III. Konferenciakötet : A pécsi jogász doktoranduszoknak szervezett konferencia előadásai.

2018 és 2019-et követően – a pandémiás időszak miatt egy év kihagyással – 2021. április 07-én szerveztünk harmadik alkalommal konferenciát a Pécsi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar doktoranduszainak. A konferenciát ezúttal online felületen a teams alkalmazáson keresztül bonyolítottuk le. 2018 őszén doktoranduszokban és fiatal oktatókban felmerült az ötlet, hogy a pécsi jogász doktoranduszoknak szervezzünk konferenciát. Korábban is voltak erre pozitív kezdeményezések, ilyen volt például az ún. JoDoPet (Jogász Doktoranduszok Pécsi Találkozója) című PhD konferencia, amely szintén több alkalommal került megrendezésre a Pécsi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Karán. JoDoPet Konferenciát legutóbb 2015-ben rendeztek, azóta pedig kizárólag pécsi jogász doktoranduszoknak szervezett konferencia nem volt. 2018 november 30-án szerveztük meg az első konferenciát, ahol tizenöt előadó három szekcióban ismertette kutatási eredményeit 15 perces előadásokban. Így újra lehetősége nyílt jogász doktoranduszoknak és doktorjelölteknek, hogy helyben a Pécsi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Karán adjanak elő. Az előadásokat követően lehetőség volt a résztvevőknek kérdéseket, hozzászólásokat intézni a prezentálókhoz. A hagyományt folytatva egy évvel később újabb konferenciát szerveztünk 2019. november 15-én. A második konferencián már 18 előadó vett részt, külön idegen nyelvű szekcióval. A konferenciákon elhangzott előadásokból ezt követően egy tanulmánykötetet terveztünk készíteni, egy bővített szerkesztői bizottsággal. Ezúton is, mint szerkesztőbizottsági tag, szeretném megköszönni valamennyi előadónak a részvételt, és külön azoknak, akik tanulmányukkal hozzájárultak a konferenciakötet létrejöttéhez. Remélhetőleg a jövőben is tudjuk folytatni a hagyományt, és újabb konferencia lehetőséget biztosíthatunk a pécsi jogász doktoranduszoknak és doktorjelölteknek

The Evolving Cyber Threat Landscape during the Coronavirus Crisis

In light of the societal changes wrought by the coronavirus pandemic, this report examines the impact this crisis has had on the general cybersecurity threat landscape during the first two quarters of 2020. This report highlights that the coronavirus pandemic has generated a set of remarkable and psycho-societal, technical, and logistical-economic circumstances upon which malicious actors have capitalized. The analysis of the COVID-19-related cyber threats conducted for this report shows an overarching degree of continuity in terms of the types of attacks, threats actors, and the volume of attacks. Adversarial behavior has, however, changed and evolved in terms of scale, sophistication, targets, and motivation. Based on these findings, this report has developed a range of recommendations for addressing key cybersecurity implications of the pandemic.Vor dem Hintergrund der durch die Corona-Pandemie hervorgerufenen gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen untersucht dieser Bericht die Auswirkungen dieser Krise auf die allgemeine Bedrohungslage im Bereich der Cybersicherheit in den ersten beiden Quartalen des Jahres 2020. Der Bericht hebt hervor, dass die Corona-Pandemie eine Reihe von bemerkenswerten psycho-sozialen, technischen und logistisch-wirtschaftlichen Umständen geschaffen hat, aus denen bösartige Akteure Kapital geschlagen haben. Die für diesen Bericht durchgeführte Analyse der COVID-19-bedingten Cyberbedrohungen zeigt ein grosses Mass an Kontinuität im Bezug auf die Arten von Angriffen, die bedrohenden Akteure und das Ausmass der Angriffe. Das Verhalten der Angreifer hat sich jedoch in Bezug auf Umfang, Raffinesse, Ziele und Motivation verändert und weiterentwickelt. Basierende auf diesen Erkenntnissen hat dieser Bericht eine Reihe von Empfehlungen entwickelt, um die wichtigsten Auswirkungen der Pandemie auf die Cybersicherheit anzugehen

