Connecting the Brain to Itself through an Emulation.

Pilot clinical trials of human patients implanted with devices that can chronically record and stimulate ensembles of hundreds to thousands of individual neurons offer the possibility of expanding the substrate of cognition. Parallel trains of firing rate activity can be delivered in real-time to an array of intermediate external modules that in turn can trigger parallel trains of stimulation back into the brain. These modules may be built in software, VLSI firmware, or biological tissue as in vitro culture preparations or in vivo ectopic construct organoids. Arrays of modules can be constructed as early stage whole brain emulators, following canonical intra- and inter-regional circuits. By using machine learning algorithms and classic tasks known to activate quasi-orthogonal functional connectivity patterns, bedside testing can rapidly identify ensemble tuning properties and in turn cycle through a sequence of external module architectures to explore which can causatively alter perception and behavior. Whole brain emulation both (1) serves to augment human neural function, compensating for disease and injury as an auxiliary parallel system, and (2) has its independent operation bootstrapped by a human-in-the-loop to identify optimal micro- and macro-architectures, update synaptic weights, and entrain behaviors. In this manner, closed-loop brain-computer interface pilot clinical trials can advance strong artificial intelligence development and forge new therapies to restore independence in children and adults with neurological conditions

Universe creation on a computer

The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of the epistemology and metaphysics of universe creation on a computer

Neuroscience and Education: The Importance of a Christian Understanding of Human Persons

The increased research in the neurosciences has affected the discipline of education in numerous ways, with publications translating this research into classroom practices. A caution is given to Christian educators to carefully reflect upon how this research influences our view of human persons and what difference this view makes in the teaching and learning process. The purpose of this paper is (1) to examine some of the ways that neuroscience is speaking into the discipline of education, particularly in understanding the capabilities and processes of the learner; (2) to develop an awareness of how this affects our understanding of persons; and (3) to establish the necessity for the preparation of future educators with a distinctly Christian perspective of the human constitution

Minds, Brains and Programs

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

Can biological quantum networks solve NP-hard problems?

There is a widespread view that the human brain is so complex that it cannot be efficiently simulated by universal Turing machines. During the last decades the question has therefore been raised whether we need to consider quantum effects to explain the imagined cognitive power of a conscious mind. This paper presents a personal view of several fields of philosophy and computational neurobiology in an attempt to suggest a realistic picture of how the brain might work as a basis for perception, consciousness and cognition. The purpose is to be able to identify and evaluate instances where quantum effects might play a significant role in cognitive processes. Not surprisingly, the conclusion is that quantum-enhanced cognition and intelligence are very unlikely to be found in biological brains. Quantum effects may certainly influence the functionality of various components and signalling pathways at the molecular level in the brain network, like ion ports, synapses, sensors, and enzymes. This might evidently influence the functionality of some nodes and perhaps even the overall intelligence of the brain network, but hardly give it any dramatically enhanced functionality. So, the conclusion is that biological quantum networks can only approximately solve small instances of NP-hard problems. On the other hand, artificial intelligence and machine learning implemented in complex dynamical systems based on genuine quantum networks can certainly be expected to show enhanced performance and quantum advantage compared with classical networks. Nevertheless, even quantum networks can only be expected to efficiently solve NP-hard problems approximately. In the end it is a question of precision - Nature is approximate.Comment: 38 page