An Empirical Investigation of the Predictors of Executive Career Success

The present study examined the degree to which demographic, human capital,motivational, organizational, and industry/region variables predicted executive career success. Career success was assumed to comprise objective (pay, ascendancy) and subjective (job satisfaction, career satisfaction) elements. Results obtained from a sample of 1,388 U.S.executives suggested that demographic, human capital, motivational, and organizational variables explained significant variance in objective career success and in career satisfaction. Particularly interesting were findings that educational level, quality, prestige, and degree type all predicted financial success. In contrast, only the motivational and organizational variables explained significant amounts of variance in job satisfaction. These findings suggest that the variables that lead to objective career success often are quite different from those that lead to subjectively defined success

Job and Life Attitudes of Male Executives

Despite executives\u27 important positions in organizations, their attitute have not received much research attention. In an attempt to remedy this deficiency, the present study tested a hypothesized model of executive attitudes involving job satisfaction, life satisfaction, job stress, and work-family conflict. Using data gathered from a large, representative sample of male executives (due to the small number of female executives in the study, the analyses were confined to males only), LISREL results indicated support for the overall model and the specific relationships within the model. These results are the first to simultaneously consider job and life satisfaction, job stress, and work-family conflict, and also constitute the most comprehensive evidence to date on executive attitudes. The meaning and contributions of the findings are discussed

Implementasi Kebijakan Program Kebun Bibit Rakyat (Kbr) Di Kecamatan Bambalamotu Kabupaten Mamuju Utara

The result of observations at research objects, the implementation of people's nursery program policy in Bambalamotu Subdistrict, North Mamuju Regency over the last 3 years (2011 to 2013), has not shown the optimal result, therefore the aim of this research is to ascertain the the implementation of people's nursery program policy in Bambalamotu Subdistrict, North Mamuju Regency. This is a qualitative research with descriptive method. The number of informants in this research is 7 persons, taken by purposive sampling technique. This research uses a triangulation technique including observations, interviews, and documentation in the data collection. The result of this research elucidates that implementation of people's nursery program policy in Bambalamotu Subdistrict, North Mamuju Regency in increasing land cover and people's welfare is not optimal yet, based on the policy theory of George C Edward III, covering: communication which consists of transformation and information clarity are not satisfying yet, but the information consistency is fairly satisfying; the resources which consist of human resource quantity like top level executives is inadequate but the quality is adequate and human resource quality of low level executives is not adequate but the quantity is reasonably available, budget resource is inadequate, working facilities resource is adequate enough while the facilities of program final result in form of wood products industry are not available, and the information and authority resource are not optimal; Disposition related to support toward sustainability of program is not maximal; bureaucracy structure related to mechanisms implementation and bureaucracy structure are not maximal yet

Workplace 2000: A Delphi-Study

[Excerpt] Prognosticate and one thing is certain: you are likely to be wrong. Then why speculate about Workplace 20001 Because Boulding is right; as the future unfolds, surprise is preferable to astonishment. Informed speculation enhances anticipation and understanding, the bases of informed decision-making. It produces a vision with which to agree or disagree, and the means to ascertain why. If the vision proves disagreeable, there is a baseline from which to plot a preferred scenario. For in the end, Workplace 2000 will emerge not from prediction, but from choice

Comparing Line and HR Executives’ Perceptions of HR Effectiveness: Services, Roles, and Contributions

This study compared HR and line executives’ evaluations of the effectiveness of the HR function in terms of its service delivery, roles, and contributions to the firm. Survey responses from 44 HR and 59 line executives from 14 companies indicated that (a) HR executives consistently rated the functions effectiveness higher than did line executives, and (b) the greatest differences were observed on the more important and/or strategic aspects of HR. Implications are discussed

Connecting up strategy: are senior strategy directors a missing link?

