Central Bank Communication and Multiple Equilibria

We construct a simple model in which a central bank communicates with money market traders. We demonstrate that there exist multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, traders truthfully reveal their own information, and by learning this, the central bank can make better forecasts. Another equilibrium is a gdog-chasing-its-tailh equilibrium in Blinder (1998). Traders mimic the central bankfs forecast, so the central bank simply observes its own forecast from traders. The latter equilibrium is socially worse in that inflation variability becomes larger. We also demonstrate that too high transparency of central banks is bad because it yields the gdog-chasing-its-tailh equilibrium, and that central banks should conduct continuous monitoring or emphasize that their forecasts are conditional because doing so eliminates the gdog- chasing-its-tailh equilibrium.Transparency, disclosure, coordination

Inventories, financial structure and market structure.

In this paper, we study the effect of different financial contracts on the firm's inventory policy. Doing so will allow to define the best financial instruments to diminish the stock variability of a profit-maximizing firm in a given economic environment (expansion or recession), and for a given market structure. We show that in periods of recession (expansion), reducing (increasing) the amount of short-term debt is an optimal strategy independently of the market structure.Inventories; Financial structure; Market structure;

Impact of the Operations Manager's dual role on inventory policy

In modern corporations, the Operations Manager’s role in defining of firm’s strategy is becoming more important. In this paper we describe how firms can use this tendency for Operations Managers to make strategic decisions as a mechanism to prevent inventory mismanagement. These managers have incentives to speculate with inventory cost reductions, thereby avoiding sharp reductions in a single period, because it would hinder further reductions in the future. Remarkably, firms may prevent such behavior by stimulating the Operations Managers’ strategic orientation, without losing sight of inventory-efficient management

Impact of the Operations Manager's dual role on inventory policy

In modern corporations, the Operations Manager’s role in defining of firm’s strategy is becoming more important. In this paper we describe how firms can use this tendency for Operations Managers to make strategic decisions as a mechanism to prevent inventory mismanagement. These managers have incentives to speculate with inventory cost reductions, thereby avoiding sharp reductions in a single period, because it would hinder further reductions in the future. Remarkably, firms may prevent such behavior by stimulating the Operations Managers’ strategic orientation, without losing sight of inventory-efficient management.

Modelling monetary transmission in UK manufacturing industry

This paper studies the transmission of monetary policy to industrial output in the UK. In order to capture asymmetries, a system of threshold equations is considered. However, unlike previous research, endogenous threshold parameters are allowed to be different for each equation. This approach is consistent with economic intuition and is shown to be of tangible importance after suitable econometric evaluation. Results show evidence of cross-sectional differences across industries and asymmetries in some sectors. These findings contribute to the debate about the importance of alternative economic theories to explain these asymmetries and support the use of a sectorally disaggregated approach to the analysis of monetary transmission

Corporate social responsibility and inventory policy

In this article, we study the impact of implementing corporate social responsible (CSR) practices on a firm’s inventory policy. Our proposal is that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between firms’ CSR and their inventory levels. Two elements explain such proposal. First, stakeholders have different interests regarding the outcome of the inventory system. Specifically, we hypothesize that customers pressure firms to increase inventories; employees have conflicting views regarding inventories and, for this reason, they do not pressure firms in a particular direction; and environmental activists force firms to reduce inventories. The second reason is that there is different level of stakeholder proactiveness contingent on the intensity in the implementation of social responsible policies. In particular, we posit that for low levels of CSR, customers are more relevant, while for larger levels other stakeholders gain more importance. We test this theoretical prediction by crossing two databases, COMPUSTAT, for financial data, and KLD for data on social responsibility. Our final database contains data on 1881 different US companies for the period 1996-2006. The results found conform to our theoretical prediction. Our analysis will be helpful to strategic and tactical decision-making processes on inventory management and will allow researchers to offer concrete advice on the likely outcomes of various stakeholder relationship practices in order to improve the effectiveness of inventory systems. Additionally, the connection between CSR and inventory policies has interest at a macroeconomic level given that, on the one hand, there is a growing tendency for firms to behave in a socially responsible way. On the other, inventories are responsible for up to 87% of the total peak-to-trough movement in GDP. Thus, our results suggest that this tendency to incorporate the social dimension in firms’ strategy should smooth out the overall economic cycle given that firms apply more intensive CSR policies in the expansive periods (decreasing inventories) rather than during the downturns (increasing inventories).Corporate social responsibility, Stakeholders, Inventories

Some Alternative Perspectives on Macroeconomic Theory and Some Policy Implications

An initial version of this paper was presented at a meeting of the Euro50 group in Paris on 20, November, 2009. It has benefitted from comments by David Laidler and Axel Leijonhufvud, neither of whom necessarily agree with all of its contents.

Unexplained Gaps and Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions

We analyze four methods to measure unexplained gaps in mean outcomes: three decompositions based on the seminal work of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) and an approach involving a seemingly naïve regression that includes a group indicator variable. Our analysis yields two principal findings. We show that the coefficient on a group indicator variable from an OLS regression is an attractive approach for obtaining a single measure of the unexplained gap. We also show that a commonly-used pooling decomposition systematically overstates the contribution of observable characteristics to mean outcome differences when compared to OLS regression, therefore understating unexplained differences. We then provide three empirical examples that explore the practical importance of our analytic results.discrimination, decompositions

Chained Credit Contracts and Financial Accelerators

Based on the financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999), we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model for a chain of credit contracts in which financial intermediaries (hereafter FIs) as well as entrepreneurs are subject to credit constraints. Financial intermediation takes place through chained-credit contracts, lending from the market to FIs, and from FIs to entrepreneurs. Calibrated to U.S. data, our model shows that the chained credit contracts enhance the financial accelerator effect, depending on the net worth distribution across sectors: (1) our model reinforces the effects of the net worth shock and the technology shock, compared with a model that omits the FIs' credit friction a la Bernanke et al. (1999); (2) the sectoral shock to FIs has a greater impact than the sectoral shock to entrepreneurs; and (3) the redistribution of net worth from entrepreneurs to FIs reduces the amplification of the technology shock. The key features of the results arise from the asymmetry of the two borrowing sectors: smaller net worth and larger bankruptcy costs of FIs relative to those of entrepreneurs.Chain of Credit Contracts, Net Worth of Financial Intermediaries, Cross-sectional Net Worth Distribution, Financial Accelerator effect

Universal statistical properties of poker tournaments

We present a simple model of Texas hold'em poker tournaments which retains the two main aspects of the game: i. the minimal bet grows exponentially with time; ii. players have a finite probability to bet all their money. The distribution of the fortunes of players not yet eliminated is found to be independent of time during most of the tournament, and reproduces accurately data obtained from Internet tournaments and world championship events. This model also makes the connection between poker and the persistence problem widely studied in physics, as well as some recent physical models of biological evolution, and extreme value statistics.Comment: Final longer version including data from Internet and WPT tournament