Beyond the Principles of Bioethics: Facing the Consequences of Fundamental Moral Disagreement

Given intractable secular moral pluralism, the force and significance of the four principles (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice) of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress must be critically re-considered. This essay examines the history of the articulation of these four principles of bioethics, showing why initially there was an illusion of a common morality that led many to hold that the principles could give guidance across cultures. But there is no one sense of the content or the theoretical justification of these principles. In addition, a wide range of secular moral and bioethical choices has been demoralized into lifestyle choices; the force of the secular moral point of view has also been deflated, thus compounding moral pluralism. It is the political generation of the principles that provides a common morality in the sense of an established morality. The principles are best understood as embedded not in a common morality, sensu stricto, but in that morality that is established at law and public policy in a particular polity. Although moral pluralism is substantive and intractable at the level of moral content, in a particular polity a particular morality and a particular bioethics can be established, regarding which health care ethics consultants can be experts. Public morality and bioethics are at their roots a political reality

Moral Autonomy as Political Analogy: Self-Legislation in Kant's 'Groundwork' and the 'Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law'

'Autonomy' is originally a political notion. In this chapter, I argue that the political theory Kant defended while he was writing the _Groundwork_ sheds light on the difficulties that are commonly associated with his account of moral autonomy. I argue that Kant's account of the two-tiered structure of political legislation, in his _Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law_, parallels his distinction between two levels of moral legislation, and that this helps to explain why Kant could regard the notion of 'autonomy' as apt to express the principle of morality---at least in the mid 1780s

Human Gene Patents and the Question of Liberal Morality

Since the establishment of the Human Genome Project and the identification of genes in human DNA that play a role in human diseases and disorders, a long, moral and political, battle has began over the extension of IPRs to information contained in human genetic material. According to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, over the past 20 years, large numbers of human genes have been the subject of thousands of patent applications. This paper examines whether human gene patents can be justified in terms of liberal theories of morality such as natural law, personality development, just reward and social utility. It is argued that human gene patents are in conflict with fundamental principles of liberal morality and justice because they result in “genetic information feudalism”

Derivation of Morality from Prudence

This chapter derives and refines a novel normative moral theory and descriptive theory of moral psychology--Rightness as Fairness--from the theory of prudence defended in Chapter 2. It briefly summarizes Chapter 2’s finding that prudent agents typically internalize ‘moral risk-aversion’. It then outlines how this prudential psychology leads prudent agents to want to know how to act in ways they will not regret in morally salient cases, as well as to regard moral actions as the only types of actions that satisfy this prudential interest. It then uses these findings to defend a new derivation of my (2016) theory of morality, Rightness as Fairness, showing how the derivation successfully defends Rightness as Fairness against a variety of objections. The chapter also details how this book’s theory helps to substantiate the claim that Rightness as Fairness unifies a variety of competing moral frameworks: deontology, consequentialism, contractualism, and virtue ethics. Finally, the chapter shows how Chapter 2’s theory of prudence entails some revisions to Rightness as Fairness, including the adoption of a series of Rawlsian original positions to settle moral and social-political issues under ideal and nonideal circumstances—thus entailing a unified normative and descriptive psychological framework for prudence, morality, and justice

Theo-Political Conspiracy Discourse in \u3cem\u3eThe Wanderer\u3c/em\u3e

This study undertakes an intensive analysis of The Wanderer, an ultra·conservative Catholic weekly newspaper. It is argued that con· spiracy discourse in The Wanderer provides a continuous series of god and devil terms that playoff one another as generic warrants authorizing a domino effect that solidifies an over·arching rhetorical vision, which ultimately affects the interpretation of U.S. Roman Catholic Church doctrine and its application to a number of contem· porary socio·political issues. Discowse emanating from this particular publication is representative of a paranoid style and provides a case study for tracing operant terms in an ongoing backlash movement

