Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times : creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

En 2007, los países de la periferia europea disfrutaban de un crecimiento estable, y défi cits fi scales y primas de riesgo reducidos. Sin embargo, la crisis fi nanciera global empujó a estas mismas economías a profundas recesiones, aumentando sus défi cits públicos y volúmenes de deuda pública de tal forma que en 2010 estas economías comenzaron a sufrir episodios de crisis de deuda soberana muy severos. Al tiempo que las primas de riesgo aumentaban, también lo hizo la proporción de la deuda pública en manos de inversores residentes. De esta forma, el crédito disponible fue reasignado del sector privado al sector público, lo que vino acompañado de una caída en la inversión privada y un agravamiento de la recesión económica. En este trabajo proponemos un modelo de riesgo soberano, en el que la deuda pública se negocia en mercados secundarios, y que es capaz de racionalizar todos estos hechos estilizados. El modelo tiene dos ingredientes principales: discriminación entre acreedores y «efecto expulsión» (crowding-out effect, en inglés)..In 2007, countries in the euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low defi cits and low spreads. Then the fi nancial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recession, raising their defi cits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and, surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocated from the private to the public sector, reducing investment and deepening the recession even further. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debt can be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects.

To surcharge or not to surcharge? A two-sided market perspective of the no-surchage rule

In Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs) the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge the same final good price regardless of the means of payment chosen by the customer. In this paper, we analyze a three-party model (consumers, merchants, and proprietary EPNs) to assess the impact of a NSR on the electronic payments system, in particular, on competition among EPNs, network pricing to merchants and consumers, EPNs' profits, and social welfare. We show that imposing a NSR has a number of effects. First, it softens competition among EPNs and rebalances the fee structure in favor of cardholders and to the detriment of merchants. Second, we show that the NSR is a profitable strategy for EPNs if and only if the network e¤ect from merchants to cardholders is sufficiently weak. Third, the NSR is socially (un)desirable if the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently weak (strong) and the merchants' market power in the goods market is sufficiently high (low). Our policy advice is that regulators should decide on whether the NSR is appropriate on a market-by-market basis instead of imposing a uniform regulation for all markets. JEL Classification: L13, L42, L80American Express, Discover, Electronic payment system, market power, MasterCard, network externalities, no-surcharge rule, regulation, two-sided markets, Visa