Alasdair MacIntyre’s Fallibilistic Interpretation of Aquinas’ Theory of Truth

Questo saggio cerca di fare luce sulla possibilità di un’interpretazione fallibilistica della teoria della verità di d’Aquino, attribuitagli da Alasdair MacIntyre. Prima facie, sembra strano leggere nella teoria della verità di d’Aquino un tipo di fallibilismo che si avvicina al pensiero di Popper, specialmente prendendo in considerazione la visione teologica e ottimistica di d’Aquino circa la capacità dell’intelletto di giungere alla verità. In questo saggio, argomenterò a partire da due prospettive, vale a dire i meccanismi dell’intelletto e la spiegazione di d’Aquino dei principi primi, a favore della possibilità di una versione condizionata di fallibilismo, la quale mantiene le sue differenze dalla versione popperiana.This paper seeks to shed some light on the possibility of a fallibilistic interpretation of Aquinas’ theory of truth, as attributed to him by Alasdair MacIntyre. Prima facia, it seems strange to read into Aquinas’ theory of truth a kind of fallibilism which approaches Poppers’ thought, especially taking into account the theological and optimistic view of Aquinas concerning the capacity of the intellect to arrive at truth. In this paper, I will argue from two perspectives, that is, the mechanisms of the intellect and Aquinas’ account of first principles for the possibility of a qualified version of fallibilism, which retains its differences from the Popperian version

Explaining and evaluating Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of tradition-constituted rationalities and justices

This thesis is a study on the notion of practical rationality. Its main objective is to explore whether there is a shared way of reasoning in practical and moral issues between different cultures and traditions. For this purpose, I chose MacIntyre's notion of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rationality and justice (constitution thesis) as the key topic of the thesis, which holds there is no rationality and justice independent of a tradition. Rationality here is mainly practical rationality a most important outcome of which is the idea of justice. We can understand MacIntyre's constitution thesis in contrast to Cartesian epistemology and Kant's moral philosophy as they are understood by him. The constitution thesis runs counter to Cartesian epistemology by its anti-epistemological tendencies; that is to say, we do not and cannot start our substantial intellectual enquiries based on some indubitable ideas whose evidence can be shown to any rational human being. The constitution thesis runs also counter to Kantian moral philosophy by its opposition to providing a universalistic rule-based account of morality. The constitution thesis in this sense is related to virtue-ethics which emphasizes the importance of moral education and following moral masters for knowing moral duties. I will argue that we can have an account of morality that does not depend on the notion of the final good; rather, it assumes basic facts about human beings, which include their basic and intellectual needs the failure to satisfy which damages their normal and desirable functioning. The mark of real needs is that their satisfaction sustains and improves our normal and desirable functioning, and this point lets us distinguish real needs from our acquired desires and expectations. This would be against MacIntyre's claim that the justification of morality requires the notion of the human good

Aquinas’ Theory of Knowledge and the Representative Theory of Perception

The representative theory of perception is one of the realist theories of perception which maintains we do not have direct access to the objects of perception; our ideas represent some objective objects in the world. In this paper, I will address the question about the representative nature of mental ideas from a Thomistic perspective. I will explore if some Thomists are entitled to claim that Aquinas’ theory of knowledge based on his metaphysics can provide a basis for resolving this issue. I will argue that this question is wrong-headed and it should be replaced with the following question: If we assume the existence of a real world and that we are not under the influence of hallucination, how we can know that our ideas truly represent the world?La teoria rappresentativa è una delle teorie “realiste” della percezione, le quali affermano che non è possibile avere un accesso diretto agli oggetti di percezione, per cui le nostre idee rappresentano solo gli oggetti nel mondo. In questo contributo, mi propongo di avvicinare la questione della natura rappresentativa delle idee mentali da una prospettiva tomista, tenendo anche in conto che per alcuni seguaci dell’Aquinate la teoria della conoscenza da lui formulata poteva effettivamente offrire una soluzione al problema. A mio avviso, la questione deve essere così riformulata: se si assume l’esistenza di un mondo reale, e nel contempo si è certi di non essere in uno stato di allucinazione, come è possibile affermare che le idee veramente rappresentano il mondo