With companies being exhorted to become more strategically agile and internally connected, this article examines the role of the Senior Strategy Director, the executive tasked specifically with internal strategy. In particular, it explores what they do, what specific capabilities they deploy to enable effective contribution to the company, and in what ways they facilitate the connectedness of strategy. An analysis of multiple interviews over time with Senior Strategy Directors of large companies shows the vital and challenging role these executives play in both shaping, connecting up, and executing strategy. This article identifies the particular capabilities necessary for Senior Strategy Directors to perform their role and shows how it all depends upon their skilful deployment. These findings have significant implications for understanding unfolding micro-processes of strategy in large organizations, for assumptions about the skills and capabilities necessary to be an effective Senior Strategy Director, and for business schools in terms of the content and style of strategy courses they provide

The Economics of Corporate Executive Pay

[Excerpt] In the past ten years, the pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) has more than doubled, and the ratio of median CEO to worker pay has risen to 179 to 1. High and rising executive pay could be an issue of public concern on two different grounds. First, it is contributing to widening income inequality that may be of concern from an equity perspective. Second, it could be the result of economically inefficient labor markets. It is difficult to determine whether executive pay is excessive across the board since executives’ marginal product cannot be directly observed. An upward trend in pay over time is not sufficient proof that the market is not efficient since factors determining supply and demand, such as the skills required of the position, can change over time. To show that pay is excessive from an economic perspective, one must first demonstrate that there is a market failure that is preventing the market from functioning efficiently. The market failure could originate in the division in large modern firms between management and ownership, which is typically dispersed among millions of shareholders. Shareholders’ interests are represented by a board of directors. Critics of executive pay have argued that boards have all too often been “captured” by the executive and are no longer negotiating pay packages that are in the shareholders’ best interests. They point to a number of common practices that they call “stealth compensation” which are inconsistent with arm’s length contracting. These include “golden parachutes,” generous severance packages, company-provided perks, and bonuses that are unrelated to firm performance. Stock options have been the fastest growing portion of executive pay since the 1990s, and critics believe this pattern can also be explained through the prism of stealth compensation. Rewarding executives with employee stock options was often justified in terms of the “pay for performance” mantra, but options are usually designed to reward absolute, not relative, performance. This means that in the bull market of the 1990s, when virtually all stock prices were rising, a company could fall behind its competitors and its executives could still receive handsome options payouts. Indeed, a sizeable portion of the increase in executive pay in the 1990s was likely due to options that turned out to be much more valuable than expected because of the unprecedented price increases of the bull market. Many of the recent corporate scandals appear consistent with stealth compensation as well. Stock options backdating, earnings manipulation, and accounting fraud might have been motivated by attempts to covertly increase executive pay. If short-term fluctuations in the stock price are not good proxies of firm performance, then tying compensation to the stock price can create incentives for executives to engage in activities that are detrimental to shareholders. Policy proposals mostly focus on improving transparency, increasing board independence, and strengthening shareholder control rather than attempting to curb pay directly. S. 1181 (Obama) and H.R. 1257 (Frank), which the House approved on April 19, 2007, would give shareholders a non-binding vote on executive pay. Another proposal would modify the limit on deductibility of executive pay from corporate taxation. More broadly, income inequality could be reduced by increasing the progressivity of the tax system. For current developments and legislation, see CRS Report RS22604, Excessive CEO Pay: Background and Policy Approaches

Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and State Ownership in China: Evidence from New Panel Data*

This paper provides the first systematic evidence on compensation for executives of firms listed in China’s emerging stock market (currently the eighth largest of the world with market capitalization of over $550 billion). Specifically, using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China’s listed firms from 1998 to 2002 (data modeled after Compustat and CRSP in the U.S.), augmented by unique data on executive compensation, we find for the first time statistically significant sensitivities and elasticities of annual cash compensation (salary and bonus) for top executives with respect to shareholder value in China. The size of the estimated sensitivities imply that a 1000 RMB increase in shareholder value yields a 0.020 RMB to 0.053 RMB increase in annual cash compensation, whereas the size of the estimated elasticities suggest that a 10 percent increase in shareholder value results in 3.7 to 4.0 percent increase in annual cash compensation for top executives. The estimated sensitivities and elasticities of cash compensation for top executives in China’s listed firms are greater than what has been reported for Japan and the U.S. However, we also find that state ownership of China’s listed firms is weakening executive pay-performance link and thus possibly making China’s listed firms less effective in solving the agency problem. As such, ownership restructuring may be needed for the “shareholding experiment” to fully succeed in transforming China’s emerging listed firms to efficient modernized corporations and for the overall successful economic transition of China. Finally, we find that sales growth is significantly linked to executive compensation and that Chinese executives are penalized for making negative profit although they are neither penalized for declining profit nor rewarded for rising profit insofar as it is positive.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40076/3/wp690.pd