Management and its public: imagining management practices

This paper suggests that there is value in a conversation between science technology studies and management philosophy. In particular, the paper illustrates how a cocktail of two powerful forces in STS, actor network theory and public understanding of science, can serve to foreground aspects of management hitherto hidden. Actor network theorists persuasively demonstrate that contemporary experience involves human and non-human agents in material and heterogeneous practices. This position leads to a claim that we must increasingly learn to live in tension, as aspects of social life present themselves as full of open ended options that are come to rest either no-where or elsewhere. This paper examines such actor net work concerns through a discussion of agency and raises questions regarding relationships between managerial agency, epistemology of management and public understanding of management. In this context, publics are considered as a legitimate and powerful location through which notions of science and management are coproduced. A case is made for the value of fiction in actor net work studies of organisational behaviour by reference to literature of public understanding of science (PUS). PUS is rendered comparatively relevant here by reference to contextual parallels between science and management such as contemporary challenges to the singular naturalistic narrative, changing social status of disciplinary knowledge and contemporary governance and responsibility debates that impact on day to day practices. In making this comparison it is suggested that whilst it is not uncommon to find a mix of character traits in representations of the contingent and vulnerable human-scientist there is little space for either the vulnerable or heroic manager in popular culture. To close this discussion and offer a point of departure for further discussion this study playfully examines a particular popular fiction Eric (Faust) [Terry Pratchett 1990]. Using material from this fiction, management is reframed in terms of resonance, public understanding of business management and coproduction processes. Finally, this study stops and turns to its readers to continue imaging management and its public

Distinguishing Justifications From Excuses

Ann swings her arm and injures Ben. She faces moral condemnation and legal liability unless she can offer an explanation that absolves her of full blame. She might make a claim of justification that, despite initial appearances, her action was desirable or proper, or she might make a claim of excuse that she does not bear full responsibility for injuring Ben. If Ann is fully justified, she will not be subject to blame or to classification as a weak or defective person. If Ann is excused, she may be regarded as wholly or partly free of blame, but she will have demonstrated weakness or some defect. Because the moral evaluation of a justified actor differs from the moral evaluation of an excused actor, deciding whether Ann is justified or excused is an important moral question. In the legal context, a defendant who successfully establishes the legal Analogue of a moral justification or excuse is typically relieved of liability. Because of the injury to Ben, it is likely that Ann will be prosecuted for assault, which is defined as purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another. Nevertheless, Ann may offer an exonerating explanation that precludes satisfaction of the basic elements of the crime or that, conceding the presence of the basic elements, precludes liability on other grounds. In modern American criminal law the terms justification and excuse only refer to the second kind of explanation – that is, they concede the presence of the basic elements but deny liability on independent grounds. If Ann acknowledges that she intentionally hit Ben but did so to prevent him from detonating a bomb, she offers a justification; if she says that she decided to hit him because she was insane, she offers an excuse. There are other explanations that exonerate an actor from liability because they preclude satisfaction of the basic elements of a crime. These explanations are similar to justifications or excuses but are not labelled as such by the law. If Ann says she had to take the risk that her swinging arm would injure Ben in order to protect Carol from David\u27s deadly attack, she effectively denies that her actions were reckless, since recklessness involves the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. If Ann says she was flailing her arms for dramatic effect, unaware that Ben was standing close by, she denies the minimal culpability requirement of conscious risk-taking. In admitting clumsiness, Ann removes her actions from the ambit of assault. As J.L. Austin noted in A Plea for Excuses, [when] I have broken your dish... maybe the best defense that I can find will be clumsiness. The second half of this article notes that many exonerating explanations that look like justifications and excuses concern the basic elements of offenses and explains why this fact bears strongly on the expectations one should have from the legal system in distinguishing justifications from excuses more narrowly understood

The construction of identities in narratives about serious leisure occupations

Engagement in occupation contributes to the shaping of identity throughout the human life. The act of telling about such engagement involves interaction based on symbolic meaning; the speaker constructing an identity by conveying how the occupation is personally meaningful. This study explored meaning in narratives told by people who engage in serious leisure occupations. A total of 78 narratives were extracted from interviews with 17 people who invest considerable time and other resources into their leisure. Analysis focused on the content, structure and performance of each narrative in order to explore meaning. The meanings were organised into a framework based around three dimensions: the located self, the active self and the changing self. Each dimension has facets that the individual might emphasise, constructing a unique identity. The framework offers a structured basis for conceptualising how occupation contributes to the shaping of the internalised self and the socially situated identity