Aquinas’ Theory of Knowledge and the Representative Theory of Perception

The representative theory of perception is one of the realist theories of perception which maintains we do not have direct access to the objects of perception; our ideas represent some objective objects in the world. In this paper, I will address the question about the representative nature of mental ideas from a Thomistic perspective. I will explore if some Thomists are entitled to claim that Aquinas’ theory of knowledge based on his metaphysics can provide a basis for resolving this issue. I will argue that this question is wrong-headed and it should be replaced with the following question: If we assume the existence of a real world and that we are not under the influence of hallucination, how we can know that our ideas truly represent the world

Positive Freedom and Liberalism in Kant's Political Philosophy

The subject of this article is the analysis of the concept of freedom as one of the fundamental issues of political thought in Kant’s philosophy. Given Isaiah Berlin’s typology of the negative and positive conceptions of freedom in the history of philosophy, this article examines Kant’s position on freedom in the form of the above two conceptions. In Kant’s view, moral action is a practice with a purely moral motive and respect for the moral law, without the accompaniment of human desires. There is a kind of opposition between moral inclinations and motivation in Kant’s moral theory. In Kant’s view, freedom means the abandonment of desires and the fulfillment of moral duty. In his view, inner tendencies act as internal barriers to moral action and‌ freedom, and must be eliminated or at least controlled. The concept of freedom has a central place in Kant’s moral theory, as freedom is the product of obedience to moral duties, and this positive concept, contrary to Berlin’s claim, does not lead to tyranny

MacIntyre's Moral Theory and Moral Relativism

In this paper, I seek to explain the similarity and disparity between MacIntyre’s moral theory and moral relativism. I will argue that MacIntyre’s moral theory can escape the charge of moral relativism because both his earlier social and his later metaphysical approaches appeal to some criteria, the human telos or universal human qualities respectively. The notion of telos is wider than the notion of function which is defined in social contexts. If there is a context-transcending notion of telos or essence and the good for human beings qua human beings, it will provide some independent measures for dismissing the charge of moral relativism

Krytyka Alasdaira Macintyre’a koncepcji o tożsamości narracyjnej. Perspektywa neurofilozoficzna

In MacIntyre’s view, the agent in order to have a consistent identity should be able to narrate a story about her life, which relates the different episodes of her life together. This story should explain the transition between these episodes. This story is based on the notion of the good of human beings. A notion of the good should be present in the agent’s life to give a direction to her life. This integrity forms an identity for the agent. We intend to challenge this narrative view of identity in this paper. We will argue in this paper that though identity is formed in the eye of others, it does not need to be constituted in a unified narrative form, i.e., the agent does not need to place all episodes of her life in narrative order and have a consistent and unified account of her life, which includes her life from birth to death. Rather, shorter-term episodes of time suffice for identity formation. We will appeal to some findings of empirical psychology and neuroscience to support our claim.W myśl koncepcji MacIntyre’a warunkiem posiadania przez sprawcę spójnej tożsamości jest zdolność przedstawienia swojego życia jako opowieści, która łączy w całość różne epizody jego życia. Opowieść ta powinna wyjaśniać związki między tymi epizodami. Opiera się ona na pojęciu dobra istot ludzkich. Pojęcie dobra powinno być obecne w życiu sprawcy, aby nadać kierunek jej życiu. Ta integralność tworzy tożsamość sprawcy. Autorzy kwestionują tę narracyjną koncepcję tożsamości. Jak argumentują, chociaż tożsamość kształtuje się w obecności innych, nie musi tworzyć jednolitej formy narracyjnej, tzn. sprawca nie musi umieszczać wszystkich epizodów swojego życia w porządku narracyjnym ani posiadać spójnego i jednolitego ujęcia swojego życia od chwili narodzin aż do śmierci. Do kształtowania tożsamości wystarczą krótsze epizody formacji. Autorzy odwołują się do niektórych ustaleń psychologii empirycznej i neuronauki, aby uzasadnić swoje stanowisko