Does party colour matter? The effect of government partisanship on pledges’ left–right location

Despite extensive research on the ‘politics matter’ hypothesis, the findings achieved so far remain ambiguous. Inspired by that hypothesis, this research focuses on electoral promises, a chief but as yet untested indicator. It examines whether government party colour explains the adoption of an ideologically committed policy agenda in electoral manifestos. To answer this goal the research looks at the left–right placement of manifesto pledges of the Portuguese governing parties between 1995 and 2019. The results indicate that partisanship significantly explains the executive’s party agenda-setting and that this relationship prevails over time. Findings also suggest that the partisan effect is mediated by issue salience.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

The effects of party identification on perceptions of pledge fulfilment: evidence from Portugal

Empirical research has found that, despite citizens’ perceptions to the contrary, political parties tend to deliver on their campaign promises. What are the reasons for this mismatch between perceptions and performance? Research to date has paid insufficient attention to the reasons for such a mismatch, neglecting the effects of political predispositions such as party identification and sympathy for the government. This article argues that it is such political predispositions that cause biased perceptions of pledge fulfilment. Bias towards perceiving pledges as unfulfilled is expected to be higher for voters whose political predispositions are more unfavourable to government. The argument is supported by data on Portuguese voters and party manifestos in the 2011 election, contributing to better understanding of the mechanisms of political accountability.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

A Lei da Disparidade Curvilinear revisitada: o caso dos partidos políticos portugueses

May’s law of curvilinear disparity (1973), which argues the intermediate leadership strata in parties assume more radical political positions compared to both the party leaders and the electorate, has been tested in diverse contexts, often repeated and mainly refuted. However, of these tests of the law not one has included a profound and comparative analysis of the Portuguese political parties. The aim of this article is to fill this lacuna and to ascertain to what extent May’s law is valid for understanding the ideological and political representation of the two main Portuguese parties: the Socialist Party (PS – Partido Socialista) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD – Partido Social Democrata). In both cases the positions of deputies in the national parliament and their respective electorate are compared with an intermediate stratum of political activists. We will see, first, that the law is almost entirely applicable when it is used an indicator of self-positioning on the left-right scale. Second, that the Law has greater applicability in terms of this political division than it does in relation to socio-economic issues or to “new politics” issues. Third, in the case of socio-economic issues, the law’s applicability is much greater within the PS, while in the case of “new politics” it is more applicable within the PSD.A Lei da Disparidade Curvilinear de May (1973), que advoga que as camadas intermédias da liderança nos partidos assumem posições políticas mais radicais por comparação aos líderes partidários ou aos eleitores, tem sido testada em diversos contextos, tendo algumas vezes sido reiterada e na maior parte dos casos refutada. De entre estes testes à validade da Lei não se inclui nenhum trabalho que tenha analisado com profundidade e comparativamente os partidos políticos portugueses. O presente artigo tem como objetivo central dar resposta a esta lacuna, averiguando em que medida a Lei de May é válida para compreender a representação ideológica e política junto dos dois maiores partidos portugueses: PS e PSD. Comparam-se, para os dois casos, as posições dos deputados na Assembleia da República, dos respetivos eleitores, e de um estrato intermédio constituído pelos ativistas. Verificamos, primeiro, que a Lei se aplica quase na íntegra quando usamos como indicador o autoposicionamento na escala esquerda-direita. Segundo, há maior aplicabilidade da Lei no caso desta clivagem política do que no caso dos temas socioeconómicos ou da “nova política". Terceiro, nos temas socioeconómicos a aplicabilidade da Lei é muito maior no PS; o reverso (PSD) é verdadeiro para os temas da nova política

Political parties in troubled times: economic crisis and voter's perceptual bias of parties' ideology in Europe

To what extent did the 2010 economic crisis in Europe accentuate voters’ perceptual bias of parties’ ideological positions? This article investigates the perceptions of voters concerning the left-right positioning of parties by testing the displacement theory effects. Two moments in time are considered: before and after the economic crisis emerged (2009 and 2014), covering a sample of seven European countries (countries most and least affected by the crisis). It is argued displacement effects have increased after the emergence of the crisis, especially right-wing contrast effects in those countries most affected. Analysis using micro-level data from the European Election Studies (2009-2014) and party-level data from the Chapel Hill experts’ survey (2006-2014) supports the study’s primary argument. The findings presented below show general support for these propositions, making an important contribution regarding applying the displacement theory to different economic contexts, and globally to the study of democratic accountability.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Party manifestos, opposition and media as determinants of the cabinet agenda

