Robust Computer Algebra, Theorem Proving, and Oracle AI

In the context of superintelligent AI systems, the term "oracle" has two meanings. One refers to modular systems queried for domain-specific tasks. Another usage, referring to a class of systems which may be useful for addressing the value alignment and AI control problems, is a superintelligent AI system that only answers questions. The aim of this manuscript is to survey contemporary research problems related to oracles which align with long-term research goals of AI safety. We examine existing question answering systems and argue that their high degree of architectural heterogeneity makes them poor candidates for rigorous analysis as oracles. On the other hand, we identify computer algebra systems (CASs) as being primitive examples of domain-specific oracles for mathematics and argue that efforts to integrate computer algebra systems with theorem provers, systems which have largely been developed independent of one another, provide a concrete set of problems related to the notion of provable safety that has emerged in the AI safety community. We review approaches to interfacing CASs with theorem provers, describe well-defined architectural deficiencies that have been identified with CASs, and suggest possible lines of research and practical software projects for scientists interested in AI safety.Comment: 15 pages, 3 figure

HeteroGenius: A Framework for Hybrid Analysis of Heterogeneous Software Specifications

Nowadays, software artifacts are ubiquitous in our lives being an essential part of home appliances, cars, cell phones, and even in more critical activities like aeronautics and health sciences. In this context software failures may produce enormous losses, either economical or, in the worst case, in human lives. Software analysis is an area in software engineering concerned with the application of diverse techniques in order to prove the absence of errors in software pieces. In many cases different analysis techniques are applied by following specific methodological combinations that ensure better results. These interactions between tools are usually carried out at the user level and it is not supported by the tools. In this work we present HeteroGenius, a framework conceived to develop tools that allow users to perform hybrid analysis of heterogeneous software specifications. HeteroGenius was designed prioritising the possibility of adding new specification languages and analysis tools and enabling a synergic relation of the techniques under a graphical interface satisfying several well-known usability enhancement criteria. As a case-study we implemented the functionality of Dynamite on top of HeteroGenius.Comment: In Proceedings LAFM 2013, arXiv:1401.056

Reductionism and the Universal Calculus

In the seminal essay, "On the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences," physicist Eugene Wigner poses a fundamental philosophical question concerning the relationship between a physical system and our capacity to model its behavior with the symbolic language of mathematics. In this essay, I examine an ambitious 16th and 17th-century intellectual agenda from the perspective of Wigner's question, namely, what historian Paolo Rossi calls "the quest to create a universal language." While many elite thinkers pursued related ideas, the most inspiring and forceful was Gottfried Leibniz's effort to create a "universal calculus," a pictorial language which would transparently represent the entirety of human knowledge, as well as an associated symbolic calculus with which to model the behavior of physical systems and derive new truths. I suggest that a deeper understanding of why the efforts of Leibniz and others failed could shed light on Wigner's original question. I argue that the notion of reductionism is crucial to characterizing the failure of Leibniz's agenda, but that a decisive argument for the why the promises of this effort did not materialize is still lacking.Comment: 11 pages, 1 figur

Unbounded safety verification for hardware using software analyzers

Demand for scalable hardware verification is ever-increasing. We propose an unbounded safety verification framework for hardware, at the heart of which is a software verifier. To this end, we synthesize Verilog at register transfer level into a software-netlist, represented as a word-level ANSI-C program. The proposed tool flow allows us to leverage the precision and scalability of state-of-the-art software verification techniques. In particular, we evaluate unbounded proof techniques, such as predicate abstraction, k-induction, interpolation, and IC3/PDR; and we compare the performance of verification tools from the hardware and software domains that use these techniques. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to perform unbounded verification of hardware using software analyzers

Sound and Complete Runtime Security Monitor for Application Software

Conventional approaches for ensuring the security of application software at run-time, through monitoring, either produce (high rates of) false alarms (e.g. intrusion detection systems) or limit application performance (e.g. run-time verification). We present a runtime security monitor that detects both known and unknown cyber attacks by checking that the run-time behavior of the application is consistent with the expected behavior modeled in application specification. This is crucial because, even if the implementation is consistent with its specification, the application may still be vulnerable due to flaws in the supporting infrastructure (e.g. the language runtime system, libraries and operating system). This runtime security monitor is sound and complete, eliminating false alarms, as well as efficient, so that it does not limit runtime application performance and so that it supports real-time systems. The security monitor takes as input the application specification and the application implementation, which may be expressed in different languages. The specification language of the application software is formalized based on monadic second order logic and event calculus interpreted over algebraic data structures. This language allows us to express behavior of an application at any desired (and practical) level of abstraction as well as with high degree of modularity. The security monitor detects every attack by systematically comparing the application execution and specification behaviors at runtime, even though they operate at two different levels of abstraction. We define the denotational semantics of the specification language and prove that the monitor is sound and complete. Furthermore, the monitor is efficient because of the modular application specification at appropriate level(s) of abstraction