Lawyers as money laundering enablers? An evolving and contentious relationship

Using limited datasets and case studies drawn from the Global North and South, this article critically considers the available evidence about the involvement of lawyers in elite money laundering and attempts to control their involvement. In addition to lawyers’ lobbying and drafting laws , the normal focus of the ‘enablers’ discourse is on lawyers using expert knowledge and legal professional privilege/professional secrecy to facilitate frauds and to conceal the criminal origins of the funds of others. In few known laundering-for-others casesis there much evidence that lawyer assistance goes beyond doing their normal business: setting up constructions for clients that avoid external scrutiny is usually legal. It is implausible to fully resolve the extent to which lawyer ‘enablers’ are, respectively, naïve, negligent, wilfully blind and/or intentionally criminal. Within-firm supervision and both real and expected regulatory/criminal justice/reputational controls may have an impact, but the evidence base for assessing control effectiveness remains weak

Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures

In this updated edition of the well-established practitioner text, Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng have brought together a team of experts in the field to provide an exhaustive treatment of electronic evidence and electronic signatures. This fifth edition continues to follow the tradition in English evidence text books by basing the text on the law of England and Wales, with appropriate citations of relevant case law and legislation from other jurisdictions. Stephen Mason (of the Middle Temple, Barrister) is a leading authority on electronic evidence and electronic signatures, having advised global corporations and governments on these topics. He is also the editor of International Electronic Evidence (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008), and he founded the innovative international open access journal Digital Evidence and Electronic Signatures Law Review in 2004. Daniel Seng (Associate Professor, National University of Singapore) is the Director of the Centre for Technology, Robotics, AI and the Law (TRAIL). He teaches and researches information technology law and evidence law. Daniel was previously a partner and head of the technology practice at Messrs Rajah & Tann. He is also an active consultant to the World Intellectual Property Organization, where he has researched, delivered papers and published monographs on copyright exceptions for academic institutions, music copyright in the Asia Pacific and the liability of Internet intermediaries

Fear drop and fear change. Perceptions of security in the 21st century: their formation, trends, and impact in society

This thesis is an exploratory study of perceptions of security in the 21st century, the way they form and have developed in recent decades, as well as their impact in society. The study is rooted in the criminological sub-discipline of fear of crime studies, a research tradition that developed in the second half of the last century. At that time, the level of violent (street) and property crimes was rising in western societies, while public fear of this crime was thought to form a social problem in itself. The research tradition that developed yielded an extensive body of knowledge on, for instance, the operationalisation, measurement, and determinants of fear of crime, but remained less developed in theory formation and aspects such as development of fear of crime over time and its impact in society. From the last decade of the 20th century, in western societies the prevalence of ‘traditional’ crime decreased substantially (the ‘crime drop’), while the new millennium confronted these societies with new types of crime and related threats that shook the public (the ‘crime change’). The research tradition of fear of crime studies has not shown great agility in accommodating these changes, while these have made the need for a more thorough theoretical foundation even greater. Therefore, an exploratory exercise was undertaken that, based on a mix of empirical and conceptual studies and reviews of the literature, resulted in a process-oriented perspective on perceptions of security. This perspective is founded on an interdisciplinary theoretical base, in which notions from social-psychology (and stress-studies in particular) and complexity science form a major part. The study makes plausible that ‘new fears’ (such as fear of terrorism, cybercrime or even the corona pandemic) form in similar ways as ‘traditional’ fear of crime and yield similar ‘stone in the pond’ effects in society. These effects feed back into the process in which perceptions of security form, making this process circular by definition. The study also shows that, similar to what has been observed in the prevalence of crime, both a fear drop and a fear change can be observed in western societies: the prevalence of ‘traditional’ fear of crime decreased, while ‘new fears’ emerged and increased in prevalence