No. 55: The Engagement of the Zimbabwean Medical Diaspora

Despite the well-documented negative impacts of the ‘brain drain’ of health professionals from Africa, there is an argu­ment that their departure is not an absolute loss and that transnationally-oriented medical migrants (or diasporas) can act as development agents in their home countries. Financial remittances, in particular, are said to have significant transformative development potential. African countries are also expected to benefit from knowledge and skills transfer through the return of health professionals from abroad. Other diaspora engagement initiatives that do not require permanent return (such as short term work assignments, technological transfer to country of origin and ‘virtual’ participation of the diaspora involving the use of communication technologies) are seen as another positive feed­back mechanism, mitigating the negative impact of out-migration. Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis has led to the emigration of many physicians over the last twenty years as the skills and experience which they possess are valued in countries in the North as well as in South Africa. Previous studies have focused on the magnitude and damaging impact of this exodus on the Zimbabwean health system. This is the first study to focus exclusively on physicians in the diaspora. The study is based on a global email survey of physicians and in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean doctors living and working in South Africa. The results of the survey and interviews provide new insights into the nature of the Zimbabwean medical diaspora, their motivations for leaving the county, the links which they maintain with Zimbabwe, the prospects of them returning to Zimbabwe and their interest in making their skills, knowledge and resources available to the country in the future. The conventional wisdom on the brain drain is that skilled profes­sionals move directly from a country of origin to a country of destination. The impacts of this movement for both countries are then assessed. However, this fails to capture the complexity of the migration patterns of Zimbabwean physicians. Only 42% of those surveyed had moved directly from Zimbabwe to their current country of residence. Seventy one percent of the Zimbabwean doctors in South Africa came directly from Zimbabwe. The rest had first been to a variety of other destinations including the United Kingdom, Australia, Asia and elsewhere in Africa. This suggests that there has been “return migration” from overseas, but benefitting South Africa not Zimbabwe. A common feature of studies on the causes of skills migration is to ask respondents to identify discrete “causes” of migration and then to rank them. In this study, respondents were presented with a set of possible reasons for leaving and then asked to rate the importance of each of them to the decision-making process on a five point scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ The three factors with the highest levels of concurrence were the bad political environment (74% in agreement), lack of opportunities for career advancement (73% agreed) and poor economic conditions in Zimbabwe (71% agreed). Other factors cited by the majority of respondents were unsatisfactory working conditions, inadequate remuneration and benefits, the collapse of the health care system and a better future for their children. The relative importance of each of these factors varied with race and the year when the physician left. Another 30% of the respondents moved first from Zimbabwe to South Africa and then joined the “brain drain” from South Africa and migrated onwards to a variety of overseas destinations. Less than half of the doctors who had migrated to the UK did so directly from Zimbabwe. Only 5% of the Zimbabwean doctors in the USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand came direct from Zimbabwe. South Africa and the UK are clearly the main transit countries for medical doctors from Zimbabwe. These two intermediary destinations seem to act as “stepping stones” to get to the ultimate destination. The intermediate point allows them to specialise in their chosen field which then increases their chances of gaining entry to their ultimate destination. Furthermore, it enables them to develop networks with similar professionals located elsewhere who can assist them in making an onward move. Eventually, a migration chain develops linking the emigrant Zimbabwean medical doctors in an intermediate country to their counterparts located in a more attractive destination. Previous surveys have shown that migrant remittances play a major role in ensuring household survival in Zimbabwe. We do not know if physicians are distinctive in their remitting behaviour or whether they follow the general pattern. This study therefore focused on whether phy­sicians, who are amongst the highest earning occupational category in the Zimbabwean diaspora, display different remitting practices than other Zimbabweans. The survey found the following: 60% of the diaspora physicians send money to Zimbabwe while 40% never do so. The propensity to remit was highest among medical doctors working in South Africa, with 79% sending money to Zimbabwe. Two thirds of doctors in the USA remit but only 42% in the UK and a third of those in Canada. To put these figures in context, various surveys of Zimbabweans in South Africa have found that 85-95% of migrants remit money home. Another study of Zimbabweans in the UK found that 80% remit­ted funds to Zimbabwe. the propensity of physicians to remit varies with the year of emi­gration (with 95% of those who left after 2000 remitting) and race (only a third of white doctors remit compared to 100% of black doctors.) around 50% of those who remit do so at least once a month. Amongst the general Zimbabwean migrant population in the UK, around 41% remit at least once a month. Remitting frequencies from South Africa are higher; 60-75% at least once a month. There is thus nothing particularly unusual about the frequency with which physicians remit. the vast majority of Zimbabwean migrants (over 90%) use various informal channels when remitting to Zimbabwe. Highly-educated, middle-class migrants such as physicians might be expected to make more use of formal remitting channels such as banks and money transfer companies. In fact, at the time of the survey (2008), most physicians were also using informal channels and stayed away from the banks. the research on Zimbabwean remittances clearly shows that the bulk of it is spent on household survival needs with very little investment of the proceeds. The question is whether remittances from physicians are any different. The answer is no. Over 90% of the respondents who send cash remittances do so to meet the day to day expenses of family members in Zimbabwe including food purchase, rent and the cost of electricity and water. the only thing that really distinguishes the physicians’ remit­ting behaviour is the volume sent (which is well above aver­age). However, even if the average physician remittance figure of US$2,616 p.a. was sustained over a 30 year period, the total remittances from one individual would still not compensate for their training costs in the first place. Considerable international enthusiasm surrounds the idea of “return migration.” In the case of Zimbabwean physicians outside the country, the probability of permanent return migration is generally low but varies with race, age, year of emigration and location: 53% of black physicians said they are likely to return compared to only 11% of white physicians. Conversely, 70% of the whites said they would never return compared to only 16% of the blacks. In other words, the potential for return is higher amongst black physicians and only a small minority (16%) definitely ruled out the possibility. the possibility of return is highest amongst the younger doctors: 78% in the 31-40 age group said they are likely to return, compared to 23% in the 41-50 age group, 10% in the 51-60 age group and none over the age of 60. the year of emigration is positively correlated with the possibility of return: 12% of those who left in the 1980s said they might return compared to 30% of those who left in the 1990s and 79% of those who left after 2000. possibility of return varies with a doctor’s current country of residence. Return was more likely among those located in South Africa (40%) than amongst those in the UK (21%) or in the USA (13%). Diaspora engagement has been increasingly advanced as a possible solution to the skills problems facing developing countries. In Zimbabwe, the diaspora option arguably offers the most sensible policy prescription since it entails the use of the skills of the diaspora without requiring them to return home permanently. Options proposed by the physicians and discussed in this report include: medical training, short-term medical visits, raising funds, sourcing supplies and telemedicine. In each case the opportunities and obstacles to the particular form of engagement are discussed