Cabinets are the engine of policy change in parliamentary systems. Yet we still know little about how cabinets micro-manage the content of their multifaceted agenda during their term in office. Drawing on the party and agenda-setting literature, this article addresses this gap by focusing on three main determinants of cabinet priorities: issue priorities in the electoral platforms of majority and opposition parties, and new and unforeseen problems as conveyed by the media. Our analysis reveals that: 1) as expected by the party agenda hypothesis, majority platforms have a stronger impact on the cabinet agenda than those of opposition parties, but this effect decreases as the legislative term progresses; 2) cabinet agendas do take into consideration opposition electoral priorities but only when the latter are expressed by mainstream competitors or when the media focus on them; 3) an externally-imposed adjustment programme can also create conditions for strengthening the congruence between electoral and cabinet agendas. This article furthers the understanding of the mechanisms used by cabinets for their regular agenda-setting through an analysis of the policy content of the Council of Ministers' press releases in Portugal from 1995 until 2015.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Is ‘Old Southern Europe’ still eurosceptic? Determinants of mass attitudes before, during and after the eurozone crisis

One of the consequences of the eurozone crisis in the countries of ‘Old Southern Europe’ is the shift from pro-European to eurosceptic attitudes. Our overarching goal is to assess whether these critical stances towards the EU are more conjunctural or long-lasting. We further aim to analyse the determinants of euroscepticism at the micro-level before, during and after the emergence of the eurozone crisis. Our analysis reveals that euroscepticism is of a more conjunctural nature in Spain and Portugal, yet more structural in Italy and Greece. Moreover, our findings show that cultural and political/institutional approaches, but also political/ideological ones, better explain South European euroscepticism before, during and after the crisis when compared to utilitarian/economic approaches.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Losers of globalization, losers in representation? The impact of education on unequal policy representation in Europe

The article focuses on the impact of education on policy representation. It examines degrees of congruence between political elites and citizens on policy preferences across different policy issues, trying to discern whether there is a representation gap between the so-called “winners” and “losers” of globalization in Europe as captured via the proxy measure of educational attainment. Additionally, we examine whether this representation gap, as well as overall levels of congruence, are affected by contextual factors related to the economy and the ideological orientation of governments. Using data from the 2014 European Election Studies and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, our findings largely confirm the existence of a representation gap along educational lines. Contextual factors related to the economy present weak or no direct and moderating effects whereas ideologically left-leaning governments accentuate, for the most part, the representation gap between individuals of low and high educational attainment.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Parties and political representation

How has the topic of representation been studied empirically in Portugal? Which main results have been reached? This chapter focuses on the party-voter linkage, and aims at mapping the study of party representation in Portugal. On the one hand, we systematize the most relevant research contributions on the topic; on the other hand, we update and consolidate the findings on the most important trends that have been identified so far. The analysis comprises four main lines of research studies on the subject in Portugal: on political and ideological congruence; on promises fulfilment; on political agendas; and on roles of representation. The general conclusion, aligned with the findings of the international research, is that there is a prevalence of reasonable and quite stable levels of correspondence between parties and electorates.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Determinants of political trust during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic: Putting policy performance into evidence

Basing on the previous and early months of the Covid-19 pandemic, this article analysis the main determinants of citizens’ trust in the prime minister over this period. Prior research on the political effects of the pandemic has mostly focused on identifying a rally around the flag effect, and little is known about other reasons behind the increase in trust after the outbreak of the pandemic. Based on survey data from February to July 2020 for Spanish citizens, we argue that the reasons for the increased trust in the prime minister after the pandemic outbreak are due more to performance evaluations than to emotional-related factors regarding Covid-19 health issues. We also argue that among performance evaluations, the assessment of policy performance in fighting the Covid-19 crisis is of preeminent relevance in explaining trust in the prime minister during the pandemic period. Findings widely support our argument. By comparing the effects of conventional to emotional-related factors we extend scholarship on political trust in the context of an exogenous crisis.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio