Aeronautical charging policy incentive schemes for airlines at European airports

This article was accepted for publication in the of Air Transport Management. The definitive published version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2013.06.009This paper introduces the concept of incentive schemes that may accompany airports’ aeronautical charging policies and develops a taxonomy of such schemes based on an analysis of data for 46 European Airports held in the RDC Aviation database.1 This taxonomy details the different types of incentive schemes that in are operation. It is clear their use is widespread and that the magnitude of the incentive is often significant. A financial benchmarking analysis is undertaken for four selected airports to illustrate the extent of the variations between airports both in terms of the basic characteristics of the incentive schemes and in the periods over which the discounts are available

The economic value of additional airport departure capacity

This article presents a model for the economic value of extra capacity at an airport. The model is based on a series of functional relationships linking the benefits of extra capacity and the associated costs. It takes into account the cost of delay for airlines and its indirect consequences on the airport, through the loss or gain of aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues. The model is highly data-driven and to this end a number of data sources have been used. In particular, special care has been used to take into account the full distribution of delay at the airports rather than its average only. The results with the simple version of the model show the existence of a unique maximum for the operating profit of the airport in terms of capacity. The position of this maximum is clearly dependent on the airport and also has an interesting behaviour with the average number of passenger per aircraft at the airport and the predictability of the flight departure times. In addition, we also show that there exists an important trade-off between an increased predictability and the punctuality at the airport. Finally, it is shown that a more complex behavioural model for passengers can introduce several local maxima in the airport profit and thus drive the airport towards suboptimal decisions