266,564 research outputs found
Modeling On-Line Art Auction Dynamics Using Functional Data Analysis
In this paper, we examine the price dynamics of on-line art auctions of
modern Indian art using functional data analysis. The purpose here is not just
to understand what determines the final prices of art objects, but also the
price movement during the entire auction. We identify several factors, such as
artist characteristics (established or emerging artist; prior sales history),
art characteristics (size; painting medium--canvas or paper), competition
characteristics (current number of bidders; current number of bids) and auction
design characteristics (opening bid; position of the lot in the auction), that
explain the dynamics of price movement in an on-line art auction. We find that
the effects on price vary over the duration of the auction, with some of these
effects being stronger at the beginning of the auction (such as the opening bid
and historical prices realized). In some cases, the rate of change in prices
(velocity) increases at the end of the auction (for canvas paintings and
paintings by established artists). Our analysis suggests that the opening bid
is positively related to on-line auction price levels of art at the beginning
of the auction, but its effect declines toward the end of the auction. The
order in which the lots appear in an art auction is negatively related to the
current price level, with this relationship decreasing toward the end of the
auction. This implies that lots that appear earlier have higher current prices
during the early part of the auction, but that effect diminishes by the end of
the auction. Established artists show a positive relationship with the price
level at the beginning of the auction. Reputation or popularity of the artists
and their investment potential as assessed by previous history of sales are
positively related to the price levels at the beginning of the auction. The
medium (canvas or paper) of the painting does not show any relationship with
art auction price levels, but the size of the painting is negatively related to
the current price during the early part of the auction. Important implications
for auction design are drawn from the analysis.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/088342306000000196 in the
Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org
Bidding among friends and enemies
We consider an auction setting in which bidders, even if they fail
to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study
the impact of these price externalities on the first-price auction and
the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. We
establish a distinction between price externalities that do not depend
on the identity of the winner and price externalities that depend on
the identity of the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price
auction is not affected by the first type of price externalities while the
outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, the second type
of price externalities affects the outcome of both auction formats. In
any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second-price
auction exacerbates the effects of price externalities whatever their
types are. The two auction formats are generically not equivalent
The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources
This paper provides an economic framework within which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets. The paper looks at the use of auctions as a policy instrument and the effects of auction design on consumer interests, the efficient allocation of resources, and industry competitiveness.Australia; Research; Ascending-bid auction; Auctions; Bidders; Conservation funds; Descending-bid auction; Dutch auction; English auction; Environmental Management; First-price sealed-bid auction; Infrastructure; Markets; Oral auction; Outcry auction; Pollutant emission permits; Power supply contracts; Public resources; Radio- spectrum; Second-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum licences; Vickrey auction; Water rights;
Auction-Based Distributed Resource Allocation for Cooperation Transmission in Wireless Networks
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance
by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous
work on resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on
centralized control. In this paper, we propose two share auction mechanisms,
the SNR auction and the power auction, to distributively coordinate the
resource allocation among users. We prove the existence, uniqueness and
effectiveness of the auction results. In particular, the SNR auction leads to a
fair resource allocation among users, and the power auction achieves a solution
that is close to the efficient allocation.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the IEEE IEEE Global Communications
Conference (GLOBECOM), Washington, DC, November 26 - 30, 200
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