Creed vs. Deed: Secession, Legitimacy, and the Use of Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers has troubled human rights activists, policy-makers, and local communities for decades. Although rebellions around the world routinely use children in their activities, many do not. Despite its overwhelming importance for conflict resolution, the topic of child soldiers remains understudied. My research blends classic rational choice and constructivist themes to develop an explanation for when child soldiers will be used, and when they will be avoided. The likelihood of child recruitment is influenced by the value of international opinion; this is determined by the groups\u27 long-term goals. Secessionist rebellions desire to have their own state. However, statehood is jealously guarded by the international community and is only granted under extreme circumstances. The use of child soldiers has been condemned around the world as a crime against humanity, and it can curtail international support. Thus, secessionists should be the least likely rebel type to use child soldiers out of a concern to appear legitimate. Opportunistic rebellions face few constraints in their recruitment efforts. They do not desire international support because their long-term goal is the same as their short term goal: profit. Instead of refraining from using children in order to curry favor with external parties, they will abduct, adopt, and abuse children because they are cheaper to employ than adults. Opportunists are unconcerned with losing legitimacy or reducing the chances of victory. Therefore, they should be the most likely to use child soldiers. Concern for costs can affect all rebels. As duration grows, constraints over long-term legitimacy diminish. Therefore, all rebellions should be more likely to use child soldiers as duration increases. I test my theory quantitatively by looking at 103 rebel groups active between 1998-2008. I explore rebellions in Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan and Sudan to further elucidate the causal mechanisms. There is considerable empirical support for the theory. These results offer policy-relevant conclusions in the areas of rehabilitation and conflict resolution. More importantly, they offer a workable strategy to curb the use of child soldiers in civil war

Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the \u27War on Terrorism\u27: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed \u27Unprivileged Combatants\u27

The purpose of this essay, written in late 2006, is to take stock of the current application of the Geneva Conventions in the global war on terrorism, including interpretations recently taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hamdan case. The Geneva Conventions and the laws of war more generally comprise a sophisticated regulatory regime whose rules can and should be closely analyzed by lawyers. Yet, like all law, the inevitable imprecision in the rules presents opportunities for governments to exploit gray areas so as to augment governmental authority, and to avoid sensible interpretations that will protect individuals from overreaching governmental power. Such exploitation invariably severs the rules from their ethical foundation and loses sight of their underlying object and purpose. The events of 9/11 and their aftermath revealed complicated scenarios that do not fit easily into the traditional paradigms of the laws of war, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Highly knowledgeable persons in the field have reached diametrically opposite conclusions about certain fundamental issues, such as whether the conflict with Al Qaeda constitutes an armed conflict within the meaning of the laws of war, whether it matters if the Taliban wore regular uniforms or operated within a regular command structure, and whether a person who fails to qualify as a prisoner of war under one convention must invariably then qualify as a protected civilian under another. Many of these controversies arise because the two dominant paradigms that operate within the Geneva Conventions - one concerning international armed conflict between two or more states, and the other concerning non-international (typically understood as internal) armed conflict between a state and non-state actors - do not fit the phenomenon of global terrorism, where the dominant paradigm concerns transnational armed conflict between state and non-state actors. Yet from their earliest formation, the laws of war have recognized the problem of dealing with irregular forces and the problem of adapting the law to circumstances that change over time. For that reason, built into the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols are the means for taking account of areas that are not addressed explicitly or in detail. Rather than trying to exploit such gray areas in the law, lawyers should seek to inject the dictates of humanity into them, in a manner that best reconciles the competing interests during armed conflict of both governments and persons who are at risk. As an example of how one might allow the Geneva Conventions to evolve in a sensible fashion, this essay discusses the rules that should be applied with respect to the termination of the captivity of unprivileged combatants, such as those held at Guantánamo Bay. While the environment for handling such detainees remains fluid, and the norms expressed by the laws of war on these points are far from certain, this essay suggests answers that are legally plausible and that appear consistent with sound policy choices. Similar efforts to fill in the gray areas for other aspects of the law of war as it relates to global terrorism should also be pursued

Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the \u27War on Terrorism\u27: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed \u27Unprivileged Combatants\u27

