The Unsupportable Support Price: The Government in Paddy Auctions of Northern India

In most developing countries, there is an active debate on the changing role of the government in mediating market outcomes. In grain markets in India, this debate assumes a renewed significance, given the excessive accumulation of food stocks in recent years. For example, the wisdom of maintaining a 'high' Minimum Support Price has been called to question. Auction theory provides a powerful and hitherto unused tool not only for analysing the structure of grain markets and the process of price formation, but also for analysing implications of alternative government policies. Our results for a small, regulated market for parmal paddy in Northern India, where grain sales occur through the open ascending auction, suggest that (a) the government's inability to support the minimum price in the market has less to do with the poor quality of grain offered for sale, and more to do with a reluctance to accumulate stocks. (b) a lower but credibly-enforced minimum support price will not have the desired effect on government purchases. (c) a lowering of the percentage that millers are required to sell as levy to the government is consistent with a credible support price and effective management of stocks.

Networks, Network Externalities and Market Segmentation

This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz-Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits.network structure, network externalities, price competition, market segmentation.

Local network externalities and market segmentation

This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz-Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium.network structure, network externalities, price competition, market segmentation

DO AUCTION BIDS BETRAY EXPECTATIONS-BASED REFERENCE DEPENDENT PREFERENCES? A TEST, EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE, AND ESTIMATES OF LOSS AVERSION

In this paper, we provide a novel experimental auction design that exploits an exogenous variation in the probability of winning to test for the presence of expectations-based reference dependent preferences. We prove that (i) in this design, (which is a one parameter modification of a Becker-de Groote-Marschak (BDM) auction), a lower probability of winning will cause a loss averse agent to bid lower, for a large range of intrinsic values for the object. Data from an experiment demonstrate the existence of this effect. The effect would be absent if preferences were 'standard', or if the status quo was the reference point. Thus we contribute to the nascent literature that empirically documents the importance of expectations as a source of reference points. (ii) We further prove that the experimental design enables unique identification of participants' value distribution and loss averse than men. Finally, as a contribution to experimental methodology, we prove that the BDM mechanism will underestimate loss averse participants' values, we quantify the underestimation, and we suggest methods to bound this bias.Auctions, Expectations, Loss Aversion, Reference dependence

Competition and Collusion in Grain Markets: Basmati Auctions in North India

Many small wholesale grain markets in India are characterized by large numbers of sellers, and a relatively small number of buyers, thereby lending the price formation process open to manipulation through collusion. Government intervention limits the extent of such manipulation by instituting regulated markets where the rules of exchange are clearly spelled out. The key institutional features of these markets are (a) sales through open ascending auctions; (b) the presence of "commission agents" representing both buyers and sellers. We present simple models of noncooperative and collusive behavior in auctions incorporating the above, and some more market specific, assumptions. We exploit data from a primary survey of a market for basmati paddy in North India. The main findings are (i) the collusive model explains the data better; (ii) the incentives of sellers and a subset of the large buyers are aligned; (iii) this, along with a Principal-Agent slack between millers and commission agents who buy for them, facilitates the form that collusion takes, and (iv) due to (ii) and (iii), the impact of collusion on market prices is not necessarily adverse. Insofar as the features of the market we study are common to grain markets in North India, we believe that these findings may be of much wider significance.

Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Auction Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India

This paper undertakes structural estimation of asymmetric auction models in a market for basmati, and detects the presence of a cartel consisting of a large (in market share) local miller and commission agents purchasing for large distant millers. The contracts between the distant millers and their commission agents help to explain the specific form that collusion takes. Simulations indicate that (i) the cartel gains considerably by colluding, over the competitive outcome; (ii) however, sellers (farmers) do not lose significantly under collusion when the commission agents bid; (iii) a knowledgeable auctioneer would choose much higher starting prices for auctions when commission agents bid, compared with the observed starting prices. The paper also shows that efficient collusion, the form of collusion commonly assumed in the literature, does not explain the data well.Auctions, Cartels, Agricultural Markets.

Standard Chartered Bank: Women on Corporate Boards in India 2010

This first Standard Chartered Bank: Women on Corporate Boards in India 2010 report looks at the representation of women on the boards of India's leading companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-100) . It ranks the companies in terms of the gender diversity of their boards, with those with the highest percentage of women on their boards appearing at the top. The report also examines the general topic of gender diversity on the boards of the BSE-100 by presenting the findings of interviews with 18 female directors of BSE-100 companies

EPSS FOR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING PROCESSES (Chapter 10)

Al-Hawamdeh, S. (2003). Knowledge Management – Cultivating Knowledge Professionals. ... Designing Electronic Performance Support Systems, Ph.D thesis. ... Delivering E-Learning for Information Services in Higher Education. Oxford, UK: ..