Pengaruh Agency Costs terhadap Kebijakan Dividen Perusahaan-Perusahaan Go Public di Bursa Efek Jakarta

At the real world, the managers and investors are typically not the same people. Oftenly, they don't access the same information these differences frequently cause conflicts between management and investors as owners especially in large firms where managers and owners have different incentive. The cost of problems and conflicts resulting from the separation of the firm or these agency problem is called agency costs. Agency factors that creates agency costs in this research consist of insider ownership , dispersion of ownership , free cash flow and collaterizable assets. Theoritically, dividend policy can be used as one of the mechanisms to reduce the agency problem. This paper investigates the influence of agency costs on dividend policy of companies listed on Bursa Efek Jakarta during the early years of economic crisis (199E - 1999) to see whether that four factors influence dividend policy

Local agency costs of political centralization

We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources from public services but contributed part to benefit the ruler. The autocratic ruler would value better public services only when residents reduce taxable investments which become unprofitable without good public services. For local government to benefit local residents, they must have some decentralized power to punish an official who serves them badly even while serving the ruler well

Agency Costs and Investment Behavior

How do differences in the credit channel affect investment behavior in the U.S. and the Euro area? To analyze this question, we calibrate an agency cost model of business cycles. We focus on two key components of the lending channel, the default premium associated with bank loans and bankruptcy rates, to identify the differences in the U.S. and European financial sectors. Our results indicate that the differences in financial structures affect quantitatively the cyclical behavior in the two areas: the magnitude of the credit channel effects is amplified by the differences in the financial structures. We further demonstrate that the effects of minor differences in the credit market translate into large, persistent and asymmetric fluctuations in price of capital, bankruptcy rate and risk premium. The effects imply that the Euro Area's supply elasticities for capital are less elastic than the U.S.Agency costs, Credit channel, Investment behavior, E.U. Area

Agency Costs Dan Kebijakan Dividen Pada Emerging Market

The purpose of this research was to analyze agency costs and dividend policy onemerging market. The research population was 147 manufacture industry companies listedat the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Sample were retrieved bases on purposive sampling method,there were 25 companies, which were fulfilling the condition needed, starting from 2000until 2005, pooling data with analysis unit n = 6 x 25 = 150. Research used ordinary leastsquare. Research results showed that agency costs did not significantly influence dividendpolicy. Research conclusion was that agency costs were not important factors of dividendpolicy. Next analysis result showed that insider ownership, institutional ownership, dispertionof ownership, and free cash flow did not significantly influence dividen policy. Thecollateralizable asset significantly influenced dividend policy. This finding showed that therewas no agencial conflicts between manager (agent) and stockholders (principals) in emergingmarket (manufacture industry companies listed at the Indonesian Stock Exchange). However,there were agencial conflicts between stockholders and creditor (bondholders)

R&D, Agency Costs and Capital Structure: International Evidence

We examine the impact of R&D intensity and agency costs on the value of firms across 13 economies. We find that R&D adds value while high agency costs reduce value. R&D adds value, however, even when agency costs are high. We show that in those firms where agency costs are high and R&D intensity is high the debt control hypothesis is at work. In contrast to the stylised fact of high R&D firms having low levels of debt, these firms have higher levels of debR&D, Agency Costs, Capital Structure

Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs

This paper studies the interplay between advice and agency costs in entrepreneurial financing. We show that advise may exacerbate agency problems, because the agent may use it at the investor's expense and thereby hurt investors. Depending on the magnitude of the agency problem, optimal financing relationship may induce full, partial, or no advice. Because the trade--off between the positive and negative effect of entrepreneurial advice is delicate, investors need to control the information flow carefully. This explains the dual role of financing and consulting by investors in entrepreneurial financing.optimal advice, agency costs, informed investors, entrepreneurial financing

Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs

This paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income, and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion. Using a costly state falsification framework, we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and, in particular, how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority. The optimal contract may adjust to offset, at least partially, the effect of sanctions against illegal evasion, and we find a new and policy-relevant non-equivalence result: penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders.

Agency Costs, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations

Bad economic times are typically associated with a high incidence of financial distress, e.g., insolvency and bankruptcy. This paper studies the role of changes in borrower solvency in the initiation and propagation of the business cycle. We first develop a model of the process of financing real investment projects under asymmetric information, extending work by Robert Townsend. A major conclusion here is that when the entrepreneurs who borrow to finance projects are more solvent (have more "collateral"), the deadweight agency costs of investment finance are lower. This model of investment finance is then embedded in a dynamic macroeconomic setting. We show that, first, since reductions in collateral in bad times increase the agency costs of borrowing, which in turn depress the demand for investment, the presence of these financial factors will tend to amplify swings in real output. Second, we find that autonomous factors which affect the collateral of borrowers (as in a "debt-deflation") can actually initiate cycles in output.

Monetary shocks, agency costs, and business cycles

This paper integrates money into a real model of agency costs. Money is introduced by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint on a subset of transactions. The underlying real model is a standard real-business-cycle model modified to include endogenous agency costs. The paper’s chief contribution is to demonstrate how the monetary transmission mechanism is altered by these endogenous agency costs. In particular, do agency costs amplify and/or propagate monetary shocks?Business cycles ; Monetary policy

An empirical investigation of agency costs and ownership structure in unlisted small businesses

The study uses panel data to investigate agency costs, both principal-agent (PA) and principal-principal (PP), in 240 small businesses not listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Results show that both forms of agency cost vary according to industry, the life of the business and size. The results indicate that the degree of owner involvement in the business influences firm PA and PP agency costs. Moreover, this study finds non-linear relationship between agency costs and ownership structure align with convergence of interest hypothesis and managerial entrenchment hypothesis. It is noted that the distortion between equity returns and debt returns gives rise to a preference for quasi-equity and distorts the productive base and effective pricing of risk. The analysis indicates there is considerable variability in the burden of agency cost and that this raises the potential for regulatory and policy reforms that may enhance the productivity and growth in the sector