(Still) Unsafe at Any Speed : Why Not Jail for Auto Executives?

Americans can be forgiven for wondering what has gone so drastically wrong with the companies that sell automobiles. In 2014, 64 million, a number equivalent to one in five of the cars on the road, was recalled. Safety defects such as the lack of torque in ignition switches installed in GM compact cars like the Cobalt put motorists in the terrifying position of coping with a stalled engine and loss of power brakes while traveling at high speeds. GM had the audacity to classify this condition was not a safety defect, but instead was merely “inconvenient” for its customers. It persisted in this position for many years until a private lawsuit forced the company to acknowledge that stalled engines also meant disabled airbags. This Article uses the ignition switch debacle to consider two crucial questions. First, is the regulatory system capable of stepping into the marketplace and stopping corporate malfeasance that creates too many incentives for executives to deny the existence of safety defects well past the time when they should be acknowledged? Concluding that the answer to this question is no, the piece then considers whether criminal prosecution of mid- and senior-level managers, including in-house counsel for the companies, is a feasible and effective alternative to traditional regulation? I argue that publicly available facts justify criminal prosecution of GM as well as individual managers for reckless homicide under state law, as well as such federal crimes as failure to disclose a safety defect and obstruction of justice

Why not glycine electrochemical biosensors?

Glycine monitoring is gaining importance as a biomarker in clinical analysis due to its involvement in multiple physiological functions, which results in glycine being one of the most analyzed biomolecules for diagnostics. This growing demand requires faster and more reliable, while affordable, analytical methods that can replace the current gold standard for glycine detection, which is based on sample extraction with subsequent use of liquid chromatography or fluorometric kits for its quantification in centralized laboratories. This work discusses electrochemical sensors and biosensors as an alternative option, focusing on their potential application for glycine determination in blood, urine, and cerebrospinal fluid, the three most widely used matrices for glycine analysis with clinical meaning. For electrochemical sensors, voltammetry/amperometry is the preferred readout (10 of the 13 papers collected in this review) and metal-based redox mediator modification is the predominant approach for electrode fabrication (11 of the 13 papers). However, none of the reported electrochemical sensors fulfill the requirements for direct analysis of biological fluids, most of them lacking appropriate selectivity, linear range of response, and/or capability of measuring at physiological conditions. Enhanced selectivity has been recently reported using biosensors (with an enzyme element in the electrode design), although this is still a very incipient approach. Currently, despite the benefits of electrochemistry, only optical biosensors have been successfully reported for glycine detection and, from all the inspected works, it is clear that bioengineering efforts will play a key role in the embellishment of selectivity and storage stability of the sensing element in the sensor

Dictators Don’t Compete: Autocracy, Democracy, and Tax Competition. CES Open Forum Series #22 2018-2019

It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries follow the Irish example, cut their capital taxes and get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the economic standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the economic standard model implicitly assumes competing governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries world-wide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011. Our findings shed light on how domestic institutions and global markets interact in economic policy making

Pennington to Rev. H. S. Lower, February 25, 1948

Pennington writing to Reverend H. S. Lower explaining why he will not join the state campaign for the Christian Independent Party.https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/levi_pennington/1235/thumbnail.jp

Ladies in Red: Learning From America\u27s First Female Bankrupts

Several years ago, the Honorable Joyce Bihary, a bankruptcy judge in Atlanta, Georgia, asked me3 why our country\u27s first bankruptcy law specifically referred to debtors using “he” or “she” rather than a gender-neutral noun (such as “bankrupts”) or the male possessive pronoun “he.” Implicitly, she was also asking whether there were any women debtors under our early bankruptcy laws. Although I had read the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 more than once, I did not recollect its use of these gender-inclusive pronouns. Nor did I know why the Act employed them. Despite having given considerable thought to contemporary women in debt, I too had no inkling as to whether there were women debtors under the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. And so I set out, with the help of my co-authors, to find the answers to Judge Bihary\u27s two questions. Those answers led us to new questions and concerns, most particularly questions about how bankruptcy history has been told to date

Bentham and Mill on the "Quality" of Pleasures

John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham are often said to have held opposed views concerning the way “the value” of different pleasures should be estimated. Mill is accused of being an inconsistent utilitarian because he thought that, when comparing the value of two pleasures, we should not forget to take their “quality” into account. Bentham, on the other hand, is said to have believed that we should take “only quantity” into consideration. By verifying what they actually wrote, and reflecting on what they meant by words like “value”, “quantity”, and “quality”, we find that these allegations are largely imaginary and that the difference between Mill and Bentham on this question has (at least) been exaggerated. Bentham, for example, did not write that "quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry", as is so often reported. In his Principles of Morals and Legislation he clearly tells us why he rejects the inaccurate word “quantity”, when speaking of “the value of (a lot of) pain or pleasure”, and he explicitly introduces “quality” – both the word and the concept – in his analysis of rewards and punishments. These clarifications allow us to sort-out a few other confusions concerning utilitarianism. We explain, for example, why authors like Amartya Sen and Michael Sandel are mistaken in believing that rights and freedoms have “no intrinsic value” (only instrumental value) in utilitarian ethics

Esther not Judith: Why One Made It and the Other Didn’t

Brave, wise, and stunningly beautiful, Esther and Judith have much in common. Both Jewish heroines live under foreign domination. Both risk their lives to save their people from oppression. One of the few differences between the two women is that Judith is openly pious and Esther is not. Indeed, God is not even mentioned in the Hebrew version of the Book of Esther. So why was the story of Esther included in the Hebrew Bible while the Book of Judith was left out? Because Esther never threatened the status quo, but Judith was a dangerous woman who had the power to subvert Jewish society

Faces of irrationality in Euripides: on Medea's Irrationality

In Nascimento (2015) I criticized the thesis defended in Irwin (1983) according to which two of the most famous characters in Euripides’ plays, Phaedra and Medea, could be said to exemplify akratic behavior and, in the case of Phaedra, even to explain it. In that article, I’ve pointed out several weakness in these thesis in order to justify my disagreement. I also suggested that, although there was no reason why we should stop looking for examples and explanations of akratic behavior in Euripides’ plays, that should not be the only kind of irrational behavior we ought to be interested in finding there. In this paper, I argue that Medea actually instantiates a form of irrational behavior that is different from akratic behavior. The argument that follows is divided in four parts. After a brief introduction (section I), I clarify what sort of irrationality I believe to be instantiated by Medea’s behavior using Michael Bratman’s theory of plan stability (section II). Then, I analyze Euripides’ text in order to show why I think we should say that Medea does display that kind of irrationality (section III). The paper concludes with a brief summary of the argument (section IV)

Liability and Admission of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law

Some judges and scholars have questioned the social value of the standard form in which the Securities and Exchange Commission settles its corporate enforcement actions, including the agency’s use of essentially unreviewed consent decrees that include no admission of liability or wrongdoing. This essay for a symposium on SEC enforcement provides an analysis of the deterrent effects of the three main components of settlements in public enforcement of law: liability, admission, and remedy. The conclusions are the following. All three components have beneficial deterrent effects. Cost considerations nonetheless justify some settlements that dispense with liability or admission, or even both. But a practice like the SEC’s of uniformly institutionalizing settlements without admissions, such that the deterrent effects of admissions are never realized, even for bargaining leverage, is not justified. Further, there is reason to believe that some form of judicial review of enforcement settlements would contribute to deterrence. To put the argument another way, the SEC and other agencies engaged in public civil enforcement could learn something from contemplating why the federal criminal justice system strongly disfavors nolo contendere pleas and why a plea bargaining system dominated by nolo pleas would be so undesirable as to be unthinkable