Will They Stay or Will They Go? Leadership Behaviors That Increase Teacher Retention in Rural Schools

Hard-to-staff rural schools often struggle to attract and retain promising educators. Experts have consistently identified administrative support in rural schools to be of unique importance for recruitment and retention, yet a lack of clarity continues to surround the specific leadership behaviors that new teachers interpret as supportive. This qualitative study collected data from three focus groups; including superintendents, principals, and teachers in a program for aspiring administrators; and found that rural schools have to try much harder and in more active ways to retain new teachers because of the constraints existing within rural education. Rural school support for new teachers needs to be a collective responsibility to positively impact the retention of new teachers and the structural supports, affirmation, and encouragement offered by their organizations help to heighten the retention of new teachers. The study confirms that rural school leaders can leverage leadership behaviors to better retain talented teachers

Arguments over solutions to the “surge” of Central American immigrant minors are based on myths about why they have come to the U.S.

Recent weeks have seen increasing concern over the “surge” in undocumented minors arriving at the US-Mexico border, with Republicans and Democrats in Congress putting forward potential solutions to the apparent crisis. Robert Brenneman argues that much of the discourse around the border “surge” is based on myths about why unaccompanied minors have come to the US, and whether or not they will be an economic burden if they stay

Reclaiming Beaches for the People on the Fourth of July

During these dog days of summer, millions of Americans will flock to the nation’s shores for comfort and relief. Who will go, where they will go, and who they can expect to find there speaks volumes about class in America. Now more so than ever, the distribution of people on America’s beaches each summer mirrors those bar graphs that illustrate the distribution of wealth in the nation as a whole. Long stretches of shore are the exclusive dominion of America’s super rich. A substantial segment is fenced off for the enjoyment of a shrinking upper middle class who can still afford to go on vacations or own second homes. What little remains is for the rest of us; and of that, a dwindling amount could be considered safe for bathing. My neighborhood in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for instance, hugs the western shore of Lake Michigan. Yet few of my mostly white, well-to-do neighbors can be found bathing or picnicking on this urban shoreline (voted for the second year in a row as one of the nation’s most polluted). Those of us who can afford to will rent a cottage along a secluded, sometimes privately owned, beach, or stay in an expensive seaside hotel in one of America’s vacation destinations, where the price of admission includes exclusive access to a spacious, well-manicured beach. Meanwhile, our neighborhood beach plays host to the city’s working poor, mostly black and Hispanic, who come despite the occasional water quality alert, and despite the sorely neglected state of the beach itself, another victim of our city’s struggle to maintain basic public services in our age of austerity

A surplus and welfare analysis of asymmetric regulation

Some European regulators have decided to force competition in their nationalmarkets. They have decided to go beyond the second directive and apply asymmetric regulation. Gas release programs and market shares constraints are the two asymmetric decisions imposed to incumbents. When a regulator imposes a gas release program to an incumbent, this operator is compelled to release quantities of its long term contracts to its competitor. In this paper, we will focus on gas release and its impact on welfare, consumer surplus and on the level of released quantities set by regulators. The aim of a gas release program is to give access to natural gas to competitors. They become actives on the market and are in competition with the incumbent. These programs are time limited. They only help competitors in expecting the development of hubs or new investments in importation infrastructures. If competitors want to stay active after the program, they may find others supply sources to increase security of supply. The gas release can induce Raising Rival's Costs or "Self-Sabotage" strategies. We use a Cournot model with capacity constraints to answer two questions. First, we will study the impact of these strategies on consumer surplus and welfare. We will show that there are no impact on consumer surplus but the welfare decreases. The gas release program introduces a transfer of profit between competitor and incumbent, reduces welfare because of the increase in costs of supply, but has no impact on total consumed quantities. Then, we will suppose that the regulator is setting released quantities maximising welfare. Gas release price is often based on costs plus a bid or a fixed premium. Quantities are set with a less obvious process. We will demonstrate that the regulator must set released quantities :- that would not be so high if incumbent's supplies are small to avoid Self- Sabotage or RRC strategies ;- as a function of incumbent's supplies if they are in intermediate values to avoid strategies seen above and to optimise quantities sold on the market ;- at a sufficient level to let the two operators playing their Cournot best reply function. Finally, we will conclude that the regulator can avoid RRC or Self-Sabotage strategies in maximising the welfare when it decides gas released quantities. Gathering from empirical studies, these quantities should not be so high in order to let a significant difference between the capacities of both competitor and incumbent to avoid collusive behaviours.Energy market ; Gas release ; Regulation ; Optimal released quantities ; Efficiency ; Welfare

The impact of asymmetric regulation on surplus and welfare : the case of gas release programmes