No. 74: Informal Entrepreneurship and Cross-Border Trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa

Informal cross-border trading in Zimbabwe has become more than a survivalist strategy and should be seen as an important pillar of the country\u27s economy. This report, part of SAMP’s Growing Informal Cities series, seeks to provide a current picture of informal cross-border trading in Zimbabwe and provides detailed insights into the activities of traders from the capital, Harare, who travel regularly to Johannesburg, South Africa, as part of their business. The traders make a monthly profit that far exceeds the salaries of most Zimbabweans in formal employment. Furthermore, many traders have been able to grow their businesses to such an extent that they hire people from outside their families. In Zimbabwe, this trade remains a female-dominated activity and traders are generally well educated and relatively young. Almost all respondents interviewed had started their businesses in the post-2000 era. Most had never held a formal job and went into informal cross-border trading either because they were unemployed or already involved in informal sector activities in Zimbabwe. This report notes important contributions these traders make to both the Zimbabwean and South African economies. The contribution of the informal economy in generating jobs and reducing unemployment needs to be acknowledged in Zimbabwe by policies that encourage rather than restrict the operation of informal trade

No. 73: Informal Entrepreneurship and Cross-Border Trade in Maputo, Mozambique

Cross-border trading is an essential part of Mozambique’s informal economy, with the traders playing a key role in supplying commodities that are in scarce supply nationwide. This report presents the results of a SAMP survey of informal entrepreneurs connected to cross-border trade between Johannesburg and Maputo. The study sought to enhance the evidence base on the links between migration and informal entrepreneurship in Southern African cities and to examine the implications for municipal, national and regional policy. In Mozambique, cross-border trading is primarily done by women with men mainly involved in the sale of the products brought back from South Africa. This report demonstrates the specific roles played by the cross-border traders in the economies of both Mozambique and South Africa. It shows that they contribute to the South African economy through buying goods, as well as paying for accommodation and transport costs. The cross-border traders are directly contributing to the retail, hospitality and transport sectors in South Africa, thereby creating and sustaining jobs in those sectors. In Mozambique, the traders pay import duty for the goods bought in South Africa and they play a significant role in reducing poverty and unemployment in the country. Therefore, a change in attitude of government towards cross-border traders is called for and the policy environment should encourage the operation of this trade

Diasporas, Development and Governance in the Global South

Diasporas are increasingly recognized as key development resources for low- and middle-income countries. Thus, governments in the Global South are turning to their own extra-national diasporic populations in order to boost economic development, build global trading and investment networks and increase their political leverage overseas. The main goals of the conference on Diasporas, Development and Governance in the Global South were to enhance international understanding of the role of diasporas in development, identify best practices for policy engagement of diasporas and facilitate Canadian diaspora engagement in development. The conference focused on three main areas: Critical examination of efforts by international organizations and governments in the South and North to facilitate development in the Global South through engagement with diasporas; Identification of new trends and best practices in diaspora engagement; and Assessment of the current and potential role of migrant diasporas in Canada in the economic, social and political development of the Global South. The conference was open to the public and brought together leading international researchers, policy makers, and diaspora organizations for a focused discussion and dialogue on the governance of diaspora engagement

