2,999 research outputs found
A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics
Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the introduction of negative Moorean factsânegative existentials that command Moorean certaintyâcomplicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction
Reference fiction, and omission
In this paper, I argue that sentences that contain âomissionâ tokens that appear to function as singular terms are meaningful while maintaining the view that omissions are nothing at all or mere absences. I take omissions to be fictional entities and claim that the way in which sentences about fictional characters are true parallels the way in which sentences about omissions are true. I develop a pragmatic account of fictional reference and argue that my fictionalist account of omissions implies a plausible account of the metaphysics of omissions
Cioranâs âgrain of ataraxyâ : boredom, nothingness, and quietism
In reading E.M. Cioranâs Ćuvre, one is faced with an immediate and unremitting abrasiveness that has its roots with our being born into time. Indeed, the author of The Fall into Time and The Trouble with Being Born thought that it is precisely this accidental and unredeemable temporality, an original sin that results in a life forever situated in cycles of striving and becoming, which is to be exhuastingly apprehended in the experience of boredom: âLife is more and less than boredom, though it is in boredom and by boredom that we discern what life is worth.â Cioranâs pessimism never relents; even his lugubrious friend Samuel Beckett had to keep a distance after finding him âtoo pessimisticââwho else but Cioran could write that âleukemia is the garden where God bloomsâ? Despite this, in Cioranâs often autobiographical, aphoristic and essayistic writings, we find a richly-timbred boredom (ironically so) which gives us incisive observations into a multitude of related concepts and realities. Nothingness, God, silence, mysticism, suffering, and quietism (among others) all feature in Cioranâs writings on boredom, as well as in this paperâs attempt to better situate Cioranâs work with respect to his more famous pessimistic and existentialist relationsâs take on the subject, namely Arthur Schopenhauer and Martin Heidegger. In exploring his work on boredom vis-Ă -vis his specific interest in mysticism, Taoism, nothingness, time and insomnia, this paper aims to show how the failure to attain what Cioran called âa grain of ataraxyâ, necessarily presupposes a limited set of âpossibilitiesâ and âprospectsâ when faced with the experience of âthe sensation of the emptiness of existenceâ that is boredom (Schopenhauer).peer-reviewe
In Defense of Existence Monism
The objective of this paper is a defense of a particular answer to van Inwagenâs Special Composition Question: when is it the case that some objects together compose some additional object? The answer is the conjunction of two claims. The first claim, compositional nihilism says that, necessarily, there is never an instance of material composition, and therefore all material objects that do exist are simple, or without proper parts. The second claim, existence monism, says that there exists a material object, and that all other material objects are identical with this object. In other words, there is just one material object that extends throughout the entirety of the material world.
These claims are formalized as follows, where (N) represents compositional nihilism and (M) represents existence monism:
(N) [âx: x â M] ~ây(Pxy ^ x â y)
(M) [âx: x â M] ây[(y â M) â (x = y)]
Other claims will be argued for. While I do believe these additional claims are true, I am not committed to them as strongly as I am to compositional nihilism and existence monism. These other claims serve mostly compliment the primary two claims.
The dialectic of the paper is essentially that of an argument to the best explanation. Alternatives to compositional nihilism â universalism and compatibilism â are eliminated on various grounds. Alternatives to existence monism â versions of pluralist nihilism â are also argued against. The idea is that the two views are the only strong candidates for an ontologically sound theory.
One last task of the paper is to disarm various objections to the two primary claims. This is done by demonstrating that what was previously seen as objectionable consequences of the views are, in fact, unproblematic. In at least one instance, a previously objectionable consequence is shown to be, in fact, a potential benefit of the views
Foundations of Generalism: Symmetries, Non-individuals and Ontological Nihilism
The topic of this thesis is the metaphysical theory of generalism: the view that
the world is constituted by purely general facts. Whilst the connection may not be
immediately obvious, generalism is also touted as a qualitative metaphysics: a theory
that seeks to elevate, in some important metaphysical sense, the notion of qualities
(i.e. properties and relations) over that of objects. As such, generalism is just as well
individuated by its categorial commitmentsâits commitment to the fundamentality
of certain metaphysical categoriesâas it is by its construal of fundamental facts.
My aim in this thesis is to make explicit these connections, providing a proper
explication of the generalist position, as well as its motivations and its apparent
consequences. Beyond this, the thesis can also be read as an extended argument
in favour of individualism: the view that holds, contrary to generalism, that the
category of individual, or object, is at least as fundamental as that of property and
relation.
The subtitle of this thesis, âsymmetries, non-individuals and ontological nihilismâ,
alludes to the topic addressed by each of the three chapters. In chapter 1 I explicate and critique the generalistâs primary argument against individualism, one
based on the notion of a symmetry. In chapter 2 I investigate the tenability of a
position dubbed âquantifier generalismâ, a position that, I argue, can be further explicated through the notion of a non-individual. And in chapter 3 I turn to the most
widely-discussed form of generalism found in the literature: algebraic generalism, a
(purported) form of ontological nihlism
Melville and Nietzsche: Living the Death of God
Herman Melville was so estranged from the religious beliefs of
his time and place that his faith was doubted during his own lifetime. In
the middle of the twentieth century some scholars even associated him
with nihilism. To date, however, no one has offered a detailed account
of Melville in relation to Nietzsche, who ïŹrst made nihilism a topic of
serious concern to the Western philosophical tradition. In this essay, I
discuss some of the hitherto unexplored similarities between Melvilleâs
ideas and Nietzscheâs reïŹections on and reactions to the death of God
and the advent of nihilism in the West
No objects, no problem?
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2005 ©Taylor & Francis; Australasian Journal of Philosophy is available online at: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=0004-8402&volume=83&issue=4&spage=457. DOI 10.1080/00048400500338609One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited 'survive' the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, we examine one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set of inconsistent statements fail to be 'factual'. Much of the first half of the paper is devoted to explaining a notion of factuality that does not imply truth but still consists in 'getting the world right'. The second half of the paper is a case study. Some 'compositional nihilists' have argued that, by rejecting composite objects (and so by denying the composition ever takes place), we avoid the notorious puzzles of coincidence, for example, the statue/lump and the ship of Theseus puzzles. Using the apparatus developed in the first half of the paper, we explore the question of whether these puzzles survive the elimination of composite objects
How Composites Could Have Been Indispensable
Mereological Nihilism is the thesis that no material object has proper parts; every material object is a simple. Recent developments in plural semantics have made it possible to develop and motivate this position. In particular, some have argued that the tools of plural reference and quantification enable us to systematically paraphrase true statements apparently about composites into statements that only concern simples. Are composites really surplus to philosophical requirements? Given the resources of plural semantics, what must the world be like if composites are to be theoretically indispensable? I will describe and defend the possibility of scenario in which mention of composites cannot be paraphrased. We will therefore come to appreciate one way in which the world would have to be in order for composites to be required and for Nihilism to fail
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