the societal values endorsed in Ukraine, and test whether they resemble those of Russia or Western Europe. After reviewing arguments brought by the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, Modernization, Social Identity, and Nation Building theories, we analyze the most recent data from the European Values Study and World Values Survey (2017-2021). Constructing an EU-values index, including gender equality, individual freedom, and liberal democracy, among others, we show that while values in Ukraine are closer to Russia than virtually any European Union country, there are clear differences that are especially salient among younger age cohorts. Further, we refute Huntington’s claim that Ukraine is a ‘cleft’ country by showing that regional variation within Ukraine is rather minimal. We conclude with an interpretation of these findings in light of political debates and prominent theoretical approaches to studying values

A community of shared values? Dimensions and dynamics of cultural integration in the European Union

The series of recent crises (EURO, refugees, backsliding, Brexit) challenge the self-portrayal of the European Union (EU) as a community of shared values. Against this backdrop, we analyse European Values Study data from 1990 till 2020 to assess the level and change in publics’ acceptance of the EU’s officially propagated values: personal freedom, individual autonomy, social solidarity, ethnic tolerance, civic honesty, gender equality and liberal democracy. We find that EU publics support these values strongly and increasingly over time. The EU-member publics are also remarkably distinct culturally from Eastern European non-EU-nations, especially concerning individual freedoms and gender equality. Simultaneously, however, member nations internalize EU-values at different speeds - alongside traditional religious fault lines that continue to differentiate Europe - in the following order from fastest to slowest: (1) Protestant, (2) Catholic, (3) Ex-communist and (4) Orthodox countries. In conclusion, the EU writ large evolves into a distinct value-sharing community at different speeds

A community of shared values? : Dimensions and dynamics of cultural integration in the European Union

The series of recent crises (EURO, refugees, backsliding, Brexit) challenge the self-portrayal of the European Union (EU) as a community of shared values. Against this backdrop, we analyse European Values Study data from 1990 till 2020 to assess the level and change in publics’ acceptance of the EU’s officially propagated values: personal freedom, individual autonomy, social solidarity, ethnic tolerance, civic honesty, gender equality and liberal democracy. We find that EU publics support these values strongly and increasingly over time. The EU-member publics are also remarkably distinct culturally from Eastern European non-EU-nations, especially concerning individual freedoms and gender equality. Simultaneously, however, member nations internalize EU-values at different speeds–alongside traditional religious fault lines that continue to differentiate Europe–in the following order from fastest to slowest: (1) Protestant, (2) Catholic, (3) Ex-communist and (4) Orthodox countries. In conclusion, the EU writ large evolves into a distinct value-sharing community at different speeds.

A “Harsh” Culture, Alcoholism, Climate, and Social Hardship Explain National Differences in Suicide Rates

Suicide is a major cause of death in Central and Northeast Europe and Northeast Asia. The literature on this geographic pattern has not reached consensus. The authors propose an analysis of the view that national culture may be a risk factor. They use measures of culture from a quasi-nationally representative 2015-2016 database, with over 50,000 respondents from 53 countries, and WHO suicide data for 2016. A correlation analysis across items reveals four cultural features of countries with high suicide rates (r with suicide rates >.40): parents are less likely to socialize children for helping, sharing money, forgiving offenses, and expressing feelings. These four items yield a single “harshness” factor (r with national suicide rates = .69). Measures of self-construals reveal that people in countries with high suicide rates are less helpful, generous, and forgiving, have less interest in others, lower personal stability, poorer mood, lower self-esteem and self-confidence, and use less deliberation before important decisions (r with suicide rates > .40). These items yield another “harsh culture” factor, strongly correlated with the previous. Harsh culture, alcoholism rates, climatic harshness, and social hardship (short life expectancy plus child and maternal mortality), explain 71 percent of the national variation in suicide