No. 51: Migrant Remittances and Household Survival in Zimbabwe

Migrant remittances are now recognised as an important source of global development finance and there is increasing evidence that international remittances have considerable developmental impacts. The contribution of remittances to GDP in many developing countries is significant and has shown a steady increase over the past decade. However, while there is a consensus that remittance flows to Africa are increasing, little attention has been paid to the impact of these transfers on poverty alleviation, primarily because of data deficiencies at the household level. Despite their obvious magnitude, accurate data on remittance flows to Zimbabwe is unavailable or inaccessible. In an attempt to address such data deficiencies, SAMP devised the household-level Migration and Remittances Survey (MARS) which was administered in several SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The MARS study was implemented in Zimbabwe in 2005 and surveyed 723 urban and rural households. The data generated by MARS is critical in at least three ways: (a) it quantifies the largely hidden economic value of labour migration from Zimbabwe; (b) it provides information on the significance of remittances to economic survival in a state undergoing massive formal sector decline; and (c) it provides information on the relationship between remittances and poverty alleviation at the household level. MARS allows us to do two things: first, to construct a profile of Zimbabwe’s migrant population and, second, to answer basic questions about remittance origins, volumes, channels and use. With regard to the migrant profile MARS found the following: Nearly three quarters of the migrants (72%) identified in the survey had worked outside the country for 5 years or less. Only 7% had been working outside the country for over 10 years. The number of migrants per household varied between one and five. The majority (73%) were reliant on a single migrant, and another 21% had two. Nearly 60% of migrants were in neighbouring countries, primarily South Africa (32%), Botswana (16%) and Mozambique (5%). The other 40% were outside Southern Africa in a wide range of countries. The United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada are primary destinations. Half of the migrants were sons and daughters or other relatives of household heads. However, the crisis in Zimbabwe is of such magnitude that household heads and spouses are migrating in significant numbers. Some 28% of the migrants were household heads and 13% were spouses/partners. More migrants were married (58%) than unmarried (31%). All of this suggests a broadening and deepening of participation in labour migration. In most countries in SADC, migration still tends to be heavily male-dominated. Zimbabwe has become an exception to this rule. In this study 56% of migrants were male and 44% female. The majority of migrants (72%) are under the age of 40. They are also relatively well-educated compared to migrants from other SADC countries. Less than 1% have no schooling and over 50% have a post-secondary diploma, undergraduate degree or postgraduate degree. Migrants are employed in a wide variety of jobs outside Zimbabwe, many not in the profession for which they have training or skills. In other words, this is a generalized out-movement of people, not confined to one or two professions or sectors. Nineteen percent of migrants were in the informal sector, followed by professional work (15%), health (12%), services (9%), teaching (7%), manual work (6%) and office work (5%). Comparing in-country with out-of-country employment by sector, the survey showed that 70% of Zimbabwean health workers were migrants; as were over 40% of professional workers, service workers, managerial office workers and mineworkers. Between 30- 40% of office workers and farm workers were also migrants. With teachers, the proportion was 28% and domestic workers 25%. Most migrants maintain close connections with Zimbabwe. Nearly half visit their families at least once every three months. However, almost 20% of the migrants (mostly living overseas) return home only once a year. Absences from home are highly variable: 18% are away for less than a month at a time, 19% between one and six months and 30% between six months and a year. Twenty percent are away for a year or longer. The survey also provided unprecedented insights into the remittance behaviour of Zimbabwe’s migrants, as well as invaluable information on the crucial importance of remittances to household survival. Although most migrant-sending households were struggling and poverty was increasing, very few could be considered destitute, at least on the evidence of this survey. However, without the constant and regular infusion of remittances from outside the country, the answers to this question would probably have been very different. Amongst the survey’s key findings on remittances were the following: The vast majority of migrants regularly send back remittances in cash and/or kind. In the year prior to the study, three-quarters of migrant-sending households received