The purpose of this essay, written in late 2006, is to take stock of the current application of the Geneva Conventions in the global war on terrorism, including interpretations recently taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hamdan case. The Geneva Conventions and the laws of war more generally comprise a sophisticated regulatory regime whose rules can and should be closely analyzed by lawyers. Yet, like all law, the inevitable imprecision in the rules presents opportunities for governments to exploit gray areas so as to augment governmental authority, and to avoid sensible interpretations that will protect individuals from overreaching governmental power. Such exploitation invariably severs the rules from their ethical foundation and loses sight of their underlying object and purpose. The events of 9/11 and their aftermath revealed complicated scenarios that do not fit easily into the traditional paradigms of the laws of war, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Highly knowledgeable persons in the field have reached diametrically opposite conclusions about certain fundamental issues, such as whether the conflict with Al Qaeda constitutes an armed conflict within the meaning of the laws of war, whether it matters if the Taliban wore regular uniforms or operated within a regular command structure, and whether a person who fails to qualify as a prisoner of war under one convention must invariably then qualify as a protected civilian under another. Many of these controversies arise because the two dominant paradigms that operate within the Geneva Conventions - one concerning international armed conflict between two or more states, and the other concerning non-international (typically understood as internal) armed conflict between a state and non-state actors - do not fit the phenomenon of global terrorism, where the dominant paradigm concerns transnational armed conflict between state and non-state actors. Yet from their earliest formation, the laws of war have recognized the problem of dealing with irregular forces and the problem of adapting the law to circumstances that change over time. For that reason, built into the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols are the means for taking account of areas that are not addressed explicitly or in detail. Rather than trying to exploit such gray areas in the law, lawyers should seek to inject the dictates of humanity into them, in a manner that best reconciles the competing interests during armed conflict of both governments and persons who are at risk. As an example of how one might allow the Geneva Conventions to evolve in a sensible fashion, this essay discusses the rules that should be applied with respect to the termination of the captivity of unprivileged combatants, such as those held at Guantánamo Bay. While the environment for handling such detainees remains fluid, and the norms expressed by the laws of war on these points are far from certain, this essay suggests answers that are legally plausible and that appear consistent with sound policy choices. Similar efforts to fill in the gray areas for other aspects of the law of war as it relates to global terrorism should also be pursued

Impact of illicit economics on military conflict

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, February 2007.Page 642 blank.Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 575-641).The study explores the nexus between illicit economies and military conflicts. It investigates when and how access by belligerents to the production and trafficking of illicit substances affects the strength of belligerents and governments. Although narcotics trafficking is often treated as sui generis, the study situates the drug trade within the larger class of markets for illicit products and services. The study presents a general theory of the relationship between illicit markets and military conflict - the political capital of illicit economies -- and contrasts it with conventional wisdom on connections between drug trafficking and military conflict. The political capital of illicit economies argues that belligerents derive much more than simply large financial profits from their sponsorship of illicit economies. They also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, legitimacy and support from the local population, called political capital. If belligerents choose to become negatively involved in the illicit economy (attempt to destroy it), they not only fail to increase their military capabilities, but also suffer costs in terms of political capital. The extent and scope of belligerents' gains/ losses from their involvement in the illicit economy depend on four factors:(cont.) the state of the overall economy; the character of the illicit economy; the presence of traffickers; and the government response to the illicit economy. These factors reflect both structural conditions outside of the immediate control of the belligerents and the government and strategic policy choices available to either the belligerents or the government. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about narcotics and military conflict, eradication of narcotics cultivation has dubious effects on the capabilities of the belligerents and is extremely unlikely to severely weaken them. However, it alienates the local population from the government and results in the population's unwillingness to provide intelligence on the belligerents - a crucial requirement for success against the belligerents. Thus, eradication of illicit crops increases the political capital of the belligerents without significantly weakening their military capabilities. The primary cases explored in the study are Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Additional evidence is drawn from the cases of Burma, Northern Ireland, Turkey, and India.by Vanda Felbab-Brown.Ph.D

Virtual wars : a comparative analysis of the 1991 Gulf War and the 'War on Terror'

EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Military intervention in the Kurdish crisis April-July 1991.

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:DXN035009 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo