126,943 research outputs found
The Economics of Morality
Altruism is embedded in our biology and in our culture. We offer our bus seats
to the disabled and elderly, give directions to disoriented tourists, and donate a
portion of our income charity. Yet for all the good it does, there are deep problems
with altruism as it is practiced today. Nearly all of us, when asked, will say that we
care about practicing altruism in a way that effectively improves the lives of others.
Almost none of us, when asked, can honestly say that we have made a serious effort
to ensure that we are practicing altruism in a way that effectively improves the lives
of others. Disparities like these are indicative of flaws in our cognitive architecture -
biases which ensure that the traditional practice of altruism is incongruous with our
own values. This disconnect between our values and our actions causes our altruistic
efforts to help fewer people to a lesser extent than they otherwise could. I argue that
traditional altruism is in need of reformation and defend a social and philosophical
movement aimed at achieving this reformation known as effective altruism. The
reason effective altruism is such a promising alternative to traditional altruism is its
application of economic thinking to the realm of altruism and morality. An economist’s
mentality is, I suggest, a necessary instrument for bridging the gap between our
values and our actions, allowing us to practice altruism in a way that more effectively
improves the lives of others
Changing preferences: an experiment and estimation of market-incentive effects on altruism
This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a laboratory experiment in a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benefits are experimental incentive parameters. In monopoly, subjects choose quality to tradeoff between profits and altruistic patient benefits. In duopoly and quadropoly, we model subjects playing a simultaneous-move game. Each subject is uncertain about an opponent's altruism, and competes for patients by choosing qualities. Bayes-Nash equilibria describe subjects' quality decisions as functions of altruism. Using a nonparametric method, we estimate the population altruism distributions from Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities in different markets and incentive configurations. Markets tend to reduce altruism, although duopoly and quadropoly equilibrium qualities are much higher than those in monopoly. Although markets crowd out altruism, the disciplinary powers of market competition are stronger. Counterfactuals confirm markets change preferences.Accepted manuscrip
Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size
It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups.Free Riding, Public good, Altruism
CSMA Local Area Networking under Dynamic Altruism
In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks
(LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system.
Rather than assuming "by rule" conformance to a protocol designed to regulate
packet-flow rates (e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game
framework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. The effects
of altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium for both the ALOHA and CSMA
frameworks in the quasistationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either
power or throughput based costs of networking, and the cases of identical or
heterogeneous (independent) users/players. In a numerical study we consider
diverse players, and we see that the effects of altruism for similar players
can be beneficial in the presence of significant congestion, but excessive
altruism may lead to underuse of the channel when demand is low
My Way or the Highway: a More Naturalistic Model of Altruism Tested in an Iterative Prisoners' Dilemma
There are three prominent solutions to the Darwinian problem of altruism, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and trait group selection. Only one, reciprocal altruism, most commonly implemented in game theory as a TIT FOR TAT strategy, is not based on the principle of conditional association. On the contrary, TIT FOR TAT implements conditional altruism in the context of unconditionally determined associates. Simulations based on Axelrod\'s famous tournament have led many to conclude that conditional altruism among unconditional partners lies at the core of much human and animal social behavior. But the results that have been used to support this conclusion are largely artifacts of the structure of the Axelrod tournament, which explicitly disallowed conditional association as a strategy. In this study, we modify the rules of the tournament to permit competition between conditional associates and conditional altruists. We provide evidence that when unconditional altruism is paired with conditional association, a strategy we called MOTH, it can out compete TIT FOR TAT under a wide range of conditions.Game Theory; Altruism; Prisoners' Dilemma; TIT FOR TAT; MOTH; Docking; Netlogo
Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment
This paper presents evidence from a field experiment, which aims to identify the two sources of workers’ pro-social motivation that have been considered in the literature: action-oriented altruism and output-oriented altruism. To this end we employ an experimental design that first measures the level of effort exerted by student workers on a data entry task in an environment that elicits purely selfish behavior and we compare it to effort exerted in an environment that also induces action-oriented altruism. We then compare the latter to effort exerted in an environment where both types of altruistic preferences are elicited. We find that action-oriented altruism accounts for a significant increase in effort, while there is no additional impact due to output-oriented altruism. We also find significant gender-related differences in the treatment effect: women are very responsive to the treatment condition eliciting action-oriented altruism, while men’s behavior is not affected by any of the treatments.pro-social behavior, field experiment, effort, charitable donations
Intergenerational altruism and neoclassical growth models
This paper surveys intergenerational altruism in neoclassical growth models. It first examines Barro's approach to intergenerational altruism, whereby successive generations are linked by recursive altruistic preferences. Individuals have an altruistic concern only for their children, who in turn also have altruistic feelings for their own children. The conditions under which the Ricardian equivalence (debt neutrality) theorem applies are specified. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is further analysed in the context of an economy populated by heterogeneous families differing with respect to their degree of intergenerational altruism. Other forms of altruism, referred to as ad hoc altruism, are also examined, along with their implications for fiscal policy. JEL Classification: E13, D64, E62, C60altruism, fiscal policy, Neoclassical general aggregative models
Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks
We conduct online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52 percent relative to random strangers, while future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24 percent when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.modified dictator games, directed altruism, enforced reciprocity, social networks
Using Experimental Economics to Measure the Effects of a Natural Educational Experiment on Altruism
Economic research examining how educational intervention programs affect primary and secondary schooling focuses largely on test scores although the interventions can affect many other outcomes. This paper examines how an educational intervention, a voucher program, affected students' altruism. The voucher program used a lottery to allocate scholarships among low-income applicant families with children in K-8th grade. By exploiting the lottery to identify the voucher effects, and using experimental economic methods, we measure the effects of the intervention on children's altruism. We also measure the voucher program's effects on parents' altruism and several academic outcomes including test scores. We find that the educational intervention positively affects students' altruism towards charitable organizations but not towards their peers. We fail to find statistically significant effects of the vouchers on parents' altruism or test scores.
Counter-Compensatory Inter-Vivos Transfers and Parental Altruism: Compatibility or Orthogonality?
The intersection of the standard altruism hypothesis with the quite strong evidence that bequests tend to be equal suggests that inter-vivos transfers should be strongly compensatory. Yet the available evidence is not in congruence with this implication. It has therefore been inferred that the motive underlying inter-vivos transfers is not parental altruism. In this paper we present an argument showing why parents who are equally altruistic toward their children optimally transfer more to the child whose earnings are higher. We show that rather than being orthogonal to parental altruism, counter-compensating transfers emanate from such altruism. A key point in the analysis is that parents and children are interlinked in a rich web of (vertical and possibly horizontal) transfers, reverse transfers, direct transfers, and indirect transfers.Parental altruism, Inter-vivos transfers
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