remittances. Migrants sent home R2,759 p.a. on average. Various factors influenced the amounts remitted by individual migrants. For instance, heads of households remitted more than their children. Men remitted slightly more than women, an indication of greater labour market access in destination countries. Those in the 40-59 age group remitted more than migrants in any other age category. Furthermore, those who were married remitted more on average than those who were still single. Remittances come from a diverse range of countries and wide range of sectors. Migrants overseas remit more on average than those within Southern Africa. Within the region, the largest remitters are in Botswana followed by Zambia and South Africa. Professional workers, on average, send the most money back to Zimbabwe, followed by self-employed entrepreneurs, office workers and managers. Surprisingly, unskilled manual workers remit more, on average, than health workers, teachers, domestic workers and workers in the service sector. Most migrants remit on a regular basis. Some 61% of households receive money from migrants at least once a month. Another 25% receive money at least once or twice every three months and 7% once or twice a year. There was a positive correlation between the amount remitted and the frequency of remitting: migrants who send money home more frequently remit more on average than those who remit less often. Migrants use many different channels to send remittances home. In Zimbabwe, there is a clear preference for trusted informal channels over banks and formal money transfer operators such as Western Union and Moneygram. Social networks influence the channels through which informal remittances are sent. Active social ties between migrants and family members and friends provide the personal links and local information necessary for informal remittance sending. Decisions about how much will be remitted, how often and through what channels are not the sole preserve of the migrant. Households are in regular contact with their migrant members by phone and regularly send requests for emergency assistance. Eighty percent of households reported that migrants can be relied on to send emergency remittances most or all of the time. As many as 61% of the surveyed households had received goods in the year prior to the survey. Non-cash remittances included foodstuffs (for example, maize-meal, sugar, salt, and cooking oil) as well as consumer goods such as bicycles, radios, sofas, agricultural inputs and building materials. Most non-cash remitting is based on the specific and immediate needs of the recipients. When the country faces shortages of basic commodities, non-cash remittances in the form of food tend to increase. How important are remittances to household survival and sustainability in Zimbabwe? A broad distinction is often drawn between productive and consumptive uses of remittances. Since most remittances to Zimbabwe are aimed at easing the livelihood constraints of the households back home, consumption tends to dominate remittance usage. The survey’s findings about remittance usage include: The vast majority of households receive cash and in-kind remittances. No other source of income came close in terms of the proportion of households that benefited. For example, despite the overall significance of informal sector trade only 15% of households generated income this way. A mere 6 % received income from the sale of farm products. Cash remittances were the major source of total household income, followed by wage work in Zimbabwe and remittance goods. The relative importance of remittances compared to other classes of income can be assessed via their importance to various basic household expenditure categories. Total expenses largely covered by remittances included gifts (93%), entertainment (92%), building (90%), clothes (88%), transportation (88%), education (88%), housing (85%), medical expenses (83%) and food and groceries (80%). The most common use of remittances is to buy food (by 67% of households), buy clothing (49%) and pay for school fees (48%). Domestic building materials are another common expense (by 49% of households) as are transportation costs (fuel and fares). The use of remittances to generate further income is not common although 27% of households used remittances to support food production and 12% purchased goods for re-sale. About 16% saved a portion of their remittances and 5% bought insurance policies. Nine percent spent remittances on funeral and burial policies and 8% on funerals – a clear indicator of the impact of HIV/AIDS. The MARS study clearly shows that without remittance flows, the situation of many Zimbabwean households would be even more dire than it is already. Remittances have reduced vulnerability to hunger, ill-health and poverty in both rural and urban households. Households with migrants go without basic necessities less often. Remittances have also allowed families to keep children in school and to put roofs over the heads of household members. Remittances, as a major source of household income, clearly have an important impact on livelihoods in Zimbabwe