Some European regulators have decided to force competition in their nationalmarkets. They have decided to go beyond the second directive and apply asymmetric regulation. Gas release programs and market shares constraints are the two asymmetric decisions imposed to incumbents. When a regulator imposes a gas release program to an incumbent, this operator is compelled to release quantities of its long term contracts to its competitor. In this paper, we will focus on gas release and its impact on welfare, consumer surplus and on the level of released quantities set by regulators. The aim of a gas release program is to give access to natural gas to competitors. They become actives on the market and are in competition with the incumbent. These programs are time limited. They only help competitors in expecting the development of hubs or new investments in importation infrastructures. If competitors want to stay active after the program, they may find others supply sources to increase security of supply. The gas release can induce Raising Rival's Costs or “Self-Sabotage” strategies. We use a Cournot model with capacity constraints to answer two questions. First, we will study the impact of these strategies on consumer surplus and welfare. We will show that there are no impact on consumer surplus but the welfare decreases. The gas release program introduces a transfer of profit between competitor and incumbent, reduces welfare because of the increase in costs of supply, but has no impact on total consumed quantities. Then, we will suppose that the regulator is setting released quantities maximising welfare. Gas release price is often based on costs plus a bid or a fixed premium. Quantities are set with a less obvious process. We will demonstrate that the regulator must set released quantities : - that would not be so high if incumbent's supplies are small to avoid Self- Sabotage or RRC strategies; - as a function of incumbent's supplies if they are in intermediate values to avoid strategies seen above and to optimise quantities sold on the market; - at a sufficient level to let the two operators playing their Cournot best reply function. Finally, we will conclude that the regulator can avoid RRC or Self-Sabotage strategies in maximising the welfare when it decides gas released quantities. Gathering from empirical studies, these quantities should not be so high in order to let a significant difference between the capacities of both competitor and incumbent to avoid collusive behaviours.REGULATION ; MARCHE INTERIEUR ; GAZ NATUREL ; MARCHE CONCURRENTIEL ; GAS RELEASE

Project methods in theory and practice

Almost every organizations works with projects, since a project is a onetime task with a clear beginning and an end and have never be done before. It is hard to say that a specific project method will suit all projects. It is up to the project manager who leads the project to choose a project method and use this as a tool to get the project to be successful together with a project team. Some researchers argues that it is hard to stay with just one project method, it could be better to mix two or three to make them more suitable for the project and the project team. This thesis will interview three project managers and see how they use project methods in different projects. Are they staying with the project method as they are explained in the theory or are them mixing them for what suit the project best

Artificial Financial Intelligence

Recent advances in the field of artificial intelligence have revived long-standing debates about what happens when robots become smarter than humans. Will they destroy us? Will they put us all out of work? Will they lead to a world of techno-savvy haves and techno-ignorant have-nots? These debates have found particular resonance in finance, where computers already play a dominant role. High-frequency traders, quant hedge funds, and robo-advisors all represent, to a greater or lesser degree, real-world instantiations of the impact that artificial intelligence is having on the field. This Article will argue that the primary danger of artificial intelligence in finance is not so much that it will surpass human intelligence, but rather that it will exacerbate human error. It will do so in three ways. First, because current artificial intelligence techniques rely heavily on identifying patterns in historical data, use of these techniques will lead to results that perpetuate the status quo (a status quo that exhibits all the features and failings of the data itself). Second, because some of the most “accurate” artificial intelligence strategies are the least transparent or explainable ones, decisionmakers may well give more weight to the results of these algorithms than they are due. Finally, because much of the financial industry depends not just on predicting what will happen in the world, but also on predicting what other people will predict will happen in the world, it is likely that small errors in applying artificial intelligence (either in data, programming, or execution) will have outsized effects on markets. This is not to say that artificial intelligence has no place in the financial industry, or even that it is bad for the industry. It clearly is here to stay, and, what is more, has much to offer in terms of efficiency, speed, and cost. But as governments and regulators begin to take stock of the technology, it is worthwhile considering artificial intelligence’s real-world limitations

Echoes of Greek Tragedy in Medieval Literature: The Case of Oedipus

In approaching this issue, it will be helpful to use two analytically distinct methods, to wit, the diachronic, which allows us to speculate about how the myth reached the hands of Lydgate (Guerin 2005, 183–191); and the synchronic, to clarify the similarities and differences between the two authors. Thus, approaching the subject diachronically, the first pages of this paper will attempt to delineate the main milestones in the long tradition of the myth of Oedipus, beginning from the time of Ancient Rome; and, afterwards, a synchronic analysis will examine various motifs as they have survived, disappeared or been transformed in the medieval poem. The final part will explore the possible reasons for these changes.This article has been written thanks to a stay in the Hardt Foundation of Geneva (Switzerland)

An overview of service quality towards guest’s satisfaction in hospitality industry / Aida Khalida Mohamed Idris... [et al.]

Sustainable development of hospitality industry in Malaysia has led numerous numbers of hotels, motels and other lodging accommodation to increase rapidly. It occurs due to the increment number of international and domestic tourist boarding in Malaysia. Owing to that, it is important for lodging provider to offer a good service quality because it will lead the guests feeling pleasant and satisfied during their stay. In return, it will increase the loyalty and high tendency of tourist to revisit or recommend to their friends. Researches have shown that service quality plays important elements in determining guest’s satisfaction. Guests are considered satisfied when they have the positive feeling throughout the process of evaluating the expectation and what they actually get. Due to the guest satisfaction mostly depended on the level of service quality and on how they are being treated during their stay at the lodging, it is crucial to search for a missing value in service quality towards guest’s satisfaction. Aforementioned by previous researchers shows that numerous issues have been raised pertaining of primary dimension and sub dimension in service quality when measuring satisfaction in several industries as many theories, measurements and models has been deformed recently. Therefore, this paper is to discuss the sub dimension for service quality towards guest’s satisfaction in Seberang Perai hotels