No. 02: The Urban Food System of Maputo, Mozambique

The city of Maputo, with a population of around 1.3 million, has been at the forefront of urbanization in Mozambique. While the Southern African country has posted impressive macro-economic growth rates in the last two decades, there has been only limited formal sector employment generation. Most of its working population is absorbed in informal employment and self-employment. The informal food economy is easily the most important source of food in Maputo. Almost all households regularly obtain food from informal sellers; over 90% at least once a week and many on a daily basis. For many households, daily purchasing is necessitated by unpredictable daily income and a lack of accumulated funds. Such purchasing raises the unit cost per item and leads to higher household expenditure on food. The informal food economy is not confined to the markets, and is particularly visible and extensive on the streets and in the bairros of Maputo. There are many thousands of street vendors selling a range of fresh and processed food, often from the same stall. Most of the fresh fruit and vegetables, processed food and junk food are imported from South Africa. Food insecurity is highly prevalent throughout Mozambique. This audit of the city of Maputo highlights that there are still major information gaps in our understanding of the urban food system. As its work progresses, the Hungry Cities Partnership aims to fill many of these gaps

No. 58: The Disengagement of the South African Medical Diaspora

Conventional wisdom holds that the ‘brain drain’ of health professionals from Africa is deeply damaging to the continent. Recently, a group of North American and European neo-liberal economists has challenged this conventional wisdom, variously arguing that the negative impacts are highly exaggerated and the compensating benefits many. The benefits include various forms of “diaspora engagement” in which those who have left then engage through sending remittances, direct investment, knowledge and skills transfer, return migration and involvement in diaspora associations. A previous SAMP study of Zimbabwean physicians outside the country provided clear evidence for the “diaspora engagement” hypothesis (see No 56 in this series). This paper examines the case of South African physicians who have left South Africa. South Africa provides an ideal case for examining the conflicting viewpoints on the health brain drain given the significant loss of physicians the country has experienced over the past two decades. A 2000 global survey of the location of physicians found that as many as 7,363 South African-trained doctors (or 21% of the total number in practice) were living and practising abroad. In 2005, the OECD estimated that more than 13,000 South African trained physicians were working in OECD countries, of whom 7,718 were in the United Kingdom, 2,215 in the United States, 1,877 in Canada and 1,022 in New Zealand. More recent data from Canada indicates that there were 2,193 South African physicians in that country in 2009. The research reported in this paper consists of a survey of 415 South African doctors in Canada conducted in 2009-10 (representing almost 20% of the total number working in Canada.) More than half of the survey respondents (58%) had acquired Canadian citizenship since leaving South Africa. Of the rest, around one quarter (26%) were permanent residents in Canada and only 16% were on work permits. At the same time, 70% still hold South African citizenship. This raised the possibility that they want to retain their South African citizenship because they feel a strong affinity with South Africa. Nearly 90% agreed with the statement that “being from South Africa is an important part of how I view myself” and 81% with the statement that “I feel strong ties with people from South Africa.” The vast majority (over 80%) buy or make South African foods, listen to South African music and want their children to know about South Africa. Some 80% regularly consult South African newspapers online. As many as 60% want their children to learn a South African language. Forty percent say that their best friends in Canada are South Africans. Family links with South Africa also remain strong. As many as 81% have siblings still living in South Africa and 71% still have parents there. About 95% of the respondents had visited South Africa since migrating to Canada. More than 75% visit South Africa at least every 2-3 years, with 28% visiting once a year. However, despite all this evidence of a persistent South African identity and the maintenance of strong links with the country, the vast majority (80%) disagreed with the statement that they had “an important role to play in the development of South Africa.” Only 16% said they are likely to send money for development projects in South Africa, 15% said they would participate in educational and other exchanges with South Africa, while 13% would participate in fundraising projects in South Africa. Only 10% said they would invest in a business in South Africa and just 8% might work for a period of time in South Africa. By most standards, the physicians surveyed were high income earners. As many as two-thirds earn above CAN$200,000 (ZAR 1.6 million) per annum and fewer than 5$100,000 (ZAR 800,000) annually. In general, remitting is often positively correlated with income: the more a migrant earns the greater the amount that they tend to remit. However, despite their high earnings South African physicians in Canada are not significant remitters: Only half (52%) had sent money to South Africa in the previous year and only 19% can be considered regular remitters who send money to South Africa at least once a month. A considerable number do not remit regularly (21% do so less than once a year) and 28% have never sent remittances to South Africa. Less than a third (27%) had sent more than CAN$5,000 (ZAR40,000) to South Africa. The median amount sent by remitters was only CAN$4,250 (ZAR 33,000) per annum, which falls to only CAN$1,000 (ZAR8,000) per annum for the whole sample. Such small amounts are unlikely to yield significant development outcomes in the country of origin or compensate the country for the loss of skills incurred in the brain drain. The majority of the remitters (82$1,000 (ZAR8,000) annually. The mean value of goods sent by the physicians was CAN$340 (ZAR2,430) annually. In other words, the amounts remitted by South African physicians are small in comparison to their incomes and remitting is infrequent. The South African physicians differ markedly in their remitting behaviour from physicians from other African countries and from African diasporas in general. Further evidence of the disengagement of the South African physician diaspora is provided by patterns of property ownership and other investments in South Africa. As many as 57% of the physicians maintain an active bank account in South Africa but these are funds ostensibly for use during their visits. Only 25% have substantial savings in their bank accounts. At the same time 17% own property, 35% have investments and 27% have a house in South Africa. However, these are generally acquired before leaving. Only 5% had bought a house or property in South Africa and only 4% had invested in a South African business in the year prior to the survey. The vast majority of those still holding these assets in South Africa are recent (post 2000) immigrants to Canada. There is a consistent pattern of decline in South African asset ownership over time as the physicians sell their property, close their bank accounts and disinvest. In order to gauge the potential for return migration, the respondents were asked whether they had considered returning to South Africa. About 36% have never considered the possibility of returning while 21% had given it hardly any thought. About 43% indicated that they have considered returning to South Africa. However, only 7% said they are likely to return within the next two years and another 10% within the next five years. Few had taken any concrete steps to return. Less than 2% had applied for a job in South Africa in the previous year. While this group of South African professionals are proud to think of themselves as South African and take a relatively keen interest in events in that country, they are disengaged from any serious diasporic interest in and commitment (beyond contact with and some limited support for family members who remain). Almost without exception, they paint a very negative picture of life in South Africa and they do not see any role for themselves in helping address South Africa’s deep social and economic inequalities and needs. Neo-liberal economists and proponents of diaspora engagement will find little to support their arguments in the views of this particular component of the South African diaspora

Entrepreneurship and Inclusive Growth in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique

While increasing attention is being paid to the drivers and forms of entrepreneurship in informal economies, much less of this policy and research focus is directed at understanding the links between mobility and informality. This report examines the current state of knowledge about this relationship with particular reference to three countries (Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe) and four cities (Cape Town, Harare, Johannesburg and Maputo), identifying major themes, knowledge gaps, research questions and policy implications. In many African cities, informal enterprises are operated by internal and international migrants. The extent and nature of mobile entrepreneurship and the opportunities and challenges confronting migrant entrepreneurs are under-researched in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. Their contribution to the informal economy and employment generation in countries of destination and origin are similarly undervalued by policy-makers. Informal migrant entrepreneurs are often viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by citizens and officials. In part, this is because central and municipal governments see them as increasing the growth of an informal sector that they want tamed, if not eradicated. Also, it is because they are often incorrectly seen as all “illegal immigrants” and, by definition, engaged in illicit activities. And, in countries with high levels of xenophobia such as South Africa, migrant-owned businesses are a visible and easy target for xenophobic attacks. Violent attacks on migrant entrepreneurs and their property have become extremely common in many South African cities. South Africa’s relatively small informal sector is accompanied by very high unemployment levels. Many commentators therefore feel that the South African informal economy ought to be much larger than it is. Given the apartheid-era repression of informal entrepreneurship, the key question may not be why the informal economy is not larger, but why, after decades of repression, it is as large and important as it is. One of the reasons is that the informal economy is not just populated by South African citizens. Migrants from other African countries play an increasingly important role in the sector and experience considerable success, something that eludes many locally-owned start-ups. Informal retailing has been the major focus of economic research on different sub-sectors of the informal economy. Particularly common are small-area case studies of survivalist street trading (particularly of food and handicrafts) in the inner city. The spaza shop sector in low-income residential areas has also been studied. Other informal entrepreneurial activities that have attracted attention include the minibus taxi industry, waste collection and recycling, shebeens, trade in medicinal plants and poverty tourism

Economic Growth of Japan with Special Reference to Industrial Development

A GEM article on the economic growth and industrial development of Japan.Japan’s economic success has been a characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century. Its industrial revolution took 120 years whereas Britain took nearly twice that period to become a major industrial nation. Industrialisation proceeded fairly rapidly because Japan built on Western innovation, while at the same time striving to eliminate the mistakes of the Western countries. What makes the growth of the economy more remarkable is a background of extreme resource scarcity. Japan is poorly endowed with most resources. That the Japanese were able to assemble many raw materials from every comer of the world makes their achievement spectacular. This paper examines the growth of the Japanese economy. Special reference is paid to industrial growth and the changing character of industries in response to changing demand. Initially an outline of Japan’s physical environment is presented to show the limited resources available for industrialisation, as well as the perils posed by Japan’s physical environment. The section that follows presents a survey of the growth of Japan’s economy from pre-Meiji times (before 1868) to the 1990s. In this, Japan’s economic growth is assessed in terms of Rostow’s model of economic development. The paper concludes with a description of some of the problems currently facing the Japanese economy

No. 62: Heading North: The Zimbabwean Diaspora in Canada

Studies of the Zimbabwean diaspora tend to focus on migrants in South Africa and the United Kingdom. This is the first major study of Zimbabwean migration to Canada. The report presents and discusses the findings of a SAMP survey conducted across Canada in 2010. It first discusses the recent history of migration from Zimbabwe to Canada and then provides a demographic and socio-economic profile of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada. The report also examines the linkages that Zimbabweans in Canada maintain with Zimbabwe, and the potential for return migration. According to the 2006 Canadian Census, there were 8,040 Zimbabweborn people in Canada, comprising 6,525 immigrants (permanent residents and naturalized citizens) and 1,515 non-permanent residents (students and temporary workers). Immediately after independence in Zimbabwe in 1980, there was an increase in migration to Canada. The numbers rose briefly again in the late 1980s and then remained relatively low and stable for most of the 1990s. In other words, although emigration from Zimbabwe increased in the 1990s as economic prospects deteriorated, only a small number moved to Canada. This changed dramatically after 2000. Between 2003 and 2009, at least 400 Zimbabweans per annum were granted permanent residence in Canada. The peak year was 2004, when 1,456 Zimbabweans became permanent residents. Prior to 2000, most Zimbabwean migrants to Canada entered in the economic immigration class. After 2002, refugees came to dominate the inflow. Ontario is by far the most popular destination for Zimbabweans. Between 1980 and 2009, for example, nearly 60% of all immigrants settled first in that province. Other significant populations of Zimbabweans are found in the provinces of Alberta (13% of the total), British Columbia (12%) and Quebec (10%). The Zimbabwean population in Canada generally settles in major urban centres: over 80% live in cities with populations of more than 350,000. Toronto is the most popular destination with 41% of all immigrants. Although immigration from Zimbabwe to Canada is dominated by refugees, the survey showed that most possessed good professional qualifications upon entry. For instance, at least 30% had a university degree before leaving Zimbabwe. However, 40% were asked to re-certify or re-train in Canada in order to work in a field for which they were already trained. This highlights the more general problem of recognition of qualifications that foreign-trained professionals face in Canada. After moving to Canada, 70% continued with their formal education. Immigrants to Canada frequently discover that their credentials are less desirable on the job market or they have to settle for significantly less skilled occupations than in their countries of origin. This certainly seems to be the case with Zimbabweans, with 35% of respondents noting that they are working in a job that does not make full use of their professional qualifications and experience. Once they have gained entry to Canada, many Zimbabweans acquire more secure status that enables them to stay permanently. Nearly 50% of the respondents indicated that they are now Canadian citizens, while 33% are landed immigrants (permanent residents). The survey presented the respondents with 15 quality-of-life indicators and asked them to consider which country they rated more highly on each indicator. On virtually all of the indicators, Canada was ranked better than Zimbabwe by a significant margin. These included medical services, personal or family safety, future of children, prospects for professional advancement, availability of employment and job security, and level of income. Zimbabwe ranked more highly than Canada on only one indicator: the quality of social life. Most of the respondents have a significant number of family members still in Zimbabwe: 68% have siblings, 59% have parents and 55% have grandparents in the country. A smaller number have children (16%) and spouses (5%) in Zimbabwe. Despite these family ties, just over half of the respondents (52%) said they had not visited Zimbabwe since moving to Canada. One in five respondents visit Zimbabwe at least once every 2-3 years and a further 27% at least once every 5–10 years. Among those who have visited Zimbabwe at least once since arriving in Canada, the main purpose was for family issues and events. While Zimbabweans in Canada are not frequent visitors to Zimbabwe, this does not mean that they do not maintain links there. For example, 29% have bank accounts, 24% own a house, 19% own land and 8% have investments in Zimbabwe. Two-thirds of the respondents remit money to Zimbabwe. The average annual amount sent is CAD2,703, similar to that sent by Zimbabweans in the United Kingdom. Nearly one-third send money to Zimbabwe at least once a month. A further 28% remit a few times a year. Over 60% of those remitting send money to close family members while another 20% send money to their extended family. Only 4% said they deposit funds into a bank account for their own future use. Formal channels such as money transfer agencies and banks are the main mechanism for sending money to Zimbabwe. Informal transfer channels are used by only 17%. Consumption dominates the use of remittances. Over 80% of respondents said that the recipients purchase food with the funds, while other significant uses of remittances include paying for medical expenses, school fees and meeting other household day-to-day expenses. Investment of remittances was not very common: in the previous year only 8% had sent remittances to start or run a business, 7% for savings and 4% to buy property in Zimbabwe. Diaspora engagement has the potential to address some of the challenges facing Zimbabwe, providing a potential avenue for Zimbabweans in Canada to contribute to the country’s reconstruction. More than half of the survey respondents (55%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they have an important role to play in the development of Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans in Canada clearly maintain strong social, religious and cultural links with each other. There is a strong sense of community among Zimbabweans, especially those in smaller cities, and it is not uncommon to find a large Zimbabwean presence at family events such as birthday celebrations, weddings and funerals. Many also belong to organizations and attracting growing interest. For almost 15 years South Africa. The survey found that, given the opportunity, the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada is primed to engage directly in development-related activities. At present, only a minority are involved with development organizations that have links and programmes in Zimbabwe, but there are high levels of interest in activities such as skills transfer through training, educational exchanges, working in Zimbabwe and providing distance teaching via the internet. Financial support would take the form of fundraising for projects in Zimbabwe, investment in business, sending remittances for development projects, and making charitable donations. Economic activities of interest include investment in infrastructure and import and export of goods between Canada and Zimbabwe. Studies among Zimbabweans in the diaspora elsewhere have shown that two-thirds of those based in the United Kingdom and South Africa are likely to return to Zimbabwe. What is the likelihood of return among Zimbabwean migrants in Canada? The survey respondents were almost equally divided, with 52% indicating that they have given some thought to return and at least 45% saying that they had given no or hardly any thought to the possibility. However, only 8% indicated that it was likely or very likely that they would return to Zimbabwe within two years. The likelihood of return rises to 20% within five years and to 49% at some point in the future. Clearly, Zimbabweans in Canada are worried about the state of Zimbabwe’s economy and political environment, and expect things to improve, which would set a platform for their return to the country. The survey suggests that there is unlikely to be a large-scale return movement of the Zimbabwean diaspora in the immediate future. Most Zimbabweans in Canada want to see positive signs of real economic and political change before they would seriously consider returning